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Abstract
A Comparative Case Study of the Irish PPP policy and the correlation
that exists with UK PFI Policies
This research attempts to examine the previous pathway and current state of play
in relation to the Irish PPP policy. Commentators have identified that the origins and
progression of the Irish PPP programme can be traced back to the UK PFI (PPP)
policy. The focus of this study is to examine the relationship, notably ‘the correlation’
that exists between both the Irish PPP and the UK PFI policies. In doing so we examine
the components of both policies to try to ascertain what drove Ireland and the UK to
introduce such measures, alongside the subsequent amendments that were deemed
necessary. In addition, we attempt to understand what incentivises the state to engage
in this form of procurement and to acknowledge the element of change that is occurring
within that landscape. Our focus is centred upon the Economic, Legal, and Public
Policy perspectives and how each element retains an influence over that process. In
doing so we identify that the Irish authorities developed an astuteness ‘a niche
approach’ towards the class of investment that it was willing to invest in as part of its
national procurement plan; however, as the findings suggest, this was alluded to during
the negotiations surrounding the NBP. In contrast, the approach taken by the Irish
authorities appears to counteract the actions of the UK government who regarded the
offerings of PFI as a panacea, regardless of the cost. As a consequence of which, the
then UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond announced in October 2018,
that the UK would no longer engage in PFI on the basis that the policy had become
untenable. As a consequence of the UK’s departure from the EU, Ireland is now facing
an uncertain future in relation to its reliance upon UK case law ‘legal precedent’; as
means of addressing challenges made against its procurement decisions. From a public
policy perspective, we expose the influence of the Department of Finance upon the
decision-making process, alongside the homogenisation that has evolved between the
EIB, the NTMA, and the NFDA. We conclude this study by reaching a determination,
as to where this policy now sits as a component of the public procurement regime.
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Abbreviations Table
PPP’s

Public private partnerships

PFI

Public Finance Initiative

3P’s

Public Private Partnership (North American term)

VFM

Value for Money

EU

European Union

NPM

New Public Management

PSB

Public Sector Benchmark

NDFA

The National Development Finance Agency

PB

Preferred Bidder

SA

Sponsoring Agency

TII

Transport Infrastructure Ireland

NDP

National Development Plan

SMI

Strategic Management Initiative

C&AG

Comptroller and Auditor General

PAC

Public Accounts Committee

GFC

Global Financial Crisis

IBEC

Irish Business and Employers Confederation

CIF

Construction Industry Federation

NESC

National Economic and Social Council

WACC

Weighted Average Cost of Capital

ELA

Emergency Lending Assistance

ECB

European Central Bank

EIB

European Investment Bank

ELA

Emergency Lending Assistance

SPV

Special Purpose Vehicle

NPRF

National Pension Reserve Fund

ISIF

Irish Strategic Investment Fund

NAFTA

North American Free Trade Area

EEA

European Economic Area

WTO

World Trade Organisation

GPA

Government Procurement Agreement
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Glossary
Supranational Organisation

An

autonomous

regulatory

power

acting

independently of national or intergovernmental
control, an example being the European Union
(Lindseth, 2015).
Unitary Payment

A monetary payment “consideration” that is
given in the form of an instalment over the
duration of the PPP contract term.

Social Partners

A representative group, including Employers,
Unions

and

Government,

engaged

in

a

cooperative working relationship for the benefit
of all stakeholders.
Troika

A collective term for the following institutions:
the European Central Bank, the European
Commission and the International Monetary
Fund.

Monoline Underwriters

Bond insurers, a financial loan guarantee, relating to
the principal and interest cover of private sector PPP
debt finance.

Weighted Average Cost of

A calculation to determine the average cost or

Capital

rate of capital (borrowings), that are sourced
from a blend of either debt or equity.

Soft Services

Services provided by the private sector, over the
course of the contract, to manage, maintain, clean
and service the PPP asset on behalf of the state.

Contracting Authority

State, Regional or Local Authorities delegated to enter
into procurement contracts on behalf of the state.
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Chapter One: Introduction
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1.1 Introduction
While a significant amount of research has been conducted into the different
aspects pertaining to the Irish PPP policy, including its relationship with the UK. The
objective of this study is to conduct a comparative analysis of the role that PPP has
occupied, as component of the state’s public procurement policy. Insofar as we seek
to identify the rationale behind its introduction, to determine if influence played a part
in that decision and from where that influence stemmed from. To achieve this we will
examine in close detail both the Irish PPP and the UK PFI policies, to identify any
similarities and traits that exist between both jurisdictions. In this regard the literature
has failed to make such a comparison. Reeves (2015) evaluates the experience to-date
of the Irish PPP programme and identifies that the literature thus far, has maintained a
focus on individual aspects pertaining to the policy. This study also attempts to identify
why Ireland converges with and subsequently diverges away from the UK policy. To
achieve this we will utilise policy transfer theory and apply the framework of Dolowitz
and Marsh to determine the future direction of both policies (Dolowitz and Marsh,
2000; Stone, 2012).
The literature to-date has sought to identify why Ireland adopted the measures
of the UK and under what coercive conditions (Comptroller and Auditor General,
2004; Sheppard and Beck, 2016). Connolly et al. (2009) identify that there is substance
in the argument, that isomorphism played a part in that decision. However, in light of
the announcement by the British government in October 2018, that on the grounds that
the PFI had become problematic, it would refrain from any further use of policy with
immediate effect; yet in the same instance the Irish authorities announced their
continued support for the retention of the states PPP programme. It is these events that
form the basis for the arguments that this study seeks to address. Insofar as, it seeks to
expand on the current literature by identifying the cause of divergence that has become
evident between both jurisdictions. Amid a changing landscape, we conclude by
identifying what favours the use of PPP above traditionally procurement and
furthermore, we identify from a Legal, Financial and Political perspective, where PPP
is now positioned within the confines of the public procurement regime.
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1.2 Background to the research
When the Public Private Partnership (PPP) was first introduced in 1999, as part
of the state’s public procurement policy; it was a rather seamless and low-key event,
facing little or no opposition from the social partners, the private sector or from the
opponents of the government (Reeves, 2015). The literature identifies that the decision
to do so was largely at the behest of the government of the day, who sought to replicate
the policy of its nearest neighbor in an attempt to expedite the introduction process
(Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). While the initial plans for the PPP programme were seen
as ambitious (Duggan, 2013), it was somewhat restrained by the need to introduce
legislation to administer and bring structure to the policy (Petersen, 2011). Once the
necessary structures were in-situ the government had envisaged that in the intervening
period between 2008 and 2012, PPP was capable of delivering 16% of the state’s
infrastructure requirements (Reeves, 2013). However, as a consequence of the 2008
financial crisis the programme of investments came to an immediate halt, the only
remaining activity was attributed to those projects already under construction. In an
attempt to revive the stalled PPP policy and to further rejuvenate the construction
sector, the government introduced a stimulus package in 2012; the focus of which was
centered around a series of PPP backed investments. As a means of gaining private
sector support for the package, the government also introduced a series of measures to
enhance the policy, the core of which resembled similar changes that had been
previously introduced under the UK Public Finance Initiative (PFI) policy. In the
intervening period the Irish PPP policy regained its position as part of the
government’s approach to public procurement. In contrast, the UK government
announced in October 2018 that it was abandoning any further use of PFI (PPP) as a
procurement option. Due in most part to the growth in political and public sentiment
that the policy had begun to attract. In the same instance we are able to identify that
the Irish authorities had announced their intention to retain the Irish policy.

1.5 The structure of the thesis
This thesis is comprised of eight chapters, we commence with this chapter “the
Introduction” and subsequently present the remaining seven chapters:
In Chapter Two we introduce the literature surrounding the origins of PPP and
where the seeds for its introduction had originated from. We discover that at the time
3

when the policy was first introduced, growth in the Irish economy was being restricted
by an acute deficit in capital infrastructure. In the same period, the government was
faced with a depletion in EU cohesion funding, the spending restrictions imposed by
the Maastricht Treaty and an exchequer surplus of 3%. This chapter also identifies that
once adopted, the Irish authorities had demonstrated a willingness to utilise the
framework of the UK PFI policy to administer the Irish PPP programme (Comptroller
and Auditor General, 2004). In addition, we demonstrate, that to a lesser extent, the
Irish policy encountered similar problems to that of the UK programme; notably,
concerns in relation to transparency, disclosure and the ability to demonstrate value
for money. We progress through to the impact of the financial crisis and the subsequent
effect that this imposed upon the PPP programme. We identify the measures that were
introduced to rejuvenate the policy, notably the 2012 stimulus package and how those
amendments bore a resemblance to changes that were introduced to the UK PFI policy.
This chapter also charts the subsequent return and future course of the Irish PPP
programme, alongside the demise of the UK policy, and the ultimate decision that was
taken in October 2018 to abandon that policy. It was the culmination of these events
that identified the current gap in the literature and the subsequent formation of three
research questions that seek to substantiate these arguments.
In Chapter Three we present our chosen theoretical framework “Policy Transfer
Theory” as the mechanism that will steer this study to its conclusion. The theoretical
framework enables the researcher to best explain the concept that the research seeks
to address. Relevant to this study, the framework of Dolowitz and Marsh has been
adopted to best explain the phenomenon, that a policy that originates in one
jurisdiction can and often is, replicated in another (Stone, 2012).
Chapter Four introduces the necessary methods that were adopted to conduct this
research. It identifies that by engaging in the relevant research design, a unified
approach could be taken to compose the appropriate research questions. To then apply
the relevant theory, to gather, analyse and report on the discoveries of this study. We
acknowledge that as a qualitative study it was necessary to engage in a comparative
case study, desk research and semi-structured interviews as a means of gathering our
primary and secondary data. In an attempt to decipher the content of such data we
utilised the framework of Braun and Clarke to reach our determinations.
4

Chapter Five addresses the first of our research questions, in which we identify
the common traits and the similarities that exist between the Irish PPP and the UK PFI
policies. In addition, we also give consideration to the amendments that were
introduced over the intervening periods. In doing so, we recount the introduction of
the Irish policy, including the necessary legislation and reforms that were required to
facilitate the introduction of this policy. We undertake this task by probing each
jurisdiction under the following themes: Finance, Risk and Transparency, The stages
of the Procurement Process, Budgetary controls, and the interaction between the
various stakeholder groups engaged in the PPP/PFI process. We subsequently present
our discoveries by identifying where both jurisdictions align with and subsequently
diverge away from each other.
In Chapter Six, a determination is given in respect of research question two.
Insofar as we explore the relationship that exists between both jurisdictions, from the
initial inception of the Irish policy, through to the UK Chancellor Philip Hammond’s
decision in October 2018, to abandon any further use of PFI as a method of
procurement. We study the timeline of events, from the initial introduction, and the
subsequent progression of the Irish PPP policy and in doing so we try to understand
what drove the government’s decision “in-part” to replicate the UK policy. To
demonstrate this we utilise policy transfer theory to probe both policies and to make a
judgement call to determine if the decisions taken were made in a voluntary or coercive
capacity. This chapter concludes by identifying the signs of divergence that were
identified between both jurisdictions and how in the same period, the Irish government
announced plans to retain the use of PPP as a measure to be adopted in times of fiscal
restraint.
In Chapter Seven consideration is given to our final research question, in which
we seek to evaluate the past present and future determinants that favour the use of PPP
above traditional procurement. To provide an answer to this argument, we explore the
contributions of those individuals engaged in the process, notably from an Economic,
Legal, and Public Policy perspective; to determine how we position PPP as a
component of the public procurement regime. To achieve this we will engage in a
thematic analysis process to capture and best present the viewpoints of the participants
who engaged in this study and ultimately deliver on our findings.
5

In Chapter Eight, we bring this study to a close and in doing so we present our
conclusions and recommendations, the product of this research. We summarise each
of our three research questions and outline the contribution that each has made to the
existing literature. The limitations that were inherent to this study are also discussed,
in addition to areas of interest that may form the basis of future studies.

6

Chapter Two: Literature Review

7

2.1 Introduction
This chapter begins by tracing the origins of what has subsequently become
known as the Public Private Partnership (PPP), in doing so we identify the collective
influence of Reaganism, Thatcherism, Privatisation and the subsequent role played by
New Public Management (NPM). An insight is given to the characteristics, the
definitions and the many forms in which PPP presents itself, including the benefits and
problems that have become associated with the policy. We also demonstrate that the
introduction of the UK PFI policy in 1992, wielded influence over the Irish
government’s decision to champion the implementation of a similar policy in 1999.
The indications at the time suggest that although the Irish economy was experiencing
a phase in growth, it was also faced with an acute deficit in capital infrastructure to
meet such demands. In addition, the government’s borrowing capacity to address the
situation, was restricted as a consequence of the Maastricht convergence criteria.
Parallel to this, the government was also facing a depletion in EU cohesion funding
and an exchequer surplus of 3%. We explore the impact upon PPP during the financial
crisis, the influence of the Troika, and the subsequent steps taken by the government
to rejuvenate the policy as part of the 2012 stimulus package. We acknowledge the
revival and restructuring of the Irish policy, alongside the decision of the UK
government in October 2018 to refrain from further engaging in the policy. Ultimately,
we present the research questions to address the gaps that were identified in the
literature.

2.2 The Introduction of the Public Private Partnership
The term Public Private Partnership, from the Latin Publicae Privatus Societate,
has been in existence for over 2000 years. The initial concept was embraced by the
Roman elite, who invested their private wealth in Roman Empire infrastructure,
namely road construction and public baths. A variation of this model continues in use
into the early part of the 21st century (Platz et al., 2016). A review of the literature
reveals that there are numerous terms and definitions pertaining to PPP, particularly
when viewed from the perspective of function and country. The evolution of such
terms has been created by governments and policymaking organisations. PPPs are
defined by a long-term agreement between two parties, based on contractual
arrangements where consideration is given in the form of instalments, referred to as
unitary payments (Australian Government, 2008; Comptroller and Auditor General,
8

2004). The payment of a unitary charge is seen as a reimbursement to the private sector
to cover its initial capital outlay, in addition to the interest and funding cost associated
with the proposal. The provision of maintenance and service costs is also included
within the payment structure (European PPP Expertise Centre, 2012c). The make-up
of this exchange is calculated by applying an internal rate of return (the expected
private sector profit) in addition to an estimated payment to cover the risk that is
attaching to the project “the life cycle cost”. Collectively this figure is then subjected
to a discounted cash flow (Committee of Public Accounts, 2007). Or in layman’s terms
“the time value of money”, what I need to set aside now to cover a payment in the
future, calculated by applying the Net Present Value (NPV) (EIB, 2010; Reeves,
2013a). Ownership of the asset is subsequently transferred to the government on
completion of the unitary payment schedule, typically over a 25 year period (Hurst
and Reeves, 2004; IBEC, 2006). Despite a global uptake in its use, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) has stated that there is no clear agreement on what does and
what does not constitute a PPP (International Monetary Fund, 2004). For the purpose
of this research the definition adopted by the Oireachtas (2018a) will be applied
throughout this study:
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are partnerships between the public and
private sectors for the purpose of delivering a project or service
traditionally provided by the public sector. (Oireachtas, 2018a).
PPP was introduced into the UK in the early 1990s as an alternative to its then
public-sector spending policy and as a method of attracting private sector investment.
This was facilitated by the government’s decision in 1989 to revoke the ‘Ryrie Rules’,
which had effectively put a stay on the use of private sector finance to fund public
sector investments (HM Treasury, 2018a). This formed part of the New Public
Management (NPM) model, whereby private sector business practices were adopted
by the public sector administrations (Hood, 1991). Simonet (2013) suggests that the
NPM movement had drawn influence from the political reforms implemented during
the reign of the Reagan and Thatcher governments, a decade or so earlier. During his
inaugural address, President Ronald Reagan highlighted his intent to bring reform and
change to the broken administration practices of the previous administrations:

9

In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem;
government is the problem...(Library of Congress, 1981).
Once in power, Reagan’s government introduced major tax reforms, gaining the
immediate support of the private sector. In addition, it also instigated a policy of
retrenchment towards government spending by reducing many of the state-funded
welfare programmes (Bovens et al., 2006). At the time when Reagan came to power,
the US was entering a period of recession (Bernanke, 2009). The backdrop of the
downturn, provided cover for the Reagan administration to introduce measures which
had the ultimate aim of “shrinking the state” (Lee and Strang, 2006). Running
counterpart to this, government military spending had escalated as a consequence of
the cold-war (Bovens et al., 2006). The measures adopted by the then-Republican
administration would later be termed “Reaganomics” (Kitsos, 2015). When Reagan’s
government entered into its second term in office, the emphasis of the administration
had switched to the privatisation of state assets (Edwards, 2017). The purpose of which
sought to reduce the national debt from the proceeds of the sell-off. In addition it also
attempted to instil competition into the wider economy, based on the assumption that
the capacity of the private sector is more efficient than the public sector (Tingle, 1988).
The uptake of this strategy was inspired by the policies of the then UK Prime Minister
and Reagan ally, Margaret Thatcher (Lee and Strang, 2006). Although the Reagan
administration had little success in creating a movement towards privatisation, it paved
the way for others to follow, eventually gaining ground under the Clinton
administration (Edwards, 2017).
In comparison, the reform strategy of the Thatcher led government is said to
have gained a stronger footing. When the MP for Finchley first came to power in 1979,
Margaret Thatcher sought to reduce the expenditure and inefficiencies attributed to the
provision of public sector services (Simonet, 2013). In doing so it replaced the
Keynesian economic approach which favoured state funded intervention; in return for
a neo-liberalism approach of free-market capitalism (Vries, 2010b). In the decade that
followed the conservatives implemented a privatisation policy that included the selloff of British Gas, British Airlines, British Steel and British Rail. Although initiated
under the reign of Margaret Thatcher in 1987, the privatisation of British Rail was
subsequently concluded in 1992 under the government of John Major (Edwards, 2017;
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Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2015). The prime minister
placed deregulation, privatisation and managerialism as the key reforms of the
conservative agenda (Lee and Strang, 2006). The Thatcher leadership period had a
turbulent tenure, as part of her reform package she also sought to reign in the control
of the trade unions, in addition to introducing the controversial “poll-tax” (Bovens et
al., 2006).
Initially phrased by Christopher Hood in his article “A Public Management For
All Seasons” the term New Public Management (NPM) came into being (Greve,
2010). Hood’s paper recaptured the recent history surrounding the movement in the
UK towards the reform of its public administration policies (Hood, 1991). The
introduction of NPM provided the opportunity for collaboration between the
government and the private sector, to drive reform and bring radical change to the
public sector administration process (English, 2006). NPM reform measures typically
included the introduction of performance management, privatisation and contracting
out in addition to flexible employment options. NPM has been attributed to delivering
value for money, achieved through outsourcing and privatisation. Effective delivery
of services can be attributed to the control over quantity, quality and cost of providing
such services (English, 2006). However, in some instances, NPM has failed to deliver
on efficiency gains, where staffing levels have increased in relation to support services,
despite the overall objective of NPM to deliver efficiency over effectiveness (Vries,
2010a). The introduction of NPM also necessitated changes to both public sector
accounting and marketing strategies. The necessity to do so was attributed to the
adoption of new working arrangements and to disseminate the message of change. It
also resulted in the generation of hybrid organisations, to deliver the message for both
public and private sector bodies (Demirag et al., 2017). PPPs are part of NPM, an
agenda for change in the way public services are provided. There is evidence to suggest
that the uptake in PPP was supported in part by the introduction of NPM, as
governments sought to address an alternative to the existing policy model (Broadbent
and Laughlin, 2003). It is suggested that NPM was more akin to the transfer of an
ideology, that later went on to lay the groundwork for the creation of newer policies
(Bovens et al., 2006). In response to the claims of Bovens et al. (2006), in chapter six
of this study an attempt will be made to determine, why a policy that originates in one
jurisdiction can subsequently be replicated in another.
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Private Finance Initiatives (PFI), are a form of PPP, and were introduced in 1992
by the conservative government of the day under the leadership of John Major. It was
adopted as a procurement method in health, defence, transport and education (Hodge
and Greve 2010). The original objective of PFIs in the UK was to reduce the public
sector borrowing requirement. However, when Labour came into power in 1997, the
emphasis shifted towards the achievement of Value For Money (VFM) (Connolly and
Wall, 2008; Broadbent, 2003). NPM has also identified changes relating to the balance
of power between economic theories. It has been suggested that NPM is in part a
product that has evolved as governments attempted to move away from the Keynesian
school of economics (Vries, 2010a). The diffusion of NPM gained global traction
extending to Australia, New Zealand and North America, as well as Ireland and the
UK (Broadbent, 2003; Boyle, 2014; Vries, 2010). The NPM agenda was driven by
introducing efficiency and reform into a costly bureaucratic structure model (Dewulf
et al., 2011). The UK closely followed the Canadian model with regards to the
influence of NPM across its procurement regime, in doing so it allowed for the
administration of centralised procurement units, to be operated by commercial experts.
The Canadian model of procurement is credited with reduced duplication and
repetition, and retains a clear focus on delivery (HM Treasury, 2012). In essence,
Ireland closely followed the UK application of NPM, in relation to the administration
of its public procurement policy (Reeves, 2015).
NPM began to gain traction into the Irish public service sector in 1994, and was
further strengthened by the introduction of the Public Service Management Act 1997,
which brought about further changes (Hardiman, 2008). The first wave of NPM came
in the form of the Strategic Management Initiative (SMI), introduced to bring reform
into the Irish public services sector (MacCarthaigh, 2012). The launch of the SMI
sought to instil efficiency and clarity to the process of national government. The
objectives of the SMI would subsequently be implemented through the Delivering
Better Government (DBG) programme, administered under the offices of the relevant
secretaries-general (Boyle, 2013). The key objective of the SMI favoured the
introduction of rules and to implement a cultural shift, away from the existing structure
(OECD, 2001). There has been an established precedent that Irish government policy
has followed closely in the footsteps of UK policy reforms. However, in the case of
NPM, there was limited uptake of the policy, furthermore, it had limited effect
12

(Hardiman and MacCarthaigh, 2016). The initial introduction of NPM was
problematic and was opposed by some organisations, that were set against the
implementation of new working arrangements and techniques (Robbins, 2007). Public
sector bodies in Ireland were at first hesitant to adopt the NPM reforms. In the decade
prior to the implementation, the public sector had experienced a growth in employment
numbers and remuneration (Hardiman and MacCarthaigh, 2016). In fact, NPM was
never a source of radical reform in Ireland, there was cherry-picking at play, and
further evidence of incremental change (Hardiman and MacCarthaigh, 2008). In
context, Ireland was a late adapter to the concept of NPM; it came several years after
New Zealand, the UK and Canada had engaged in their NPM initiatives (Boyle,
2014b). NPM became a brand and those countries that had initially embraced it, have
since started to retreat from it. (Hardiman and MacCarthaigh, 2008; cited Bozeman,
2007):
NPM

has

become

a

brand,

one

signifying

market-oriented

governance…The countries most closely associated with NPM are moving
away from it (Hardiman, 2008; cited Bozeman, 2007).
The following paragraphs outline the various definitions and descriptions of
PPP, that are derived from the literature. The diffusion of PPP has also resulted in an
array of definitions that are attached to different jurisdictions. PPP is also defined by
its partnership arrangements, as outlined in (Appendix B and C). This also includes a
contribution from those supranational organisations (see glossary) engaged in the PPP
process, for example the IMF, European Investment Bank (EIB) and the World Bank
(WB) (see Appendix A). The common thread exists among these organisations, in that
they promote the use of private finance to co-invest in PPP procurement (Hellowell,
2012). Ireland and the UK have similar definitions of PPP, early UK definitions
describe the invitation extended to the private sector to design and build infrastructure
in receipt of payments from the government. This is similar to the definition set forth
by the Irish government, which states how the private sector will design, plan,
construct and finance infrastructure on behalf of the public sector (UK Parliament,
1992; Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). In Ireland, PPP is referred to as Public Private
Arrangement, often associated with Urban Renewal Schemes or Procurement Process
(Reeves, 2011; Gov.UK, 2013). In the UK for example, when first introduced by the
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UK Chancellor, Norman Lamont in the Autumn Statement of 1992, the policy
description given to the UK interpretation of PPP, was that of Private Finance Initiative
(PFI) (UK Parliament, 2008; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, 2015). By 2008 a shift in the UK definition highlighted the differences
between PFI and PPP. Although similarities exist, PFI is ultimately a financing
mechanism by which to fund, design, build and operate UK public infrastructure (The
UK NAO, 2011). PPP on the other hand, facilitates a wider range of collaborative
arrangements, including outsourcing, concession arrangements (a user fee or toll
payment) and joint ventures (UK Parliament, 2008; Dewulf et al., 2011).
In 2012 the UK government sought amendments to the PFI model, and in doing
so redefined and re-branded the policy terms as Private Finance 2 (PF2) (Demirag et
al., 2015; European PPP Expertise Centre, 2015; HM Treasury, 2012; NDFA, 2013).
PF2 is the successor to PFI and was first introduced in December 2012. Although
similar to PFI it was amended to address concerns relating to transparency, a drawnout procurement process, inflexibility and the opportunity to increase the
government’s equity stake in future PF2 proposals (HM Treasury, 2018b). In
opposition to the UK definition, it is suggested that there is no definitive term to
categories the elements of what does or does not constitute a PPP. Furthermore, the
definition applied to the UK model is closely aligned to the OECD’s definition of PPP.
Both share the view that a PPP is a contractual arrangement between both the public
and private sectors, to engage in the provision of a financial and risk-sharing
arrangement (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2015; World
Bank, 2016; International Monetary Fund, 2004). In the interim period the UK
government extended the PFI model to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, however
it subsequently transcribed that both Scotland and Wales opted to introduced diluted
variations of the PFI policy model. Scotland established the non-profit distributing
(NPD)

model

and

the

Welsh

national

assembly

initiated

the

Mutual

Investment Model (MIM) (HM Treasury, 2012; Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 2015; Welsh Government, 2017). In effect, while both
nations implemented variations of the English PFI model, they are more aligned to the
structure and form of PPP (European PPP Expertise Centre, 2012b).
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Looking beyond Ireland and the UK there are many international definitions of
PPP, some of which are outlined in (Appendix A). The term PPP is also applied to the
Australian model of public private procurement, which is largely based on the UK PFI
model (English, 2006; McCann, et al., 2015). A key objective of PPP in Australia is
to deliver value for money, based on an evaluative assessment of the private sector
proposal (Australian Government, 2008). Throughout North America both the US and
Canada apply the phrase P3, an abbreviation of the term ‘public private partnership’.
The literature states that, P3 and PPP describe identical delivery methods (Little,
2011;Vining and Boardman, 2008; Himmel and Siemiatycki, 2017; International
Monetary Fund, 2004; Dewulf et al., 2011). The US definition uses the term P3 to
describe a collaboration between any government department and one or more private
actors in the pursuit of public objectives. In comparison, the definition for the
Canadian P3 model suggests that it is a long term performance-based contract to
deliver public infrastructure (Erie et al., 2010; Garvin and Bosso, 2008) (see Appendix
A).
PPPs are also defined by their partnership arrangements and are described as
being similar in nature to that of an operating lease agreement. This is created when
the private sector (lessor) and the public sector (lessee), enter into a legally binding
agreement, in return for access to a bespoke piece of infrastructure or service
requirement (Department Of Finance 2006; House of Commons Treasury Committee,
2011). The resulting cost is measured as a monthly, quarterly or annual expense, in
recognition for the unitary payments made by the exchequer. PPPs can also be defined
by the type of PPP, and are commonly described as Design, Build and Operate (DBO),
Design, Build and Finance (DBF), Design, Build, Finance and Maintain (DBFM)
(Hearne 2009; HM Treasury 2012; The Comptroller and Auditor General 2004) (see
Appendix B). The contractual structure relating to the Australian PPP model, applies
terms such as BOT (build-own-transfer) and BOOT (build-own-operate-transfer)
(Hodge and Greve, 2007; International Monetary Fund, 2004) (see Appendix C). A
similar typology of private public partnerships exists in Canada and the US with BOT
(Build Operate Transfer), DBFO (Design Build Finance Operate) and BOO (Build
Own Operate) (Siemiatycki, 2006; International Monetary Fund, 2004) (see Appendix
C). With such a variety of terms and acronyms, an element of ambiguity is introduced
when applying a concise definition for a Public Private Partnership (Miraftab, 2004;
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Hodge and Greve, 2017; European Investment Bank, 2005). For the purpose of this
research, PPP is believed to be an arrangement between a contracting authority (the
public) and a private sector consortium, acting on behalf of the state, to finance, build
and operate a bespoke piece of infrastructure over an average contractual period of
25 years, in return for a standard monthly unitary payment paid over the duration of
the contract.

2.3 The benefits and problems of Public Private Partnership
PPPs are a cooperative arrangement where both parties are jointly committed to
developing a product or services (World Bank, 2017). The literature has drawn
attention to the benefits but also the problems relating to this policy. PPPs provide an
alternative option to the state, as a means of bypassing the financial challenges
associated with the traditional procurement (Wall, 2009; Jasiukevicius and
Vasiliauskaite, 2013, Hodge, 2011; Reeves, 2013). The justification for PPP lies with
the fact that it provides value for money and in doing so they are perceived as being
efficient (Reeves and Palcic, 2017). Affordability is not the only reason for the
government to engage in PPP. It provides for the transfer of risk to the entity best able
to manage such risk. Additionally, it increases competition and offers access to private
sector efficiencies (NDFA, 2013b; International Monetary Fund, 2017).
There is evidence to suggest that PPP procurement can deliver VFM efficiencies,
by providing on budget and timely infrastructure (Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 2015). VFM can be achieved by means of standardised
contracting, and the allocation of risk to the party best able to manage such risk over
the duration of the contract. This can help to alleviate the over-inflation of the “risk
rate” that is calculated into the costs of each PPP proposal (European PPP Expertise
Centre, 2012c). When evaluating a PPP as an alternative procurement option, the key
components are a comparison of the lifecycle and risk costs associated with the
proposal (The US Dept. of Transport, 2011). The transfer of risk from the public to the
private sector, has driven the private sector to seek efficiencies that help avoid overruns which are a factor associated with traditional procurement (Nisar, 2007). The role
played by the EIB as a source of lower margin PPP finance, can also provide VFM
efficiencies over the traditional sourced finances (Reeves, 2015). To determine that a
PPP contract offers VFM, it must ascertain that the benefits associated with the transfer
16

of risk, exceed the additional finance cost. To the forefront of all procurement
decisions, VFM is a consideration that should be continuously assessed by the
sponsoring agency (NDFA, 2007; The UK NAO, 2011).
VFM is achieved in PPP through the efficiencies generated by the private sector.
PPPs are therefore said to create relationships between the government and the private
sector (Melville, 2016; NDFA, 2007; NDFA, 2013b; International Monetary Fund,
2017). This allows for the creation of best practice and the establishment of centralised
PPP procurement units that supports the culture of learning from past experiences
(Melville, 2016; NDFA, 2013a; European PPP Expertise Centre, 2012). When
collaborations are formed between the public and private sectors, it enables skills to
be shared and developed, particularly in the areas relating to finance, construction and
operations. Efficiencies can also be achieved by the private sector identifying
innovative methods of delivery that would otherwise have been bypassed under
traditional methods (Treasury NSW, 2017). PPPs have promoted the delivery and
advancement of alternative infrastructure, namely in the renewable energy and waste
management sectors (NDFA, 2015; The UK NAO, 2011; Hellowell, 2012).
VFM is achieved as PPP allows for the implication of risk to transfer to the
private sector, by helping to avoid costly overruns that have become associated with
traditional procurement (Australian Gov., 2015; DPER, 2013; NDFA, 2015;
Oireachtas, 2019b; Reeves, 2013a). A demonstration to this extent was evident during
the collapse of the Carillion group, whereby the government’s exposure to financial
risk was kept at a minimum, with the private sector retaining full responsibility
(Oireachtas, 2018a). Risk transfer arrangements are applied by identifying the
leveraging strength of each partner and their ability to maintain and manage that risk
(Siemiatycki, 2015). For example, the UK and Ireland are willing to absorb some risks
in relation to PPP, in return for certainty over construction costs and the removal of
inefficient overruns (The UK NAO, 2018; Petersen, 2011; Klijn, 2003). The pursuit of
VFM includes both financial benefits but also non-financial advantages (Treasury
NSW, 2017). The argument in support of this claim identifies that PPP can lead to
increased social enrichment, as it provides the infrastructure that delivers and promotes
social cohesion (Duggan, 2013; NDFA, 2013). It has been further identified that in
times of fiscal restraint, PPP can continue to deliver social housing and educational
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infrastructure, when the government is curtailed from doing so (Oireachtas, 2018a).
O’shea et al. (2019) identifies that when like-for-like conditions exist, there is no
distinction between both the traditional and PPP procurement periods, the author
further adds, that the attraction for the government to engage in the policy, is driven
by its ability to circumvent a borrowing restriction (O’shea et al., 2019).
In areas where the private sector fails or is unwilling to invest in social
infrastructure, PPP procurement can provide an alternative solution to that problem
(CIF, 2017). PPP is said to be an effective response for governments seeking to find a
solution to such impasses (Burke and Demirag, 2015). Despite this, social cohesion
can be compromised by the imbalance of scrutiny and the failure to apportion the
appropriate level of risk upon the private sector (Reeves, 2013). This was reiterated by
Deputy Joe Costello during a Dáil debate in 2008. When it was identified that the
proposed plans of Dublin City Council to regenerate part of its housing stock, had
failed to materialise, due to the decision of the preferred tenderer Bernard McNamara,
to withdraw from the process on the grounds that it was no longer viable to proceed
with the development. As a result of which, five PPP contracts valued in excess of €1
billion were either postponed or in part canceled. This prompted Deputy Costello to
call for a Private Members’ Motion to seek the introduction of legislation, to imposed
penalties upon those who failed to adhere to the terms of the PPP agreement.
Furthermore, Deputy Costello gave an account to the House, of the hardship that had
been imposed upon the community as a result of this collapse (Oireachtas, 2008a).
The Committee of Public Accounts has been persistent in drawing attention to
the issue of transparency that surrounds the Irish PPP policy (Reeves, 2013; Duggan,
2013; Hearne, 2009; Committee of Public Accounts, 2016). In the UK, HM Treasury
is unwilling to disclose commercially sensitive information and has stated that to
extend transparency down the supplier and investor chain, would undermine the entire
market (HM Treasury, 2012a). The Irish government’s position on transparency has
also come under scrutiny; insofar as it has maintained a similar approach to the UK,
under which its policy on disclosure has been found lacking. In comparison to the
Canadian and Australian models, who promote a policy of open disclosure, Reeves
(2015) argues that there are major shortcomings in the Irish approach. The National
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Development Finance Agency (NDFA) has found it necessary to defend the state in
this regard:
Current policy is that the final PSB, or any elements thereof, is not made
public on the basis that revealing the amount that the State is willing to
pay for a service may give tenderers an opportunity to increase their asking
price above what they might otherwise seek (NDFA, 2007, p.16).
Issues have also been identified in relation to the evaluation process, that is
applied to determine if PPP offers the optimal procurement choice. In Ireland, the
evaluation criterion used to define this has been identified as the Public Sector
Benchmark (PSB). This is implemented and administered by the NDFA for
procurement proposals of €20 million and above (Comptroller and Auditor General,
2016; Reeves, 2013). In 2018 the NDFA disclosed to the Committee of Public
Accounts, that once a project is procured by application of the PPP model, a clear
demonstration is sought that it represents VFM in comparison to the Public Sector
Benchmark (PSB) (NDFA, 2018b). The PSB considers the costs and advantages
associated with PPP and compares them with the costs and benefits that could be
achieved, by adoption of traditional procurement. Collective consideration is applied
in terms of finance and insurance, in addition to the apportionment of risk to the party
best able to manage such risk (NDFA, 2007). By engaging in a benchmarking process,
the procuring authority will also determine if there are any cost advantages or potential
for revenue generation (Hellowell et al., 2008). Reeves (2015) identifies that the PSB
is an evaluation of the associated cash flows, alongside an estimate cost to cover the
inherent risk attaching to the project in question. The application of a discount rate is
then applied to calculate the current cost of the future expenses associated with the
proposal. Quantitative and qualitative information is also considered in the evaluation
(US Department of Transport, 2011; Erie et al., 2010). Despite these rigorous tests,
there is a lack of scrutiny and public accountability surrounding PPP (Reeves, 2013a).
Public commentary has been targeted at the government, for failing to demonstrate the
true benefits and costs for all involved (Demirag et al., 2017).
Concerns have also been raised in relation to the transfer of risk. As previously
discussed, under the terms of a PPP arrangement, risk should transfer to the party best
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able to manage that risk (Siemiatycki, 2015). However, in Ireland, problems have
arisen in relation to demand risk within the transport sector, notably in relation to PPP
concession-based arrangements between the state and the private sector (Duggan,
2013; Comptroller and Auditor General, 2011). This issue came to the fore during the
procurement of the Limerick Tunnel and the Clonee-Kells motorway (Burke and
Demirag, 2015). Effectively under the terms of the contract, Transport Infrastructure
Ireland has given a commitment to underwrite the losses of the private sector, when
road usage (toll revenue) has fallen below an agreed contractual estimate. This, in turn,
undermines the entire concept, that it is the private sector that carries the risk within
the scope of a PPP arrangement (Reeves, 2013; Siemiatycki and Friedman, 2012).
Additional issues pertaining to risk have been identified in areas relating to the design
of PPP infrastructure. In some instances, it has been found to be more costly to make
design alterations during construction and operational stages, when compared with the
traditional procurement method (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2011). The
costs relating to the provision of “soft service” associated with the maintenance and
upkeep of PPP assets have been noted as expensive when compared to the traditional
procurement methods (European Investment Bank, 2005; Demirag et al., 2015).
Where PPP is adopted as a means of delivering ancillary government services, that
had previously been provided for by the state, it can generate a perception of separation
(Oireachtas, 2018c). It can also create a division within the existing network, whereby
the collective delivery of public services has become segmented by outsourcing
(Reeves et al., 2015). An additional issues associated with PPP is the lack of
competition, due in part to an inappropriate and overly prescribed procurement process
(European PPP Expertise Centre, 2016 ). In some instances, the bundling of PPPs can
result in limited market participation and can lead to the formation of monopolies (Teo
and Bridge, 2017; World Bank, 2017). Mr Gerard Cahillane, the then Deputy Director
of the NDFA explained to the Joint Committee on Finance Public Expenditure and
Reform, that in the case of the school’s projects, there was a necessity to bundle such
contracts, in doing so, it provided scale and viability for the private sector to engage
in the process (Joint Committee on Finance Public Expenditure and Reform, 2018a).
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2.4 The Introduction of Public Private Partnership into Ireland
At the time when PPP was first introduced into Ireland in 1999, The Irish
government were seeking ways to address the growing deficit in critical infrastructure.
The decision to do so was influenced from several fronts, notably the acute deficit of
physical infrastructure arising from the 1980s recession, that was now suppressing a
period of rapid growth. And how, in the same instance, it was further pressurised by
the depletion of EU cohesion funding. By 1992 the then European Community
introduced the Maastricht Treaty; the aim of the treaty sought to create a single
European Union and introduce the free movement of goods and services (Reeves and
Palcic, 2004). As a prerequisite for member states to comply with the treaty
convergence criteria, it was determined that the national budget deficit pertaining to
individual states should not exceed more than 3% of GDP or the public debt ratio to
exceed 60% of GDP (Duggan, 2013). These measures were introduced to ensure
financial stability throughout the eurozone, in addition to controlling inflation, public
debt levels, exchange rates and interest rates accordingly (Eurostat, 2015). At the time
when PPP was initially introduced into Ireland, the exchequer was in a surplus position
of 3% (Hardiman, 2003). Adherence to the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria
placed little or no restriction on the government’s ability to meet its infrastructure
requirements by means of traditional procurement (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). The
findings of an Inter-Departmental Group report noted that Ireland would no longer be
a recipient of EU cohesion funding after 2003. The report also acknowledged that the
benefits derived from EU backed investments, had been a contributory factor in the
recent growth of the Irish economy (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). However, as the Irish
economy underwent a period of rapid expansion, it also experienced a reduction in EU
Structural Funding, the downside of this is further noted by the ESRI:
A striking feature of the Irish growth experienced in the 1990s has been
the low level of investment which has accompanied expansion throughout
the economy (ESRI, 1997, p.36).
In November 1992 the UK government introduced the Public Finance Initiative
(PFI) as a measure to address the provision of national infrastructure. This followed a
decade of privatisation, which included the sell-off of British Gas, British Airlines and
British Steel (Edwards, 2017; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
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Development, 2015). By utilising the PFI model, the UK government could provide
additional infrastructure into areas such as education, health, and transport; and at the
same time, circumvent the cost of such investment from being included in the public
sector borrowing ratio. The UK authorities viewed the PFI model as a form of
collaboration with the private sector, as a means of modernising the public sector
alongside the added benefit of gaining access to private finance and expertise (Hodge
and Greve 2010; Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998; Burke and Demirag, 2017). The measures
introduced by the UK government also coincided with the introduction of the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992. One of the benefits attributed with the PFI policy was that
it provided the UK authorities with the ability to record capital investment as “off
balance-sheet” and thus bypass the borrowing restrictions, that the treaty sought to
impose (House of Commons Library, 2001)
By the latter half of the 1990s, growth within the Irish economy was exceeding
the EU average by a ratio of four to one. This growth pattern was more than twice that
of the US economy (Hardiman, 2003). For the fiscal year 1999, the Irish exchequer
experienced a 3% surplus in GDP. It also envisaged an extended growth period of
1.4% by the year 2000, and by a further 1.6% into the year 2001 (Department of
Finance, 1999). At a time of unprecedented growth, a major concern facing the
government was the lack of infrastructure which could be traced back to the recession
of the 1980s (Duggan, 2013; Reeves, 2013). The decision to address the infrastructure
deficit by means of PPP, during a period of a fiscal surplus; had attracted commentary,
suggesting that the Irish government had installed like-for-like institutions similar to
that of the UK (Wall, 2009; NDFA, 2013). This is further evidenced in the historical
relationship that exists between Ireland and the UK, including parity of currency, legal
charter and common travel area (Murphy and Honohan, 2009). It is therefore,
reasonable to suggest that the decision of the Irish authorities to implement the PPP
model, was influenced by the decision of its closest neighbour (Wall, 2009). Ireland
was a late adopter of the PPP model and the decision to introduce such measures was
not driven solely by financial restraints. The link between institutional isomorphism
and the diffusion of NPM must also be considered a factor (Boyle, 2014a; Sheppard
& Beck, 2016). It is also suggested that influence was further derived from an extended
group of Anglo Saxon countries (Hardiman and MacCarthaigh, 2008).
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In essence there was an incentive for the Irish government to embrace the
offerings of PPP, for not alone did it provide a means to offset the reduction in EU
structural funding, it also afforded the authorities with the measures to comply with
Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). On reaching a
consensus through the social partnership agreements, the then Finance Minister
Charlie McCreevy gained sufficient support to engage in PPP as a means of addressing
the infrastructure deficit (Niamh Hardiman, 2006; ICTU, 2005; Reeves, 2008).
Furthermore, in line with the UK PFI policy, the Irish government was receptive to the
UK Labour government’s Third Way approach, as a means of delivering infrastructure
through adoption of the PPP model (Petersen, 2011). In the run-up to the
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, the relationships between
Westminster and Dublin appears to have been strengthened. During a Dáil debate in
May 1997, the then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern announced that he would soon be visiting
the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair. As part of the agenda, a press release had
stated the Taoiseach’s intent to enter into collaboration with the UK government, in
pursuit of opportunities and savings relating to the introduction of the Information
Society Initiative:
The new British government plans to "wire-up schools, libraries, colleges
and hospitals to the information superhighway"…as a public-private
partnership. I will be exploring possibilities for co-operation with the
British Government during my visit to Britain this week. Specifically, I
would like Ireland to have inputs to, and benefits from [this], I look
forward to discussing the possibilities for co-operation in these areas with
Tony Blair (Oireachtas, 1997).
It is important to emphasise the timing and language of this text. Firstly it occurs two
years prior to a consensus being reached for the implementation of the Irish PPP
policy; and furthermore the Taoiseach uses the future Irish term “Public Private
Partnership” and not the then UK term “Public Private Initiative”.
In an attempt to resolve the infrastructural deficit, the Irish government
embarked upon a PPP programme to address the imbalance and by 1999 it had initiated
a pilot scheme to build five secondary schools under the PPP programme (Comptroller
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and Auditor General, 2002; Hurst and Reeves, 2004). At the time of the initial
introduction of the PPP programme, the construction price index was recorded at
12.5%, and was projected to continue for the next 3 years (NDP, 2001):
This level of tender price growth is not acceptable and has the potential to
seriously impede delivery of the NDP and other infrastructure projects
(NDP, 2001, p.14).
By 2002 the initial PPP pilot scheme had reached completion, despite the fact that
errors had been identified in the initial costings associated with the project, it would
serve as a catalyst for further PPP development across the entire Irish education sector
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004). Prior to the completion or before an
evaluation of the initial PPP pilot scheme had been undertaken, the government had
engaged in further expansion of the programme (Reeves, 2013). This was viewed as
the preferred approach of then Finance Minister of the day, Mr Charlie Mc Creevy. In
June 2001 prior to publishing the framework, the government had sought the backing
of the (social partners) for the introduction of the policy (Department of The
Taoiseach, 2002). By November 2001 the Fianna Fáil led government subsequently
published an introductory framework which outlined the scope and principles of the
programme (Department of Finance, 2001). This framework was pitched as a delivery
method to aid the overall National Development Plan (NDP), by prioritising the supply
of crucial infrastructure requirements:
The adoption of the Framework is an acknowledgement that the delivery
of projects through PPPs gives us all an opportunity to maximise the
interaction and co-operation between the public and private sectors
(Department of Finance, 2001b).
Throughout the European Union the classification of PPP is seen as a domestic
policy, insofar as it provides for individual members states to apply a different
weighting to each individual element of the PPP contract (Eurostat, 2016). In this
respect, it has been proposed that there are subtle differences between both the UK and
Irish PPP policies. The Irish PPP model sought to deliver compliance with Eurostat
rules, applied gainsharing, union consultation and VFM on behalf of the exchequer
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(Department of Finance, 2003). It could also be suggested that the Irish authorities had
alternative options by which to address the deficit in infrastructure, an exchequer
surplus 3% could have also provided the government with the means to pursue a
traditional programme of investment. This raised the question as to why Ireland
embraced the PPP model (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). During a period of
unprecedented economic growth, the introduction of the PPP framework was
questionable (Hurst and Reeves, 2004; cited in Wall 2009). A key attraction for the
government at the time was the off-balance sheet aspect pertaining to PPP (Hodge and
Greve 2010). Essentially what this translates to is, that the value of the asset remains
unrecorded in the government’s book of accounts (Petersen, 2011; NDFA, 2013;
Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). The accounting treatment of the same asset is therefore
regarded as an off-balance sheet acquisition. This suggests that the underlining
expense also creates a long-term liability on the state (Chowdhury et al.,2016). In
addition to this, servicing costs in relation to finance and maintenance are also
categorised as expenditure costs (Reeves, 2013).

2.5 Public Private Partnership in Ireland during the financial crisis
When the Irish government published the NDP for 2000-2006, its commitment
to PPP was seen as ambitious, so much so that by the end of 2001, there were notably
134 PPP proposals at various stages of appraisal and development (Petersen, 2011;
Reeves, 2003; IMF, 2004). Furthermore, to achieve this, it had gained prior approval
from stakeholder groups, including the Social Partners (Trade Unions), Irish Business
and Employers Confederation (IBEC), Construction Industry Federation (CIF),
National Economic and Social Council (NESC) to implement the planned programme
of investments (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998; The NDFA, 2003). The provision to
monitor and provide transparency relating to PPP contracts can help gain buy-in and
the support of stakeholders (Reeves, 2013). At the time when the government first
considered engaging in a PPP policy, a cross-party report noted that construction sector
wage levels were rising at 11% annually (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). The Training
and Employment Authority (FAS) had forecasted that pressure generated from an
expanding and buoyant construction sector, had created a deficit for 24,000 skilled
construction workers, the demand to meet this requirement would be sourced by
inward migration (NDP, 2001). This was driven by the need to complete a series of
developments into areas such as the LUAS line light-rail construction programme, 14
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major road developments, local authority housing projects, in addition to fulfilling the
major growth in private sector housing (ICTU, 2002). In the period 2003-2007, the
increase in the volume of activity pertaining to the construction industry had risen by
39% (CSO, 2008).
Following a period of favourable economic conditions, the US property market
peaked in 2006. When property prices began to fall later in the same year, this resulted
with some customers defaulting on their mortgage payments and others entering into
a negative equity position; collectively termed as “subprime mortgages” (Schwarcz,
2009). As a result of this, the US banking and investment sectors incurred heavy losses
and by mid-2007 it was determined that US lending institutions were under financial
stress (Eurostat, 2011; Kennedy, 2009). As a consequence of this, the contagion spread
to the US domestic economy and eventually would lead to global repercussions.
Subsequent to the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the US economy
entered into recession, it is these events that would be later identified as the source of
the global financial crisis (Reidy and White, 2017).
While the government had made some headway towards addressing the
infrastructure deficit, a decade of work had stalled due to the financial crisis of 2008
(Duggan, 2013). In perspective, the Irish banking crisis was not unique: what made it
exceptional was the fact that it was the first EU member state to experience such a
crisis (Eichengreen, 2015). The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, had
defined both the Irish banking system and PPP model as unsustainable. Access to EU
wholesale funding had removed the historical uncertainty surrounding foreign
exchange and sovereign default risk, it had instilled a false sense of security throughout
the region (Reidy and White, 2017; Eichengreen, 2015). As a consequence of the
banking crisis, the collapse of the monoline insurance industry, effectively the
underwriters of PPP bond repayments also ensued. This placed immediate pressure on
PPP investors to locate alternative sources of security backed finance, as a result of
which the only avenue of finance open to PPP was through the banking sector (HM
Treasury, 2012; Reeves, 2013). Driven by the lack of security and confidence in
lending, obtaining investment became expensive and difficult to locate; in addition, it
had the side-effect of raising the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)
pertaining to PPP investments (Reeves, 2013; Connolly and Wall 2016). The
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restrictions placed on the Irish Central Bank, by means of the EU fiscal policy, had
reduced its capacity to defend against the banking crisis, it could offer emergency
assistance, but was restricted in printing money and thus prevented it from keeping the
banks afloat (Eichengreen, 2015). At the onset of the financial crisis the private sector
bond market had almost disappeared, banks in a position to lend to the PPP sector
seized their opportunity and doubled their rates (Hellowell et al., 2008).
In November 2008, the then Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan announced the
formation of the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure
Programmes. The remit of the group was to examine ways of reducing expenditure by
identifying efficiencies within the various government departments, that could
ultimately deliver savings for the state. (Oireachtas, 2008b). The report was headed by
Economist and UCD lecturer Colm McCarthy and would subsequently be remembered
as The McCarthy Report, but more widely recognised as An Bord Snip Nua
(McCarthy, 2009a). The 2009 report had identified potential savings of €5.3 billion as
a means of relieving pressure on the exchequer in its pursuit to retain vital government
services (Oireachtas, 2010). The OECD (2009) argued that the necessity to reduce
government spending, had also provided an opportunity for the Irish government to
bring reform and change to the administration of the public services. Under the terms
of reference, the group led by McCarthy were charged with the feasibility of reducing
and relocating public sector staff, in addition to the proposition of outsourcing public
sector services to the private sector (McCarthy, 2009b). This ultimately led to a
reduction of five per cent in the public sector workforce (Hardiman and MacCarthaigh,
2013). The McCarthy Report also sought to reform the structure of local government,
when it recommended the abolition of regional authorities and replacing them with a
single-tiered system (Boyle and Riordan, 2013).
In addition to the implementation of austerity measures, Ireland had also
witnessed one of the largest budgetary adjustments in modern times (Palcic and
Reeves, 2013). The effect of this was unsustainable and in autumn 2010 the
government entered into the €85 billion Troika Programme (Reidy and White, 2017;
Duggan, 2013). In Chapter Six of this study an evaluation will be made to determine,
to what extent, did the intervention of the Troika programme impose coercive or semicoercive conditions upon the Irish government. Padgett and Bulmer (2005) note, in
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return for membership to join or to seek financial assistance from a supranational
organisation, payback will usually be sought in the form of an obligation or a condition
to comply to certain terms. Austerity measures introduced by the government were
obtained ostensibly by spending cuts and increased taxation, at a ratio of two to one
accordingly. Coupled with austerity measures, the government faced annual payments
of €3.1 billion in interest and principal in relation to the national debt, which added
further to the reduction in GDP (Eichengreen, 2015).
The global crisis had common factors, and was further added to by the
vulnerabilities of individual countries, along with the access to unprecedented
wholesale funding (Chopra, 2011). Events were further impaired by the fact that, while
there was an EU monetary union, there was no presence of an EU banking union to
monitor the decline in banking standards or control the events leading up to the crisis
(Eichengreen, 2015). The events surrounding the global crisis could be described as
the most severe since that of the Great Depression of the 1930s (Bernanke, 2009).
Further comments describe it as a destructive economic force unlike any seen for
generations (Buffett, 2010). The effect of the financial crisis is most evident when
viewed from the perspective of the national capital investment budget, which fell from
a peak in 2008 of €8.6 billion to €3.5 billion in 2012 (Duggan, 2013). The onset of the
recession not only deprived the government of a revenue stream, it had the added effect
of raising unemployment. By 2008 the rate had reached 10.2% and was forecasted to
rise (Healy, 2012; Ruhs, 2009).
There were inevitable consequences surrounding the financial crisis. In relation
to PPP, due to the increased cost and scarcity of funding, over 20 PPP projects at
various stages of completion were abandoned or cancelled. These included among
others; The National Concert Hall, The Decentralisation Programme and Thornton
Prison project, along with plans to expand the third level institution sector (NDFA,
2013). Under the constraint of reduced exchequer resources relating to the crisis, the
government had no choice but to defer large-scaled projects such as the Luas
extension and Metro-North (The DPER, 2011). The C&AG estimated that costs
incurred in relation to the cancelled Metro North project were in the region of €154
million (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2012) (see Table 2.1).

28

Table 2.1: PPP Projects Abandoned or Suspended since 2009
Roads
N17/18 Gort – Tuam

Reinstated July 2012

M11 Gorey – Enniscorthy

Reinstated July 2012

Rail
Rail Metro
North Metro West
Dart Underground
LUAS
Lucan

Project postponed re-scheduled in 2040 NDP

Courts Courts Bundle
(County Towns)
Prisons
Mountjoy Complex Relocation Munster
Prison Complex
Arts
Abbey Theatre
National Concert Hall Office

Project cancelled November 2010

Office of Public Works
Decentralisation of Government Offices
Education
Bundle 1 – Third level buildings

Project cancelled November 2011

Bundle 2 - Third level buildings

Project cancelled November 2011

Bundle 3 - Third level buildings

Project cancelled November 2011

Environment (ex Water Services)
Greystones Harbour Re-Development
Dublin Waste to Energy

Now re-commenced on phased basis
Suspended

Social Housing – O’Devaney Gardens Social
Housing – St. Michaels, Inchicore Social

Project cancelled 2008 Project cancelled 2008

Housing – Dominick Street Social Housing –

Project cancelled 2008 Project cancelled 2008
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Infirmary Road Social Housing – Sean

Project cancelled 2008 Project cancelled 2008

McDermott St. Social Housing – Jamestown

Project cancelled 2008

Road Social Housing – Croke Villas
Health
National Network for Radiation Oncology
Hospital co-location (2 contracts)

Part-completed Not officially recorded as a
PPP. Cancelled.

Those projects that did survive the impact were primarily associated with the
National Roads Authority (NRA), road infrastructure delivery programme (IBEC,
2013; NDFA, 2013) The NDP 2007-2013 had also contained plans for the
rejuvenation of Dublin City Council housing stock. This included St Michael’s Estate,
a 1970s style flat complex, located four kilometres to the west of the city at Inchicore.
The rejuvenation programme also included O’Devaney Gardens housing complex,
situated close to Dublin’s Phoenix Park, it was developed in 1950s and consisted of
278 residential units that were laid out in thirteen blocks (Dublin City Council, 2017a,
2017b). However when the PPP consortium failed to deliver on its objectives;
subsequent blame was attributed to aspects of shared risk and transparency (Reeves,
2015). Exposure to the financial crisis had not alone affected the PPP sector, it went
beyond the control of the government. As a consequence of the financial crisis, output
in the construction sector incurred an immediate reduction of 21% (CSO, 2008). It
was apparent that by September 2008 the crisis had not only affected the banking
sector, it had also seen the collapse of the construction sector and the ultimate lull in
the Irish PPP programme (Reidy and White, 2017).
By 2012 activity relating to European PPP had fallen year on year by 35%,
representing a year low with a transaction value of €11.7 billion, the transport sector
accounting for 59% of this activity (EPEC, 2013; Burke and Demirag, 2015). Given
the severity of the national banking crisis, PPP activity in Ireland had effectively come
to a standstill. Taking a global perspective, it would suggest that Ireland was not a
stand-alone case; worldwide PPP activity had also suffered as a consequence of the
Lehman Brothers failure (Reeves and Palcic, 2017). In response to the effects of the
financial crisis, in July 2012 the government introduced a stimulus package, the
content of which included a variety of PPP construction projects that were targeted at
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investments into Health, Education, Justice and National Road Development. In
addition, a series of reform measures were also introduced to entice private sector
investors to engage with the stimulus plan (Howlin, 2012). In Chapter Six of this study,
we examine whether the introduction of the stimulus package was a voluntary
decision, or for what reasons were the government compelled or coerced into making
the choices that it did.

2.6 The introduction of the 2012 Stimulus Infrastructure Package
In an attempt to address the impact of the financial crisis, the government sought
the introduction of a Stimulus Package, targeted at the promotion of jobs and growth
within the economy (NDFA, 2012). Ireland was not alone in introducing a stimulus
programme as a result of the financial crisis, the US government, under the Obama
administration, also introduced a stimulus plan, notably the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act, 2009 (The House of Representatives, 2009). Additional stimulus
plans were introduced in the following jurisdictions: France in 2008, subsequently
followed in 2009 by Canada, United Kingdom, Germany and Australia (The Library
of Congress, 2009). In the economic climate of 2012 unemployment in the Irish retail
and construction sectors stood at 15%, due in most part to the catastrophic effects of
the financial crisis, while the Export and Foreign Direct Investment sectors remained
virtually unscathed (Hardiman and Regan, 2013,p.6). In acknowledgement of the
efforts that had been made to address the situation, the EU regarded Ireland as the
‘poster child’ for austerity compliance (Roche et al., 2017). However, the knock-on
effect of such measures had delivered a decline in domestic demand of 26%; public
sentiment had grown thin of such measures and was now attracting social commentary
and public backlash (Healy, 2012).
In July 2012 the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform, Brendan Howlin
announced details of the government stimulus package, designed to target growth and
unemployment within the economy (NDFA, 2012; Reeves, 2013). The investment
entailed €2.25 billion diversified across a number of sectors, including projects derived
by PPP to the sum of €1.4 billion. The funding for the programme was sourced from
the EIB, government initiatives and private equity, in addition to the sale of several
state held assets (Howlin, 2012b). The proposed stimulus determined that through the
means of PPP, the government could address its infrastructure requirements and at the
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same time rejuvenate the construction sector. The proposal included the provision of
two school bundles, the Grangegorman DIT campus, 20 primary care units in addition
to substantial undertakings in the justice and transport areas ( NDFA, 2013; Reeves,
2015). In addition, the government introduced a range of amendments to the PPP
policy in support of the stimulus package.
While the stimulus programme gained initial union support, they subsequently
added a caveat, that the programme was lacking in stature and that the terms of the
delivery appeared too long (SIPTU, 2012). The government stated that it was fully
committed to getting people back to work and was in search of job-rich public
infrastructure projects as a way of achieving this agenda (Howlin, 2012). The necessity
to introduce such measures was driven in part by macro events outside the control of
the Irish government, the origin of which could be traced back to the financial crisis
of 2008 (IMF, 2012):
Assistance comes with politically difficult, and often resented,
conditions. Adjustment and recovery goals are difficult to meet.
Crisis countries do not recall their experience fondly
(Eichengreen, 2015, p.11).
In Chapter Five of this research, a comparison will be made between the UK PFI
and the Irish PPP policies, to identify the similarities and differences that exist between
both jurisdictions. Where comparisons can be found, this will be examined further in
Chapter Six, to determine, to what extent are such similarities derived from voluntary,
semi-coercive or coercive influence.

2.6.1 Events following the financial crisis
As an alternative to the existing finance model, going forth the government
proposed to finance the new round of PPP proposals, by means of non-exchequer,
publicly sourced funding streams. This would also necessitate an expansion of the role
played by the EIB (Reeves, 2015). The contribution made by the EIB is estimated on
average, to be of 50% of the required capital investment (NDFA, 2015). By 2014 EIB
investment into Ireland had increased by 37%, amounting to €932 million. This was
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dispersed into the following sectors: Education, Transport, Social Housing and Energy
(EIB, 2017). The classification of public, non-exchequer financing is identified as
investments made on the part of the Irish Strategic Investment Fund (ISIF), which
consists of an €8.5 billion discretionary portfolio fund. The establishment of ISIF was
derived from the National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF) and was targeted at direct
investment into areas of employment creation (DPER, 2016; Reeves, 2015). Other
sources of non-exchequer funding were allocated from the sale of legacy state assets
(NDFA, 2013b).
The series of PPP investment set out in the 2012 stimulus package, was seen as
the first of three phases and focused primarily on the Transport and Education sectors.
The intention of the stimulus package was to also drive a horizontal policy, its primary
aim being to generate employment within the construction sector (Oireachtas, 2018b).
A subsequent investment of €300 million in 2014 was deemed as the second phase of
the PPP programme and was targeted extensively at the provision of social housing
(SCSI, 2014). The third phase of the programme introduced in 2015, amounted to €500
million and was broadly directed towards the health, education and justice sectors
(Oireachtas, 2018b).
The key shift in the post-crisis phase of the Irish PPP policy is identified by
Reeves (2015), when the PPP model was first introduced into Ireland, the rationale
behind the decision was to address a deficit in critical infrastructure (Farrell Grant
Sparks, 1998). However, as a consequence of the financial crisis, going forward, any
new rounds of PPP proposals would remain focused on stimulating the economy and
to secure employment (Reeves, 2015). In light of fiscal constraints, another motivation
for the government to engage in PPP was the ability to record such investments as offbalance sheet. This provided scope to circumvent the need for upfront funding and it
was also in keeping with the wishes of the Troika, who at the time, gave their prior
consent for PPP to be included within the measures set forth in the stimulus package
(Joint Committee on Finance Public Expenditure and Reform, 2018a). The subtleties
in relation to this decision will be discussed in Chapter Six of this study, where an
attempt will be made to identify the conditions under which the government engaged
in the PPP programme, and if there was a coercive nature to that decision.
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In the post-crisis era, key PPP projects that came to fruition included the Dublin
Waste to Energy project. Although the project was initially suspended in 2008,
construction resumed in May 2014, the plant subsequently commenced operations in
June 2017 (NDFA, 2018b). Under the proposals announced in the 2012 stimulus
package, the government also targeted investment into the third level educational
sector, notably the construction of the DIT Grangegorman Campus. However, due to
a delay in the procurement process, initiated by the losing tenderer “BAM”, court
proceedings were brought to challenge the award of a contract to Eriugena, which
ultimately delayed the start of the construction phase until March 2018 (Grangegorman
Development Agency, 2018). Other projects of note include the grouped school
projects; bundle three had reached financial close in November 2012 and had become
fully operational by April 2014, with school bundle four subsequently coming on
stream in May 2016 (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2016). The NDFA note, that
in July 2016 schools bundle five had come to financial close and that the award of
contract had been granted to the preferred bidder “Inspired Spaces” a consortium made
up of Carillion PLC and the Dutch Infrastructure Fund. However by January 2018, due
to a collapse of Carillion’s UK parent company, the handover of the five schools was
placed in jeopardy (NDFA, 2018b). In the aftermath of the collapse, Carillion’s
nominated Irish sub-contractor, “Sammon Group” went into examinership in April
2018, although the five schools associated with bundle five were estimated to be 90%
complete, due to the allocation of risk assigned under the PPP arrangement, it went
beyond the remit of the Department of Education to take ownership of the issue
(Department of Education and Skills, 2018). Mr Gerard Cahillane, Deputy Director of
the NDFA gave the response of the state to the Joint Committee on Finance Public
Expenditure and Reform:
Our remit is to deliver these schools as fast as possible and to protect the
taxpayer in that process… we have entered into a contract, where the risk
of delivery and funding to the required standards of the facilities is with
the private sector. That price has been agreed and we do not want to pay
any more than that price (Joint Committee on Finance Public Expenditure
and Reform, 2018a).
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In February 2018 the government announced the introduction of the Project
Ireland 2040 Framework, the objectives of which would be implemented under the
National Development Plan 2018-2027 (NDP) (Government of Ireland, 2018). The
NDP 2018-2027 identified the government’s preference for the retention of the
existing PPP model, in addition to outlining the future role of the policy. The plan also
highlighted the necessity to introduce versatility into the planned programme by
lowering the duration and contact value of future proposals, in addition to favouring
concession and hybrid PPP contracts (DPER, 2018a). In July 2018 an InterDepartmental agency group examined the future role for PPP and underlined its
continued support for the retention of the policy. The report cited that PPP has the
ability to harness innovation and to accelerate the delivery of infrastructure at times of
fiscal restraint, (DPER, 2018b). The Project Ireland 2040 Framework also stated the
government’s continued support for the implementation of the National Broadband
Plan (NBP), in an effort to extend commercial opportunities throughout the rural
community (Government of Ireland, 2018). It is estimated that of the 2.385 million
broadband connections, 545,000 were without highspeed connectivity, equating to
23% of national coverage (Department of Communications Climate Action and
Environment, 2019a). Under the terms of the NBP contract, the government have
opted for the gap-funding model, effectively funding the project on behalf of the
private sector throughout the construction phase of the contract. This provides for the
private sector to access such investments, from a very low-risk margin (Reeves and
Palcic, 2019). It was also identified by Deputy Brian Stanley at the joint committee
hearing into the NBP that heretofore assets acquired under the PPP programme, were
operated and maintained and subsequently returned to the state upon completion of the
unitary schedule. Under the proposals of the €3 billion NBP, it is proposed at the end
of the 25-year contract term to transfer ownership of the NBP assets to the preferred
bidder Granahan McCourt. Both aspects represent a change in policy for the Irish PPP
programme (Department of Communications Climate Action and Environment,
2019b).
In December 2019 the government published a revised edition on the guidelines
surrounding the future use of PPP, the contents of which had replaced the procedures
that were introduced in 2006, which were predated by the 2003 and 2001 guidelines
respectively (DPER, 2019). Under the amended terms, a higher emphasis was placed
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on identifying the level of risk that was attributed under the Public Sector Benchmark
(PSB), in contrast to the level of risk that would be weighed against a similar PPP
proposal. Going forth the evaluation process would also make a comparison of
historical data, to gain a more comprehensive take on the level of risk associated with
operational, maintenance and lifecycle costings, in relation to both traditional and PPP
proposals. In addition, the government also stated its preference to adopt a qualitative
“lessons learnt” approach by engaging in sensitivity analysis, which was absent under
the previous fail or pass quantitative process. The revised guidelines also placed a
significant weight, upon the cost and impact relating to the socio-economic benefits
that could be gained by the investment. In addition, the measures also provided that
once complete, on-going management of the project should be administered under the
control of the NDFA, away from the sponsoring agency. The guidelines also
emphasised the necessity to adhere to the amended 2014 EU procurement Directives,
that formed the basis of the 2016 Irish procurement regulations. The guidelines also
identify that where a financial gain has been realised as a result of refinancing, under
the new terms the maximum entitlement of the sponsoring agency has been reduced to
33%; this is in keeping with the EU Directives, which also introduce the relevant
grounds by which to terminate a PPP contract.
Throughout the literature, it has been identified that in the UK, there has been
extensive investment in healthcare infrastructure by means of PFI (PPP) investment
(HM Treasury, 2018a). In contrast under the Irish system, direct investment by means
of PPP into Irish hospital development is non-existent, although some reference is
made to primary care investment (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2016). In relation
to the development of the Children’s Hospital, PPP was not considered an option. The
Taoiseach Mr Leo Varadkar clarified to the Dail, that there was a difference between
the NBP and the National Children’s Hospital, under the PPP model price certainty
could be estimated, the Children’s Hospital was a two-phase investment and therefore
didn’t fall into that category (Oireachtas, 2019b). It was identified to the Committee
of Public Accounts that phase A of the development related to the below groundworks,
while phase B was relating to the above ground construction. The advantage offered
by this approach, enabled early commencement of phase A while providing the
appropriate scale as to attract competition for phase B of the development (Committee
of Public Accounts, 2019). In November 2018 the Children's Hospital Project and
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Programme (CHP&P) who are charged with the oversight of the hospital project,
ultimately decided on the grounds of economic viability to also award phase B of the
development to BAM (Oireachtas, 2019a). In Chapter Seven of this study, an
evaluation will be made to determine the rationale for the government’s decision to
opt for one class of procurement over another, secured by application of the PPP model
or through the traditional procurement route. This will be examined in light of the legal
and political frameworks that govern the PPP process, in addition to how budgetary
and fiscal measures can have a bearing over the procedure.
In 2012 the UK government sought to introduce amendments to the PFI model,
and in doing so redefined and re-branded the policy terms as PF2 (Demirag et al.,
2015; European PPP Expertise Centre, 2015; HM Treasury, 2012; NDFA, 2013).
Despite the government’s efforts to rejuvenate the policy, in the subsequent period,
the policy failed to generate any meaningful interest on the assumption that it failed to
provided value for money (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2018).
In a surprise move in October 2018, Philip Hammond the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
announced that the UK was abandoning its PFI policy (Gov.UK, 2018). In essence,
the UK decision has effectively left Ireland without a future benchmark, by which to
guide the Irish policy, the context of this will be examined further in Chapter Six. In
addition, the impact of the UK’s decision to depart from the EU, will also ensure that
Ireland along with Cyprus, in becoming the two remaining common law jurisdictions
among 27 member states (Hogan, 2018). In practice, the UK has consistently provided
Ireland with a determination in respect of challenges taken against the EU Procurement
Directives (Kelly, 2018). In effect due to the volume of UK case law, the Irish judicial
system has deemed that it was both reasonable and practical for the Irish courts to look
to the UK as a source of case law (P. Fitzgerald, 2017).

2.7 Research themes and questions
The examination of the literature in the previous sections draws attention to the
motivations for the adoption of PPP in Ireland, as well as the ongoing reliance on this
procurement approach. The analysis of the existing literature has determined that while
events pre and post the financial crisis have been extensively examined, research
pertaining to recent events has been found lacking. The impact of the financial crisis
is addressed by Duggan in 2013, the paper articulates the investment crisis faced by
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Ireland and gives a broad description of the effects that this had on the provision of
traditional and PPP infrastructure during this period (Duggan, 2013). In 2015 Reeves
gave a comprehensive review of the experience to date, pertaining to the Irish PPP
policy, in which the author identified that the initial uptake of PPP was seen as a means
of alleviating the constraints upon the exchequer. However, in light of this, there is
lack of evidence to determine if PPP has delivered on its promise to provide value for
money for the state. The article also noted the events surrounding the introduction of
the 2012 stimulus package and the measures that were subsequently adopted. In
addition, Reeves identifies that the motivation for engaging in PPP has changed as the
policy has progressed over time (Reeves, 2015). The publication of the government
overview of Irish PPP procurement in 2018, noted the role envisaged for PPP in the
future delivery of national infrastructure. The review also highlighted the liabilities,
advantages and challenges faced in relation to PPP procurement. Nonetheless, the
overview fell short in determining the role of the private sector in the provision of PPP
(Oireachtas, 2018a). In recent publications the government has acknowledged that PPP
has a brief history in Ireland and is therefore subject to review, indicating that it has
adjusted its stance on the future role of PPP. The NDP 2018-2027 envisages that PPP
will function in the provision of large scale infrastructure developments, where
concession arrangements will generate third party income as a method of financing
such investment. Furthermore, the government has determined that future PPP
engagement will act as an alternative source of infrastructure and not as a stimulus
measure as was the case in the recent past. It has also identified that in comparison to
the UK, it does not wish to create an over-reliance on PPP where it may be exposed to
market inflation or collapse (Oireachtas, 2018a).
Given the longevity pertaining to PPP contract terms, in some instances for
periods of 45 years, during which time the financial and political landscape will be
exposed to change (DPER, 2018b), it therefore reasonable to assume that an evaluation
process is merited. However, in this regard there is a gap in the literature in relation to
the events that have presented themselves within the current period. Notably, by the
decision of the UK government to abandon its PFI policy in October 2018; which was
further compounded by its resolve to depart from the European Union in January 2020.
In the same instance, the Irish authorities have demonstrated its willingness to retain
the Irish PPP policy, as a component of the NDP 2018-2017. In the absence of any
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viable literature that seeks to address these concerns, it raises the argument as to why
this research is of importance and furthermore how it will add to the body of previous
studies thus far. Furthermore within the body of existing literature there has been no
previous attempt to correlate the similarities and differences that exist between both
policies, or to understand what caused those changes to occur. It is therefore imperative
to examine the impact of such changes, and to evaluate where PPP is now positioned
as part of the state’s policy on procurement. This research will also observe if lessons
were learnt and how they could be applied to future PPP proposals. This study will
investigate these issues, which are expressed in the following three research questions.
(1) What are the similarities and differences that exist between the Irish PPP
and UK PFI policies and to recognise the element of change that has
occurred since the Irish policy was first introduced.
(2) What is the initial alignment and subsequent divergence that has occurred
between the Irish PPP and UK PFI policies
(3) What incentivises the state to retain this method of procurement,
and to further examine how Economic, Legal and Public Policy
Perspectives retain an influence over that process.

2.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have acknowledged the origins of and to what gave rise to
the introduction of PPP, including the rationale for the introduction of the Irish policy
and how it replicated the form and structure of the UK procedures. We charted its
current history where it was demonstrated that less than a decade into the programme,
a series of PPP-backed initiatives were immediately abandoned as a consequence of
the financial crisis. We identified the necessity for the government to seek the
assistance from the Troika and the associated cost for doing so. An insight was given
behind the rationale for the introduction of the 2012 stimulus package and the
accompanying amendments to the PPP policy that had a striking resemblance to
changes that were introduced to the UK PFI policy. Parallel to the recovery of the Irish
PPP sector, the literature also identified the gradual descent of the UK policy, which
was ultimately abandoned in October 2018. We concluded by introducing three
research questions, that summon up the objectives of this study.
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Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework
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3.1 The Introduction
It is proposed in the following chapter, to explore how the policies of another
state can have a bearing or influence, that enables another jurisdiction to adopt such
measures as their own. For the purposes of this research, the application of Policy
Transfer Theory will be adopted as the Theoretical Framework most suited to steer
this research to achieve its findings. Marsden and Stead (2011) state that policy
transfer is a phenomenon, it raises questions that ultimately identify the reasoning
behind the movement of a policy from one jurisdiction to another. It identifies those
players actively involved in the process, it can also highlight the coercive nature that
can accompany the implementation or transfer of a policy (Dolowitz and Marsh,
2000).

3.2 The Introduction & the application of Policy Transfer Theory
The transfer of knowledge from one domain to another, “an ancient
phenomenon”(Martínez, 2005), has always been in existence (Dolowitz and Marsh,
1996a; Stone, 2001; Zhang and Marsh, 2016). However, since the onset of the Second
World War, the methods by which information is disseminated has grown rapidly. This
in turn has provided a shared platform for those with an interest in policies and
programmes, and in particular how such policy information is subsequently shared and
evaluated (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). The advancement in technology and global
communication methods has subsequently escalated the frequency, range and level, at
which policies are transferred (O’Dolan and Rye, 2012). Prior to 1940, most policy
evaluations were state-centred, focusing ostensibly on government departments and
institutions (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996a). The growth in policy transfer has also led
to the increase in the harmonisation of policies, institutions and organisations (Monios,
2017).
In the present tense, it is reasonable to assume that policy transfer will commonly
be found across a range of political spaces, including local and regional authorities,
national and international governments, in addition to supranational and global
organisations (Evans and Davies, 1999). Policy transfer is therefore, best understood
as, an attempt to replicate, draw lessons from and to ultimately gain knowledge
pertaining to administrative procedures, policies and institutional arrangements; that
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have their origins in one particular place and time, that will subsequently be replicated
at a future time, in a different jurisdiction (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; James and
Lodge, 2004). By engaging in an exchange of policies, the ultimate goal is to unlock
the events that are required to make that process happen. However, it can also help to
determine the driving factors and causes that steer such transfers (Brady and Curtin,
2012). This can entail amending an existing policy and subsequently comparing these
changes against a substitute policy, alternatively lessons drawing can also be an
explorative tactic (Benson and Jordan, 2011). There is an implied recognition that
policy transfer is not an independent process (Stone, 2001). An emphasis is therefore
placed on the role played by those actors working behind the scenes that guide the
process (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). The inner elements of a transfer can convey a
range of objectives and outcomes, this can include the assignment of policy goals and
instruments, ideologies or administrative techniques, the core of an institution or
institutional structure (Monios, 2017). Padgett and Bulmer (2005) suggest that within
the EU for example, there are various and multiple streams of policy transfer, that are
presented in both horizontal and vertical formations.

3.2.1 Definition of policy transfer theory
Table 3.1: Summary Definition of Policy Transfer Theory

A determination, for the circumstances and to what extent can a programme that is
effective in one place, transfer to another place (Rose, 1991).

A process by which knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and
ideas in one political system (past or present)’ is used in the development of similar
features in another (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).

A continuum that runs from lesson-drawing to the direct imposition of a program, policy or
institutional arrangement on one political system by another (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000).

A process of using knowledge about policy-making from one setting and applying it to
another (Marsden and Stead, 2011).

Policy transfer allows cities, municipalities or countries to learn from one another and solve
their problems without having to reinvent the wheel (O’Dolan and Rye, 2012).
The process in which an innovation is communicated though certain channels over time
among the members of a social system (Leiber et al., 2015).
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Policy transfer referrers to as a process in which the decision-makers in one institutional
setting “learn” from the policy decisions made in another setting (Moyson et al., 2017).

For the purpose of this research, the definition offered by Dolowitz and March
(1996) will be employed to best demonstrate an understanding of the processes and
actions that are necessary to undertake a policy movement from one jurisdiction to
another:
A process by which knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements,
institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present)’ is used in
the development of similar features in another (Dolowitz and Marsh,
1996).

3.3 The classification of policy transfer
There are attributes that promote and define the classification of policy transfer
and are characterised by the following terms, voluntary transfer, indirect coercive
transfer and direct coercive transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Evans, 2006). The
literature also identifies that policy transfer is a composite of four mechanisms:
learning, competition, coercion and mimicry (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). Marsden
and Stead (2011) categorised the peripheral factors that can influence the outcome and
receptiveness of a transfer. These include language, the constitutional and economic
structure, the geographical setting of the exchange and the culture of the host nation.
There are variations relating to depth and scope of the transfer including, copying likefor-like, emulating the key intent of the policy, combinations a hybrid of different
policies, inspiration gathered from alternative jurisdictions (Dolowitz and Marsh,
2000; O’Dolan and Rye, 2012).

3.3.1 Voluntary transfer
Lesson drawing is characterised as a voluntary decision (Leiber et al., 2015),
made by political actors in one jurisdiction, to replicate the policies or procedures of
another jurisdiction; and to subsequently implement those policies into the host nation
or organisation as part of their own institutional arrangements (Manwaring, 2016). The
decision to do so, can be applied on a prospective or retrospective basis, this provides
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for the examination of past experiences that can subsequently be incorporated into
future policies, that will then be evaluated in a future period (Evans, 2006). The phrase
“lesson drawing” was first brought to prominence by Rose (1991). It is attributed as
being a mechanism that allows policy transfer to function. It acts as a political moral,
by casting judgement on the decision to implement or defer the transfer of the policy
in question. The primary driver of “voluntary transfer”, a term introduced by Dolowitz
and Marsh (1996), is attributed to the presence of a disconnect with an existing policy
or status quo (Brady and Curtin, 2012). Actors in this category will only seek address
if they perceive that the policy or procedure isn’t functioning as it should, and only
then will it be necessary to engage in lesson drawing (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996;
Marsden and Stead, 2011).
Where the diffusion of a policy or procedure is voluntary in nature, it dilutes the
effect of bias, persuasion, and the authority of those with the power to proceed with or
abort a programme of change (Stone, 2001). Furthermore, a higher emphasis is placed
on conveying information to the relevant stakeholders, information is transmitted to a
lesser extent during a coercive scenario (O’Dolan and Rye, 2012). The classification
purported by Rose (1993) distinguishes the different types of lesson drawing and is
demonstrated in Table 3.1

Table 3.2: Summary Definition of the different types of Lesson Drawing

Type of lesson drawing

Description

Copying

Enacting more or less intact a program already in
effect in another jurisdiction.

Adaptation

Adjusting for contextual differences a program already
in effect in another jurisdiction.

Hybridization

Combining elements of programs from two different
jurisdictions.
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Are there different degrees of
transfer

From where are lessons learned, locally, nationally,
internationally.

Synthesis

Combining familiar elements from programs in a
number of different places to create a new program

Inspiration

Using programs elsewhere as an intellectual stimulus
to develop a novel program.

3.3.2 Indirect coercive transfer
Indirect Coercive Transfer, subscribes to the notion that policies or procedures
are transferred from one jurisdiction to another, where the decision to do so is
influenced by an external actor such as a government, supranational organisation,
financial institution or a donor entity that holds undue influence over the process
(Evans, 2006). Collectively this term has been applied under the following headings:
semi-coercive (Benson and Jordan, 2011), fostered (Cairney, 2007), and adopted
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). In the past, actions of indirect coercion have been
attributed to the functions of the IMF. Under circumstances where a sovereign state is
in receipt of financial aid, it is expected to adhere to the restructuring policies and
financial stewardship administered on the part of the IMF (Williams and Dzhekova,
2014). In general, developing countries are more receptive to methods of coercive
policy transfer, than those of established nations, due in part to the promise of financial
aid or by the influence of the organisation involved in the negotiations (Marsden and
Stead, 2011).
Diffusion is the transfer of information and knowledge, communicated through
neighbouring jurisdictions that ultimately leads to the implementation of similar
policies and procedures (Dolowitz, 2017). The EU has been identified by several
commentators as one such example of that (Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Stone, 2001).
O’Dolan and Rye (2012) identify that in the context of EU funding opportunities, it is
commonplace among neighbouring states to disseminate or diffuse knowledge
pertaining to EU regional opportunities. It has also been suggested that in the course
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of some voluntary transfers, the presence of “soft incentives” such as guidelines or
benchmarking can be present; the result of which generates a non-hierarchical transfer
(Padgett and Bulmer, 2005). Where the transfer of policies and convergence is given
blanket coverage, as is the case under the EU Directives, it can result in the partial loss
of national autonomy and sovereignty (Stone, 2001). The presence of similar culture,
population densities and close governmental ties are also relevant factors to achieve a
successful policy adoption (Cairney, 2007).

3.3.3 Direct coercive transfer
The connotation of direct coercive transfer implies that there is an underlying
obligation or compelling reason attaching to the transfer of a policy, in essence, a “quid
pro quo” scenario. This was evident during the financial crisis, when the Irish
government sought the financial intervention of the Troika programme. In effect, the
Irish government had to succumb to the policy influence and shared administration of
the IMF, ECB and the European Commission. The introduction of austerity measures
as part of the assistance programme, is an indication that in reality it was a coercive
transfer (Reidy and White, 2017; Duggan, 2013). This method of policy exchange,
ensures that a measure of force is applied to the recipient nation to guarantee the
implementation of a given policy or procedure (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Williams
and Dzhekova (2014) put this into perspective in relation to the onus placed upon EU
accession states to conform to the rules and regulations pertaining to EU directives,
prior to obtaining access to EU membership. This argument is called into question,
when in practice once EU membership has been granted, it is the member states
themselves that elect to introduce new policies and regulations via the Council of
Ministers, effectively reverting back to the position of a semi coercive influence
(Benson and Jordan, 2011). In extreme circumstances, Evens (2006) identifies that a
direct coercive transfer occurs, when one government exerts pressure over another
jurisdiction, by “pushing and shoving” to introduce social and political change as a
precursor for funding or direct investment (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Political
urgency may also give rise for the adoption of a policy or measures, implemented to
act as a defensive mechanism or alternatively to provide an opportunity or gain on
behalf of the state (Minkman et al., 2018).
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3.4 Dolowitz and Marsh policy transfer framework
To help define a perspective and apply an understanding for the uptake in policy
transfer Dolowitz and Marsh have created a conceptual framework to determine the
motivations for stakeholders and legislators alike, for their decision to engage in the
process (Manwaring, 2016; O’Dolan and Rye, 2012). The framework acts as a guide,
offering a heuristic approach, prompted by a series of questions that promotes selfdiscovery, as to the reasons why a transfer has failed or succeeded (Dolowitz and
Marsh, 2000). Benson and Jordan (2011) identify that the structure of the framework
draws from the earlier works of Rose. It defines the form and scope that will be applied
to the transfer process by identifying the objectives and to what degree a transfer will
extend (Bender et al., 2014), it helps to steer the transfer process that has now become
a common currency throughout the political landscape (Benson and Jordan, 2011).
Padgett and Bulmer (2005) have utilised the Dolowitz and Marsh framework to
evaluate how policy transfer throughout the EU can be found present in the following
three forms: hierarchy, negotiation and facilitated unilateralism. The authors identified
that as part of the application process to gain membership of the European Common
Market, the requirement to subsequently accept or adhere to the policies of the EU are
often implied under “hierarchical” or direct coercive conditions. Where the EU seeks
consensus or adoption by common or majority consent, this is identified as transfer by
“negotiation” or semi-coercive. Alignment between the EU and Dolowitz and Marsh
framework, for the provision of “unilateral” or voluntary transfer, is identified where
the host nation retains sovereignty “functional interdependence” over Justice and
Home Affairs, while in the same instance maintaining alignment with the shared
objectives of the EU institutions.
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Table 3.3: Dolowitz and Marsh policy transfer framework

Why
Transfer

Voluntary
Lesson
Drawing
(perfect
rationality)

Who is
Involved

Elected officials
Bureaucrats
Civil servants
Pressure
Groups

SemiCoercive
Lesson
Drawing
(perfect
rationality)

Political
Parties

How to
How
What is From Where Degree Constraints demonstrate Transfer
Transferred
of
on
Policy
leads to
Transfer Transfer
Transfer
Failure

Policies
Goals
Content
Instruments

Experts
Consultants

International
Pressure

Think Tanks

Image
Consensus
Perceptions
Externalities

Global
Corporations

Copying

Internal
Global

Programs

National
Government

Attitudes
Cultural values
Negative
lesson drawing

Government
Departments

Supranational
Institutions

Global

Direct
Imposition

Global
Organisations

Loans
Trade
Obligations

Past policies

Hybrids

Structural
Institutional
Feasibility
Ideology
Cultural
Proximity
Technology
Economic
Bureaucratic
Language

Media

Regional
State
Local
Government
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Uniformed
transfer

Commissioned
Reports

Incomplete
Transfer

Noncommissioned
Reports

Inappropriate
transfer

Conference
Meetings
Visits
Statements

Local
Authorities

Coercive

Conditionality

Policy
Complexity

Emulation

Inspiration

Institutions
Ideologies

Policy
Entrepreneurs

Previous

3.5 Why does policy transfer occur?
To understand why different jurisdictions engage in policy transfer, it is first
necessary to clarify the core rationale behind this transition. Voluntary transfer occurs
as a measured attempt to implement a policy or procedure that can be perceived to
function in a more beneficial manner than the current status quo (Marsh and Sharman,
2009). An evaluation by means of lesson-drawing seeks to determine under what
circumstances can a policy in one jurisdiction gain a footing in another and to what
extent can that transfer be guaranteed to achieve its objectives (Rose, 1991). Lesson
drawing can be diluted under circumstances where bounded rationality is present, this
manifests itself, when the knowledge that is gathered relating to the transfer process,
is constrained by the capacity of the evaluator to comprehend or to gather the correct
information (Moyson et al., 2017). Additional constraints can be generated from a
restriction of time, resources and limited information (Marsden and Stead,
2011). When uncertainty is present in the policy landscape, it creates an incentive to
accept the measures of another (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The fear of being left
behind can also provide the rationale to implement a change in policy (Dolowitz and
Marsh, 1996). Where the implementation of a policy is at the behest of another nation
or organisation, it is therefore viewed as coercive or administered under direct
imposition. The requirement to absorb or implement a policy may be conditional prior
to the receipt of a perceived advantage (Marsden and Stead, 2011; O’Dolan and Rye,
2012).

3.6 Who is involved in policy transfer?
Dolowitz and Marsh have recognised that the provision to transfer and instigate
or champion a policy procedure will be dependent on the support of one or more actors,
among others they identify elected officials, think tanks, bureaucrats, policy experts
and supranational organisations (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz and Marsh,
1996). The role of the policy actor is seen as a key advocate in the identification of
what lessons can be drawn from the engagement. They possess strong skill sets and
belong to networks of other experts that generate and steer new policies and procedures
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). Depending on the complexity and nature of the transfer,
increasingly, it has become the role of non-government experts and civil servants to
engage in the preliminary stages of a policy exchange (Marsden and Stead, 2011).
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The role of non-state vehicles as an enabler of policy transfer must also be given
consideration (Stone, 2000). Organisations such as Greenpeace, Climate Action
Network Europe and other international organisations operate within this realm (CAN
Europe, 2018; Stone, 2000). Independent policy institutes and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) are also receptors and disseminators of policy diffusion, acting
outside of the scope of the government influence (ESRI, 2018; IMF, 2017). Stone
(2001) recognises that for some non-government actors, their aim is specifically
targeted at knowledge gathering “lesson drawing”. By means of networking and
position, they disseminate this knowledge. In doing so, they have attracted the title
“policy transfer entrepreneurs” (Williams and Dzhekova, 2014). They bring substance
and legitimacy to the process by means of rhetoric and language (Stone, 2001). Benson
and Jordan (2011) have asserted that the tactics of non-state actors are primarily
targeted at persuasive and voluntary methods of policy transfer.

3.7 What is transferred during the process?
O’Dolan and Rye (2012) suggest that the contents of a transfer can include goals,
policy instruments and programs, this can be represented by general similarities rather
than exact and concise policy designs (Williams and Dzhekova, 2014). The inclusion
of concepts, regulatory frameworks and techniques are also considered within the
scope of policy transfer (Marsden and Stead, 2011). In the context of the EU, it is more
frequent to experience “hard” coping of policies among member states. Insofar as EU
directives are applicable to all EU member states, such as the requirement to apply
VAT, outside of the EU this is a lesser-seen phenomenon (Benson and Jordan, 2011).
Policy transfer in relation to the transport sector is examined in the study by Marsden
and Stead (2011). The article applies the framework of Dolowitz and Marsh to
establish that the transfer of policies relating to transport are both common and heavily
politicised. The article also emphasises that “hard” copying among the transport
community is a rare commodity. In comparison, the connotation of “soft” copying is
more aligned to the transfer of concepts, ideas and attitudes (Evans and Davies, 1999).
The sharing of knowledge and learned experiences of policy actors can form the basis
of support for the implementation or the rejection of a policy (Moyson et al., 2017).
This was reiterated by Cairney (2007), who gave an account of the Scottish experience
during the introduction of the smoking ban, and how the Irish case had influenced the
debate for the uptake of that policy.
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3.7.1 From where are policies transferred?
Early adopters of policy change, initially focused their attention by looking
internally within an organisation or government structure for a pre-existing solution to
the problem at hand (Marsden and Stead, 2011). The decision to adopt an alternative
policy or procedure may be applied on a retrospective basis or taken from the current
prospectus (Evans, 2006). Marsh and Evans (2012) suggest that there is richness in
evaluating policy failures of the past, prior to engaging in the quest for a replacement
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Warren, 2017). Where an external remedy is sought,
policy transfers can originate from among others, state agencies, governments and
supranational organisations (O’Dolan and Rye, 2012). Dolowitz and Marsh (2000)
have grouped and phrased these categories as follows: “the international, the national
and the local”. Warren (2017) suggests, that such transfers take the form of legislation,
frameworks, policy designs and processes that commence in a different jurisdiction.
O’Dolan and Rye, (2012) examined the diffusion of knowledge pertaining to various
EU funding streams associated with the renewable energy Directive of 2008. Policy
transfer was identified to have been present in the administration of five different
processes. The study categorised the role of NGOs, academics, local government and
energy agencies, as the interface between the EU and the implementation of the policy
throughout the member states.
In the late 1990s the then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair was said to have drawn
inspiration from the policies of the Australian Labor governments of Hawke and
Keating (Reilly, 2007). The approach taken by the Australians appealed to the UK
Labour movement, to the extent that it offered a change in direction towards the
delivery of social democracy that would eventually manifest itself into the policies of
the New Labour government. In fact, it went so far as to extend into the Labour election
strategy by incorporating a selection of policies that were borrowed from the
Australian system (Manwaring, 2016). In turn, the policies of New Labour, in
particular, the “Third Way” programme; were cited as one of the influential factors for
the implementation of PPP into Ireland (Connolly et al., 2009). Dolowitz and Marsh
suggest that legislation introduced by the Blair Labour government in relation to
workforce policies, had its origins in the US. Furthermore, the same legislation based
on the UK interpretation would eventually transfer and spread throughout other EU
jurisdictions (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000).
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3.7.2 The degrees to which a policy can transfer?
Marsden and Stead (2011) identify the five categories of lesson-drawing first
established by Rose (1991) and subsequently amended by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000):
copying, emulation, hybridisation, synthesis and inspiration (Brady and Curtin, 2012).
In comparison to diffusion, lesson drawing retains a macro geographical perspective,
and focuses on identifying the inner workings and processes of a policy or procedure,
that once identified, can eventually lead to the adoption and uptake in another
jurisdiction (Dolowitz, 2017). In reality, it is rare to copy a policy in full, in most part,
the option will extend only to certain elements (Marsden and Stead, 2011). When a
policy is copied it entails a re-enactment from one jurisdiction to another, that more or
less transfers the components and inner workings of that programme (Williams and
Dzhekova, 2014). Policy emulation occurs when the influence of one state over
another, leads the recipient state, to imitate or reconstruct the policies of another
jurisdiction on the assumption of success or political standing (Lee and Strang, 2006).
Stone (2003) identifies that the motivation to emulate can be driven to achieve the
success or standards of another jurisdiction. This is best demonstrated by the actions
of EU accession states, whereby they willfully instil the practices and procedures of
the EU prior to obtaining full membership. Padgett and Bulmer (2005) suggest that
the European Monetary Union is said to have emulated the German monetary model
as an ideal standard. This can raise the phenomenon of “bandwagoning”, where
diffusion of a policy attracts latecomers to join the movement (Bovens et al., 2006;
Marsh and Sharman, 2009).
When elements of two or more policies are drawn together, a hybrid policy is
created (Benson and Jordan, 2011). The inclusion of an Ideology or cultural influence
can also be found in the formation of a hybrid programme (O’Dolan and Rye, 2012).
Warren (2017) identifies that the creation of the UK energy efficiency DSM policy,
was a hybrid creation, containing new and borrowed elements from the US PJM
energy capacity model. Among EU member states, synthesis policies are created when
EU directives are re-shaped in accordance with local norms (Padgett & Bulmer, 2005).
The welfare to work strategy, first introduced in 1998 by New Labour, was a hybrid
creation that had drawn lessons from the following jurisdictions: the Australian lone
parents “Working Nation” programme, the Dutch “Single Gateway” policy, the
Canadian “Making Work Pay” scheme and the US “Welfare to Work policy (Evans,
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2017). Where one jurisdiction draws inspiration from another, it can act as a
motivational influence to introduce a new policy or amendment. Although the end
result may not reflect an exact replica of the original source, it remains the key
inspiration for the change (Marsden and Stead, 2011).

3.7.3 The constraints pertaining to policy transfer
It is widely accepted that for a variety of reasons, policy transfers between
incompatible and ideological different structures may and do happen (Benson, 2009).
Constraints can be encountered where the governing process relating to economic
integration, imposes rules as a prerequisite to obtaining membership, this is evident
throughout EU, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the North American Free
Trade Area (NAFTA) (Bovens et al., 2006). Furthermore, due to diffusion and policy
globalisation, it makes it less likely for individual jurisdictions to take on the risk of
developing new or alternative policies; the net effect of this is that generates a
constraint on the delivery of innovative and better practices (Evans and Davies, 1999).
Warren (2017) suggests that in some instances, the ability to transfer a policy from one
jurisdiction to another is dependent on a window of opportunity; when this is not acted
upon the chances of a transition can be diminished (Williams and Dzhekova, 2014).
Electoral pressure may also pose a constraint for the implementation or rejection
of a policy (Stone, 2004). Where the political will is present and the appropriate policy
has been chosen, it may dilute the impact of any potential constraints that might have
a bearing upon the process (Cairney, 2007). Warren (2017) identifies that the lack of
time and resources may impact upon the level and scope of a transfer. This may be
compounded by inertia or entrenched interests, on the part of those actors engaged in
the decision-making process (Benson, 2009). Where policy actors experience a
disconnect in the early decision-making stage, or fail to identify the reasons for or the
rationale behind the decision to indorse a policy, this can create hurdles later on in the
process (Evans, 2006). Monios (2017) recognises that complexities can surround the
transfer process, in some instances where the government endorses an intermediary or
organisation to act as a gatekeeper during the transfer process. It can act as a barrier
by excluding those “learning brokers” that bring new knowledge to the field of policy
transfer (Moyson et al., 2017). The role of gatekeeper is afforded to government
advisors and civil servants who take on the task of selecting the most desirable policies
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that will generate the least amount of negative feedback (Monios, 2017). Under the
Blair government, an approach was taken to establish the Centre for Management and
Policy Studies (CMPS). Its remit was to create a link between the government and
academia for the purpose of making international policy comparisons prior to
implementing any future proposals. By adopting a lessons learnt approach, it sought
to negate any constraints to the process (Evans, 2017).

3.8 What drives policy transfer to fail
Monios (2017) challenges us to decide whether the presence of isomorphism can
aid or impede in the process of diffusion that surrounds the transfer of a policy. The
author raises a further question by asking if it promotes the likelihood of programme
failure, which in turn increases the rate of policy turnover. Isomorphism is identified
as the desire to imitate or replicate the form and structure of another, as a means to
attaching legitimacy or credibility to the implementation of a policy (Radaelli, 2000).
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have identified three elements to identify the
characteristics and presence of isomorphism: coercive isomorphism which stems from
political influence or persuasion, mimetic isomorphism relates to the pressure of
uncertainty that results in one jurisdiction replicating the perceived success of another
and finally normative isomorphism being the requirement to adhere to professional
standards or accreditation. Isomorphism has been described as mimicking the practices
and procedures of another jurisdiction, it may also help explain why Ireland instigated
a PPP programme, to begin with (Connolly et al., 2009; Sheppard & Beck, 2016).
Where failure has been identified, it is often attributed to the incompleteness and
inappropriateness of the policy (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). This can be exacerbated
when “crucial elements” of the policy go unrecognised during the transfer process
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; James and Lodge, 2004). Which leads policy actors to
make a fundamental mistake of believing that a policy that has worked in one
jurisdiction, will ultimately succeed in another (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). Brady
and Curtin (2012) examined the transfer of the “Big Brothers Big Sisters” social
services programme, that had originated in the US, and was subsequently implemented
into Ireland and the UK. The study identified that although the programme had failed
to gain a footing in the UK due to cultural differences, it did manage to achieve success
under the Irish policy setting.
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Where policy transfer is said to have occurred, there is often ambiguity
surrounding the extent of that transfer, under certain instances, it is merely an exchange
of influence and not a policy exchange in the true meaning of the word (Manwaring,
2016). Awareness is also brought to the phenomenon of “political spin”, proclaiming
the success of a policy in light of its failure to transfer (Marsh and Sharman, 2009).
Learning from the mistakes of others or “negative lesson drawing” helps to alleviate
the prospect of policy transfer failure (Leiber et al., 2015). In reality, it is not
inconceivable to believe that the rationale behind most policy adoptions will include
to some extent the observation of current transfers, and in particular, those policies
that have failed in the past (James and Lodge, 2004). Warren (2017) reminds us that
there is no one definitive definition, that can clarify how policy transfer is measured
as a success.

3.9 Summary
In the context of this research, policy transfer theory will be utilised to determine
the findings in relation to research question one and two, a summary of which is given
in chapter five and chapter six respectively. To summarise the above sections, it was
discovered that policy transfer theory can be applied on a prospective or retrospective
basis. In doing so, it provides scope to evaluate the initial introduction of the Irish
policy and to identify the influences that were extended over that process. The outcome
of which will provide us with a determination to substantiate the argument that the
introduction of the Irish PPP policy was enacted under voluntary, semi-coercive or
coercive conditions. It will also provide scope to evaluate the similarities and
differences that have evolved over the previous two decades since the Irish policy was
first introduced; this will be examined further in research question one, which seeks to
identify:
What are the similarities and differences that exist between the Irish PPP
and UK PFI policies and to recognise the element of change that has
occurred since the Irish policy was first introduced.
It also provides grounds to determine why in October 2018, the UK government
announced that it was abandoning its PFI policy; in the same period that the Irish
government announced that it would retain and provide continued support for the Irish
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PPP programme. The impact of these decisions will be examined further in chapter six
of this study, and will be utilised to determine an answer to research question two, i.e.
to recognise:
What is the initial alignment and subsequent divergence that has occurred
between the Irish PPP and UK PFI policies
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Chapter Four: Methodology
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4.1 Introduction
The objective of this study is to conduct a comparative analysis of the role that
PPP has played within the confines of Irish public policy, set against the backdrop of
the UK PFI policy. We focus on four events, the time-line surrounding the presence of
influence, the impact of the financial crisis, the measures set-forth to rejuvenate the
policy and ultimately the point of divergence that occurred in 2018. By means of desk
research, it was possible to obtain an up-to-date assessment of the current Irish PPP
policy and to evaluate the occurrences of past changes (DPER, 2018; Marsh and
Evans, 2012). This culminated in the composition of three research questions, which
necessitated an extended review of UK literature. The application of policy transfer
theory has been determined as the most appropriate theoretical framework to steer this
study. The conceptual framework of Dolowitz and Marsh will also be employed to
demonstrate the existence of policy transfer, in addition to defending the argument for
the presence of voluntary, semi-coercive and coercive adoption.

4.2 The Nomination of the research questions
The argument to engage in a comparative assessment was first prompted by
commentary derived from the literature, where mimicry, isomorphism and diffusion
were identified as having a bearing over the implementation of the Irish PPP policy
(Connolly et al., 2009) The act of mimicry is defined as the deed of copying (Stone,
2004). Isomorphism, the process of borrowing the shape, structure and form of an
another (Connolly et al., 2009). Diffusion the transition of a policy or procedure
between neighbouring jurisdictions (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). Despite this, previous
research had failed to engage in a comprehensive comparison between both the Irish
PPP and the UK PFI policies, it is this argument that will later form the objective of
research question one.
The literature presented evidence that a timeline exists in relation to the decisionmaking process to implement, retain or abandon both policies. It was further
demonstrated that the decision to implement the PPP programme, was initially made
at the discretion of the Irish government. By application of Dolowitz and Marsh’s
framework, we have defined this action as being voluntary in nature. As a consequence
of the financial crisis and to satisfy the terms of the Troika agreement, the policy was
amended to supplement the 2012 stimulus package, this action is indicative of a semi58

coercive decision (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996b). Following the announcement in
October 2018 by the UK Chancellor Philip Hammond, that based on compelling
evidence, PFI offers no value for the taxpayer or transfers risk to the private sector…he
was abandoning the policy. In the context of this decision, we surmise that this was a
coercive action, imposed upon the UK government. In the same period, the Irish
government announced their steadfast commitment to retain the PPP policy. By
application of the Dolowitz and Marsh framework the decision of the Irish authorities,
can be categorised as being voluntary in nature (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996b).
Research question two seeks to understand this timeline of events and to decipher what
those driving factors were.
Research question three, evaluates the landscape in which the Irish PPP policy
currently resides. The departure of the UK PFI policy is also noted, alongside the
changing objectives of the government surrounding the future use and position of the
policy.
(1) What are the similarities and differences that exist between the Irish PPP
and UK PFI policies and to recognise the element of change that has
occurred since the Irish policy was first introduced.
(2) What is the initial alignment and subsequent divergence that has occurred
between the Irish PPP and UK PFI policies.
(3) To identify what incentivises the state to retain its PPP policy
and to examine how Economic, Legal and Public Policy Perspectives retain
an influence over that process.

4.3 Research paradigm
A research paradigm is a description given to an encompassing framework by
which to engage in a process of systematic inquiry, it holds influence over what is
studied, how the study is approached and the interpretation of the findings (Bryman,
2013). Associated paradigms have become related to individual methodologies, a
positivist paradigm is best adapted to a quantitative methodology. An interpretative or
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constructivist paradigm engages in a qualitative methodology (Bagele and Kawulich,
2012). To begin the process of inquiry, researchers must first process their
philosophical assumptions in relation to the nature of reality and existence “ontology”
(Creswell et al., 2013). This is further extended to incorporate how the researcher
correlates new knowledge and the understanding of how this was obtained
“epistemology” (Braun and Clarke, 2006).
A qualitative research study engages a constructivist paradigm by which to
derive its findings. In doing so, it purports that knowledge is sourced from socially
constructed practices. Social reality, therefore, is generated and conceived in the minds
of those people engaged in the process (Yazan, 2015). A quantitative research study
undertakes a positivist paradigm to engage in the research process. It supports the
view, that science is the foundation for all true knowledge and by engaging in
quantifiable techniques, methods and procedures, this framework purports to offer the
optimal perspective, by which, to discover and investigate the social world that exists
around us (Bagele and Kawulich, 2012). Consideration should also be given to the
divergence and different assumptions that each paradigm states to offer, ultimately
they are inconsistent with each other and purport a different perspective of reality
(Bryman, 2013). However, a decision as to which paradigmatic framework is best
suited to each individual study, will ultimately be determined by the research question
and the researcher alike (Bagele and Kawulich, 2012). Ethical consideration should
also be given prevalence throughout the duration of the research, from the framework
design stage to the ultimate conclusion. Different paradigms may encounter different
ethical issues, relevant to each individual study. Ethical issues may be encountered
when addressing areas such as informed consent and participant wellbeing and safety
(Fossey et al., 2002).

4.3.1 Philosophical framework
Whether consciously or subconsciously as researchers, we inevitably bring
learned beliefs and philosophical assumptions to our field of study. This holds
influence over our decision-making process in relation to what problems we need to
solve and what research questions we should ask, and how the data obtained will be
processed. The focus remains, that we should be aware of these assumptions and
influences and decide as to whether to include or reject them from our studies
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(Creswell, 2013). The belief structure pertaining to the Paradigm framework is based
on the following assumptions, an Ontological, Epistemological, and Methodological
perspective. Each representing a worldview, that collectively acknowledges the
researchers view and position in that world alongside the range of possible sub
relationships that exist. These beliefs must be accepted on the basis of faith, without
the possibility of establishing their truthfulness (Guba and Linclon, 1994).

4.3.2 Ontology
The characteristics and nature of reality are defined by the researchers
ontological beliefs. Qualitative research, by definition, embraces a multitude of
participant realities. Different researchers, in turn also perceive multiple realities as
will the readers of their findings (Creswell, 2013). The ontological assumption
occupies two opposing positions, objectivist, believe that reality exists outside of the
researchers’ own perception of reality. In essence, quantitative research can be said to
hold an objectivist ontology, reifying the social world (Bryman, 2013). In contrast,
constructivism and interpretivism are concepts that seek to understand the lived
experience of others and how that relationship compares with reality. Key differences
between both positions, highlight that constructivism seeks to understand the nature of
reality, the source of knowledge and what defines knowledge within a qualitative
setting (Bagele and Kawulich, 2012; Braun and Clarke, 2006). The researchers’
ontology, can be referred to as a set of philosophical assumptions, general in nature,
as to how we view reality in the world in which we occupy (Maxwell, 2009).

4.3.3 Epistemology
The epistemological framework can be defined as a concept of knowledge,
dependent on a set of stable assumptions relating to the subjects that the epistemology
seeks to address (Thomas, 2015). A view taken at the initial project concept stage,
epistemology is a description given to the relationship between the researcher and the
research. It guides the researcher to say what is known about the existing research and
to further demonstrate an understanding of how new knowledge is discovered (Braun
and Clarke, 2006). In most part, the epistemological framework is dependent on the
underline assumption relating to, what is true and what exists “ontological
assumptions” (Thomas, 2015). Epistemology maintains three positions, positivism,
social constructivism and interpretivism. Positivism states, that outside of
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consciousness there is only one singular objective reality. Social constructionism
proclaims that social groups and individuals create their own reality within a social
context. Interpretivism aligns with the views of social constructionism, in that, social
reality is subjectively constructed based on social interaction and interpretation
(Quinlan et al., 2015).
Epistemology can be seen as the relationship between what we know and what
can be known, Positivism or realist seeks to investigate the research objective from a
distance, insuring independence free from bias and influence (Guba and Linclon,
1994). Ultimately a realist perspective, takes an outside-looking-in perspective,
enabling the researcher to theorise meaning (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In comparison,
the constructivist position focuses on a set of social norms by which social actors play
a role in constructing their own reality (Dahler-Larsen, 2001). The implication here is
that social categories are formed through social integration, and are in a constant state
of change. The researchers own accounts are also called in to question, and they
themselves are perceived as constructions of a specific version of social reality.
Therefore, knowledge is defined as a temporary and intermediate position (Bryman,
2013). The constructivist position, holds an inside looking out perspective, and
determines how events and realities, experiences and meanings can influence greater
society (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

4.4 Methodology
The research methodology not only considers the methods that the researcher
will apply to conduct the study, but it also seeks to comprehensively explain the logic
and reasoning behind the selection process (Kothari, 2004). Rigour must also be
applied to the methodological approach, to ensure that the research design is
appropriate to the study. Stringent measures should test that the appropriate sampling
and data collection method have been applied. Consideration should be given to
analytical strategies, in addition to the presentation and interpretation of the research
findings (Fossey et al., 2002). To determine the objective of the study, the researcher
must decide upon a qualitative or quantitative approach. The qualitative approach can
provide the researcher with rich content derived from semi-structured interviews,
thematically analysed by comparing, grouping and refining the contextual data. A
quantitative research study, supports the view, that science is the foundation for all
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true knowledge and is defined by engaging in quantifiable techniques, methods and
procedures (Bagele and Kawulich, 2012). For the purposes of this study, a qualitative
approach has been determined as the most appropriate method to determine its
findings.

4.5 Research Design
The research design is a composition of four components, the research questions,
the theory, the data, and the subsequent analysis (Keohane et al., 1994). Whatever
methods are employed, they must steer and give purpose to the research and ultimately
answer the questions that the study purports to address (Robson, 2002). The
recognition of prior studies can act as a precedent to identify the appropriate collection
methods and the most relevant theory (Keohane et al., 1994). For the purpose of this
research, Policy Transfer theory had been recognised throughout the literature as the
most appropriate framework to reach a determination, that a policy in one jurisdiction
can subsequently transfer to another jurisdiction (Minkman et al., 2018). Throughout
the field of social research, engaging in an interview process is a widely accepted
method of engagement. In the context of public policy research, semi-structured
interviews have become a frequently used approach?.

4.6 Engaging in a case study
In the context of the social sciences case studies are crucial for the purpose of
description, insofar as, they provide an account for what it is that we seek to explain
(Keohane et al., 1994). In its simplest form, a case study is a research method by which
an event or phenomenon is observed in detail, for the purpose of gaining an in-depth
understanding (Bryman, 2013). Robson (2002) sets forth, that a case study can be more
commonly understood as an investigation into a prescribed situation, an individual or
group. Yin (2003) argues that by introducing an appropriate case study design, it
becomes possible to ascertain “how and why” events occur. From a social science
perspective, this can also include an event, a decision or the introduction of legislation
(Keohane et al., 1994). Harling (2012) narrows this selection down into two singular
case types, intrinsic and instrumental and furthermore the author identifies the
collective case study, as one that incorporates a series of multiple instrumental cases.
A categorisation process must also be undertaken to ensure that a case is either an
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“intrinsic study” i.e. one being “case dominant”, or alternatively as an “instrumental
study” which is identified as being “issue dominant” (Yazan, 2015, p.141).
The contribution from authors such as Yin, Stake and Merriam demonstrate
different perspectives for the researcher to consider, when deciding on which case
study approach is most suited to the research in question. The line adopted by Yin, is
theory-driven and rigid in form, it favours an exploratory approach (Harling, 2012).
Yin has presented this as a group of case types, single holistic and embedded, multiple
holistic and multiple embedded, the creation of each case type is produced by
multiplying and merging the preceding case into a larger study group and then
systematically analysing the results (Yazan, 2015). Bryman (2013) suggests that the
methods set forth by Yin places a higher emphasis on validity and reliability than the
contributions made by Merriam and Stake. Their approach is less regimented than that
of Yin, they favour flexibility and draw influence from the literature review and by
placing a higher emphasis upon the research questions to steer the case to its
conclusion (Yazan, 2015). In a wider context, the adoption of a comparative case study
seeks to acknowledge the causal link between two or more individual cases, that in
turn might help identify differences, patterns or similarities within the confines of a
common program or policy initiative (Goodrick, 2014). For the purposes of this study,
a comparative small-N case study approach was adopted to identify the similarities
and differences that exist between the Irish PPP and the UK PFI policies, dominated
from an Irish perspective.
To validate the precision of the research, Runeson and Host (2009) lend their
support to the four-stage triangulation process as presented by Stake (1995) (see table
3.1). Through the adoption of multiple collection methods, it adds clarity and
substantiates the overall concept of the study (Eisenhardt, 2007). Triangulation is a
deliberate attempt to test the origins of the data, by means of cross-checking and
comparison, that will ultimately attribute credibility to the process (Bryman, 2013;
Fossey et al., 2002). It acts as a defensive mechanism to counter any threat to the
validity of the study (Robson, 2002), by conducting a search for discrepancies
(Maxwell, 2012).
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It was highlighted during the literature review that similar institutional structures have
developed between the UK and Ireland (Connolly et al., 2009; EPEC, 2012a). This
provided a common background by which to evaluate the policies of both jurisdictions,
including the timeline of events within each holistic setting. To deliver on the
objectives of this comparative study, an in-depth analysis was made to understand the
rationale behind the success and failure of the case in question, and to then locate the
relevant evidence to demonstrate this (Goodrick, 2014). The evidence in question was
sourced by means of document analysis (the literature review) and by the contribution
gained during the interview process (Hancock and Algozzine, 2007).

Table 4.1: Stake’s four stages of triangulation
Method of
Triangulation

Source of Data

Data Source

Observations, Interview with Informants, Gather Surveys.

Investigation

Recorded Events, Testimonies, Illustrations and Interpretations.

Theory

Review case boundaries, Participant arrangements, Past reviews.

Methodology

Gather additional data, engage in replicating.

4.7 Collection of data
Data collection methods applicable to this study were sourced extensively by
means of a qualitative approach, although the scope of the study is positioned in a
financial setting, it was deemed less-relevant to source quantitative data.
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Table 4.2: The three phase approach to data collection

Phase 1

•Engage in a literature review to gain a comprehensive understanding of
past and present events pertaining to the Irish PPP policy. To identify
the current gap in the literature.

Phase 2

•To source secondary data by reviewing the literature pertaining to the
UK PFI policy, to source additional data relating to policy transfer
theory.

Phase 3

•To develop and refine a series of research question, to compose the
relevant semi-structured interview questions, to obtain primary data and
subsequently examined this by means of thematic analysis.

4.7.1 Phase one: the literature review
By means of desk research, a literature review was conducted to gain an
understanding of the current state of play and past events surrounding the Irish PPP
policy. This required an extensive search of government publication, peer-reviewed
articles, the published papers of supranational organisations and other stakeholder
groups with a vested interest in the policy. Once complete an assessment was made to
identify the presence of themes, that would lead to the formation of our research
questions.

4.7.2 Phase two: the review of the UK literature including policy transfer
theory
An extended search was also taken in relation to UK policy documents. Given
the structure and similarities between both policies, the same areas of interest provided
the necessary research material, notably government publication, peer-reviewed
articles and supranational organisations. The review also sought to identify the
existence of policy transfer, among the different jurisdictions associated with the
policy. The requirement to do so, provided this researcher with real-life examples of
how policy transfer theory has worked in practice, it is this theme that would
subsequently form the basis of research question two:
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4.7.3 Phase three: gathering primary data, semi-structured interviews
Almost contradictory, the use of the semi-structured interview allows for
flexability while simultaneously providing depth to the process (Robson, 2002). The
term semi-structured, the recognition of a non-formal encounter, is identified as being
the exchange between the researcher and the participant, formulated around themes,
areas of interest that have emerged during the literature review (Balbach, 1999). By
adopting this format, it allows for the engagement to change direction and find its own
course (Bryman 2013; Edmondson and Mcmanus, 2007). In contrast, alternative
interview methods have also been identified. The objective of a structured interview,
requires that a direct and comparable answer is given in reply to a series of predetermined questions. The unstructured interview is open-ended and conversation like,
in comparison focus groups encompass a collective engagement (Alsaawi, 2014;
Bryman, 2013). For the purpose of this study, the semi-structured interview approach
has been determined as the most appropriate method by which to extrapolate primary
data (Keohane et al., 1994).
The most important rule for all data collection is to report how the data
were created and how we came to possess them (Keohane et al., 1994,
p51).
Unique to this study, given the high value associated with PPP investments and
the level of decision making that surrounds this process. It was necessary to seek the
contribution of those in a position of authority or standing within the PPP sector. Bika
(2017) suggests that elite interviewees are people who are known to occupy a senior
public position such as a minister, advisors and executives of large companies or
organisations. They have the potential to present a challenge for the researcher in
relation to the perception of trust, once a rapport can be established they have the
potential to provide rich and unique content (Harvey, 2011). However, due to their
position or public profile, they run a greater risk of exposure or breaches of anonymity.
Despite efforts to disguise their identity, the content of their contribution can lead to
exposure (Willis, 2019).
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4.8 Participant recruitment
Table 4.3: The participant recruitment process

Phase 1

• Key events were identified during the literature review,
including organisations, PPP projects and associated actors

• Content search of the NDFA home page, to obtain details from
the Preferred Tender list, publised as a requirement under EU
Phase 2 procurement law

Phase 3

Phase 4

• Identified specific key organisations, evaluated there past and
present participation in PPP, engaged in staff profilling.

• Targeted online search of key staff profiles related to specific
organisations, Identified their positions, located contact details

The process of participant recruitment was first considered during the literature
review, where key events were identified, it prompted an additional search of the
NDFA home page to identify the details of the parties involved. Under EU
procurement legislation the NDFA is obligated to publish the details of the contracting
authority, in addition to the preferred tenderer. By means of desk research, a listing
was complied of those companies that had invested or engaged in the provision of PPP.
Under closer inspection, key staff were identified within these organisation, by means
of online publications and staff profiling. Those that were identified were selected
from the following sectors, Legal, Financial, Public Policy, and PPP construction and
Investment sectors. Due to the narrow scope of the Irish PPP sector, there were
constraints on the number of participants that could be considered suitable to partake
in this study.
In November 2019 twelve prospective interviewees were identified and
subsequently contacted to participate in the study. The invitation outlined the
objectives of the study, in addition to the themes that would guide the semi-structured
interview process. Furthermore, the responsibilities of the researcher and the ethical
considerations that would govern the process were also conveyed to the participants.
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In all, eight participants agreed to participate in the study, two abstained from the
invitation, a further two did not reply to the initial invitation or to a follow-up invite
some two weeks later.

Table 4.4: Participant Details

Participant
No.

Sector

Position

Participant 1

Financial /
Economic

Financial Advisor in a big-four Accountancy firm, lead
advisor in relation to European and Middle Eastern PPP
investment.

Participant 2

Financial /
Economic

Private Sector Senior PPP negotiator, engaged in both
Irish PPP and UK PFI procurement.

Participant 3

Political

Participant 4

Political/Public

Participant 5

Legal

Participant 6

Financial /
Economic

Participant 7

Legal

Participant 8

Legal

Ex-Irish Government Minister
A senior member of the European Investment Bank
A legal advisor to the NDFA
An Economist and leading contributor on the subject of
PPP
A legal advisor and lecturer on EU, Competition &
Procurement Law,
A legal advisor, lecturer and published author on EU,
Competition & Procurement Law,
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4.8.1 Ethical approval
As a prerequisite prior to engaging in the semi-structured interview process, with
the participants of this study. It was necessary to obtain the relevant ethical clearance
from the TU Dublin Tallaght Campus. The purpose of which is to control the impact
between the researcher and the participants, to ensure that the interaction is not
distorted or misleading of the truth (Robson, 2002). An application in this regard had
been submitted to the ethics committee in March 2018, final approval was
subsequently granted in June 2018. As part of the initial invitation that was extended
to the targeted group of participants, it also entailed a request for their consent to
partake in this study. The contents of the consent form underlined that their input was
voluntary, and that the participant understood the objectives of the study. Furthermore,
it gave reassurances in relation to the storage of data and the anonymity of those
involved, this also ensured complience with the recently introduced legislation
surrounding GDPR. In this regard, it is the policy of TU Dublin to encrypted and store
all participant data on the grounds of the campus, and to subsequently destroy such
content once the study has been completed. Prior to engaging in the interview process,
both parties signed the agreement, and a copy was subsequently given to each
participant.

4.8.2 Pilot interview
In July 2018 a pilot interview was undertaken with an academic staff member
from the TU Dublin, Tallaght campus. The objective of which, was to test-run a series
of interview questions that would eventually steer the semi-structured interview
process. It also provided a testing ground to evaluate the response and sensitivity of
the interview questions, in addition to indicating any necessary timing issues or
restructuring to the underlining format. Furthermore, it provided the necessary
feedback to rank and order the questions in accordance with each individual
participant. Throughout the process attention was also paid to the skills of the
interviewer, feedback was given at the end of the process, to highlight the positive and
negative aspects that had developed over the course of the interaction. Prior to
engaging in the live-round interviews with the participants, the necessary steps were
taken to address any issues that had come to light during the pilot stage.
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4.8.3 Interviews
In December 2019 the interview process commenced with the eight participants
that had been identified during the recruitment stage. Prior to commencing, each
participant was given the opportunity to determine if any areas of conversation were
out of bounds or beyond the scope of the interview. Time was also taken to reinforce
the conditions attaching to the retention of data and to give assurances in respect of
anonymity. On almost all occasions the agreed location to conduct the interview, was
in a boardroom setting of the entity concerned. Throughout the interview process, the
researcher took guidance from a pre-prepared schedule, tailored accordingly to each
individual participant. The key objective of this task was to gather sufficient and
appropriate samples of ‘interview data’ as to reach a determination with respect to
research question two and three accordingly. In turn, the contributions that were
subsequently received would collectively contribute to the overall findings. In
addition, while the initial task of recording the interviews was undertaken by means of
a digital dictaphone, with the consent of the participant, the researcher also took the
added precaution of recording the event on a back-up device.
In summary, each interview was conducted in a fluid-like fashion, where a
priority was given to listening above engaging in dialogue, this avoided the necessity
to stop or cut short the process. As the interviews progressed, consideration was also
given to the effectiveness and strength of the questions, which were subsequently
edited and ranked accordingly. Once concluded each participant was personally
thanked for agreeing to partake in the study. Immediately afterwards confirmation was
sought to determine that the interview had been captured in full, allowing for the backup copy to be deleted. In the subsequent days, a follow-up email was sent to each
participant to again thank and acknowledge their participation in the study.

4.9 Data extraction
During the course of the face-to-face interviews, the average audio recording
had taken approximately 30-40 minutes to conclude, the content of which was captured
using a digital dictaphone. Upon completion of the interview process, it then became
necessary to extract the contributions that were shared by each participant. This
necessitated transferring the initial raw audio file on to a desktop device to begin the
process of transcription, from audio to MS Word format. Prior to advancing to the next
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stage of the process, the transferred data was assigned a working title and stored in an
encrypted file. The task of transcribing the interviews was undertaken by the
researcher in person, in turn, this provided the opportunity to gain familiarity with the
content of the interviews. This was addressed by means of Logic Pro audio editing
software, this provided the opportunity to loop audio segments, apply independent
volume control and to initiate start-stop functions to capture precisely what each
participant said. Once this task was complete, the transcripts were securely stored in
an encrypted file for security.

4.9.1 Data analysis
Upon completion of the data extraction phase, it is important that consideration
is given to apply the most suitable approach by which to analyse the extracted data.
Within the confines of qualitative analysis, there are several approaches that may merit
consideration. Notable interpretative approaches such grounded theory, discourse
or thematic analysis, all of which share commonalities or traits (Smith, 2014). Of
relevance to this research, Braun and Clarke (2006) identify that a correlation exists
between thematic analysis and discourse analysis, in that an overlap exists between
both approaches. Discourse analysis is an applied research method that attempts to
decipher the context of language and its subtext. In doing so it attempts to capture the
underlying tone or broader meaning that can be found within the content of both
written or spoken dialogue (Symon and Cassell, 2004). It seeks to extract and analyse
the unspoken narrative or tension that can be present within a social exchange or
process (Fairclough, 2001). In contrast, thematic analysis takes a broader approach to
detect the presence of themes or patterns within the content of the discourse. In this
regard, both forms of analysis share a common inductive approach (Gorman and
Macintosh, 2015), and on occasion, this has proved difficult to ascertain a demarcation
between both methods of enquiry (Bovens et al., 2006). For the purpose of this
research, it was determined that thematic analysis was the preferred analytical
approach given the scope of the study and the subset of objectives that it sought to
examine.

4.9.2 Thematic analysis (Nvivo)
The practice of deciphering the qualitative data that was captured during the
semi-structured interview process, required this researcher to engage in a thematic
analysis process. The product of which, will be further analysed by introducing this
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data into the NVivo software process, where it can be interrogated in an organised and
structured fashion. NVivo is described as a computer-aided qualitative data analysis
software (CAQDAS), that has gained popularity in recent years (Bryman, 2013). In
practice, it acts as an interface between the initial raw data and the processed findings,
however, it is ultimately the researcher that identifies the extracted codes and themes
(Demirag et al., 2015). NVivo also provides the researcher with an audit trail
pertaining to past events, this measure can also act to underpin the validity of the study.
Although other similar types of software exists (Wholey et al., 2015), NVivo has been
chosen as the preferred choice to address this study. To add competency to the task, in
May 2018 this researcher undertook a two-day training course in NUI Galway to
achieve the fundamental skills that are necessary to utilise this software.

4.9.3 Braun and Clarke thematic framework
Thematic analysis is an applied procedure to identify, interpret and categorise
data pertaining to the focus of the research. It is structured on a series of codes that
stem from the transcripts or field notes relating to the study (Bryman, 2013). The
framework adopted to conduct this research, is one emanating from the approach of
Braun and Clarke, and is identified as a six-stage process (Maguire and Delahunt,
2017). Braun and Clarke (2006) acknowledge that some phases of the thematic
analysis process are commonplace, in contrast, their approach brings flexibility to the
procedures, insofar as, it is not a linear process.
The opening stage of the framework requires the researcher to gain familiarity
with the contents of the transcribed interviews, this was achieved when this researcher
self-transcribed the recorded interviews. In the second stage of the process, the data
was probed for meaningful content that carried the sentiment of the participants,
towards the specific objectives of the research. This stage of the analysis has been
identified as the open coding procedure. During the third phase of the process, efforts
were made to recognise similarities within the data; by identifying shared viewpoints
and overlapping that had the potential to lead to the formation of themes. In the
subsequent stage, a review process was undertaken to determine if the relevant coding
had been captured. It was further necessary to identify if any themes had emerged from
this process; a drill-down and editing process then ensued to evaluate and summarise
each component. To illustrate this, a conceptual model was introduced to act as a visual
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aid to best demonstrate the aims of the study and the necessary course that was required
to determine its objectives (see Figure 3.1).
In stage five it was necessary to define and name the themes that evolved from
the process; a data reduction and consolidation process was then undertaken to
eliminate any unrelated or irrelevant coding, effectively a clean-up exercise. The
concluding stage “the write-up” seeks to determine an outcome in relation to research
question three, this will be examined in full in Chapter Seven. This researcher took the
added precaution of engaging in the exercise of co-coding. This necessitated the
assistance of a fellow postgrad student, to verify that the selection process was accurate
and relevant to the objectives of the study.

4.10 Summary
This chapter commenced by introducing the current obstacle “the gap” in the
literature, it was subsequently followed by a series of questions that put forth the
arguments of this study. As a means of address, a three-phase approach was adopted
to gather sufficient evidence to substantiate these arguments. The collection of which
was sourced from the body of existing literature, and by means of primary research.
This process was governed by a prerequisite to obtain ethical approval, the goodwill
of the participants and the necessity to engage in a semi-structured interview process.
The product of which was subsequently analysed within the confines of the NVivo
software platform and by adoption of Braun and Clarke’s thematical framework. The
purpose of which was to identify themes, that would eventually lead to the discovery
of findings.
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Figure 4.1
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter explores research question one, insofar as, it charts the introduction
of PPP to become an instrument within the state’s public procurement policy. We
identify the advocates that favoured its introduction, set against a backdrop of a fiscal
surplus and an acute deficit in infrastructure. Recognition is also given to the UK PFI
policy, for the influence that it extended over the Irish procedures (Connolly et al.,
2009; Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998; Petersen, 2011; Sheppard and Beck, 2016). For this
reason, we engage in desk research to equate the similarities and traits that exist
between both policies and those that have developed over the intervening period. We
will construct our analyse by examining both policies under the following criteria.
1. The structure of PPP/PFI finance
2. Issues pertaining to Risk and Transparency
3. The Procurement Procedures that apply to PPP/PFI
4. The Budgetary Controls
5. The Stakeholders engaged in the process
6. Aspects pertaining to Value for Money
We seek to examine the similarities and differences between both policies, and
in doing so answer research question one i.e. to:
What are the similarities and differences that exist between the Irish PPP
and UK PFI policies and to recognise the element of change that has
occurred since the Irish policy was first introduced.

5.2 The evolution of PPP policy in Ireland
As stated in Chapter Two, the notion that Ireland would engage with the PPP
model was first considered in 1997. A subsequent government review and policy
introduction set Ireland on course to become one of many European nations engaging
with the PPP model (Reeves, 2015; Department of the Taoiseach, 2000). Throughout
this time, many jurisdictions embarked upon their own journey of engagement with
PPP, developing different standards and policy interpretations. Under the Spanish
policy model, unlike other jurisdictions, there is no dedicated PPP unit, standardised
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contract clauses, or value for money assessment. This is not an isolated example,
several EU member states are found lacking in PPP strategy despite the long-term
implications. In particular, France was found to have no strategic tact for the role that
PPP should play within its fiscal policy, unlike its neighbour Spain, it records PPP
procurement as on balance sheet (ECO, 2018).
Table 5.1: The timeline of events surrounding the Irish PPP policy
1981

1992

Recession

Maastricht
Treaty

2000 PPP
Framework

2000-2003
Depletion of EU
Cohesion
Funding

1995-2000
Period of
Economic
growth

2008 The
Financial Crisis

1998 Deficit in
Infrastructure

2012 Stimulus
Package

1999
Introduction of
PPP

2018 Ireland
2040

However, to determine the evolution of the Irish PPP policy, commentators suggest
that one should look no further than its closest neighbour, the UK, as the precedent
that the government adopted to address its infrastructure deficit (Connolly et al., 2009;
Reeves 2015). The introduction of a policy similar to that of the UK, had gained the
government social legitimacy as part of the process (Connolly et al., 2009). In
perspective, the Irish policy relating to PPP has been inspired by international
experiences, in particular the UK model (Petersen, 2011). Prior to its introduction in
1999, the government had promoted the introduction of PPP, as an alternative means
of addressing the state’s capital infrastructure deficit. This was further influenced by
the Social Partnership Agreement and the requirements relating to the National
Development Plan (ICTU 2002; Petersen 2011). The PPP policy framework
introduced by the then Finance Minister Charlie McCreevy became enacted into law
under the Public Private Partnership Arrangements Act of 2002. To further strengthen
the policy, the National Development Finance Agency (NDFA) Act 2002 was
established to give guidance and to provide expertise in matters relating to PPP (ICTU,
2005). The NDFA act remained unchanged until amended in 2007, when the
government sought to strengthen the role and scope of the organisation. Initiated under
delegated authority, the remit of the NDFA provided overreaching guidance on all
matters relating to PPP within the state, with the exception of transport and local
authority procurement (Hearne, 2009; Department of the Environment, 2003; IBEC,
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2007). From a European perspective, a policy of best practice is administered by the
European PPP Expertise Centre, which is subsequently disseminated throughout the
region (Burke and Demirag, 2015; EPEC, 2016b). With regard to Ireland and the UK,
there is a paradox between both policy models and is best explained by the presence
of institutional isomorphism (Connolly et al., 2009). In this regard, like-for-like policy
measures have existed since the initial introduction of the PPP model into Ireland. To
determine this further, a perspective will now be taken to examine how both policies
have emerged over the course of time and to demonstrate what similarities and
divergence have since materialised throughout the intervening periods.
Consideration to develop a PPP policy in Ireland had formally begun in 1998,
when an inter-departmental group was tasked with evaluating the feasibility and
implications for the introduction of the policy. The decision to undertake the report
was commissioned by the then Fianna Fáil led government to determine the criteria by
which a PPP policy could be implemented (IBEC, 2006; Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998).
The presence of PPP type arrangements, have been evident in Ireland dating back to
the construction of the East-Link Bridge in 1984 (The US Department of Transport
2017; Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). At a local authority level, commencing in 1990,
there is verification of a relationship between private and public sectors in regard to
domestic waste collection (EPA, 2008). However, there is evidence to suggest that this
goes back even further, the relationship between church and state regarding the
provision of Education and Health within the state, can be viewed as a pre-cursor to a
public partnership arrangements (Fahey, 2005).
In June 1999, the then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern chaired a cross-departmental
committee, the Framework for Action on Infrastructural Development. Upon
conclusion of the third committee report, it was established that the core infrastructure
requirements were a national inter-urban road network, and a platform for change
programme to tackle the growing problem of Dublin transport congestion (NDP, 2001;
Department of the Taoiseach, 2001). The key findings also suggested an extension to
the LUAS network, improved DART and suburban rail services, along with the
proposal to engage in the PPP model as a means of delivering the aims of the National
Developments Plan (ICTU, 2002; Central Bank, 2004). Under the remit of the fifth
Social Partnership Agreement, The Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (2000),
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any buy-in to the proposal for implementing a PPP policy was negotiated in advance
of the draft PPP Framework and the publication and enactment of the Public Private
Partnership Arrangements Act, 2002. (ICTU, 2002; Petersen, 2011). The then Finance
Minister Charlie McCreevy stated:
I welcome and endorse the Framework for Public Private Partnerships
agreed between the social partners as a significant milestone in advancing
towards our shared objectives (Department of Finance, 2001).
At the time when the PPP model was first introduced into Ireland, the national
average income was exceeding that of the EU. To coincide with this, under-investment
in infrastructure was now creating a lag in the economy that needed to be addressed
(Hardiman, 2003). In response to this, the National Development Plan 2000-2006
outlined an expenditure programme to invest €26.6 billion into economic and social
infrastructure, included in this was a €1.85 billion investment to be administered by
means of PPP (Reeves, 2015). Through this initiative, the government had embarked
upon an immediate expansion of the PPP programme, the aim of which was to address
the infrastructure deficit in areas pertaining to transport, waste management facilities,
education and social housing (Hurst and Reeves, 2004). In many jurisdictions the
establishment of a dedicated PPP unit has become a standardised pre-requisite to PPP
policy implementation, offering guidance on VFM, regulation and the financial
process (OECD, 2009). It is also evident in the case of the UK PFI policy, that the
provision of a dedicated PPP unit had become a precedent for others to follow (EPEC,
2012). In line with international best practice in 1999 under the guidelines of the PPP
Framework, the government established a dedicated central PPP unit. Initially located
within the Department of Finance, the remit of the unit was to apply consistency and
guidance on all matters pertaining to PPP procurement (Department of the
Environment, 2003). This was in line with the Framework for Action on Infrastructural
Development, in a bid to facilitate private sector participation and investment into the
public sector (ICTU, 2002).
To achieve this goal, it further necessitated the introduction of legislation to
facilitate the incoming PPP policy. In relation to transport, the introduction of The
Transport (Railway Infrastructure) Act, 2001, by way of delegated authority, paved

80

the way for the establishment of The Railway Procurement Agency (RPA) (Petersen,
2011). The remit of the RPA sought to oversee the planning and development of the
new Luas and Metro transport systems. A progress report stated that in support of this
policy the government had determined a further series of projects for consideration,
that were scheduled for delivery under the remit of the PPP programme (IBEC, 2007;
ICTU, 2002). These included the inter-urban road network, Dublin Metro extension
and the LUAS project (Burke and Demirag, 2017; NDFA, 2015; NDP, 2001;
Department of the Taoiseach, 2001). The basis of any PPP transport policy requires a
sound legal framework by which government authorities can enter into and manage
PPP obligations on behalf of the state (World Bank, 2016). In comparative terms, the
Irish government was dedicated to setting in place a comprehensive package of
policies and regulations in respect of its PPP programme (Petersen, 2011).
In February 2002, the government set forth its policy in regard to the relationship
between local authorities and state bodies. The introduction of the Public Private
Partnership Arrangements Act 2002, delegated power to local authorities to enter into
joint venture PPP arrangements on behalf of the state (IBEC, 2006; Department of the
Taoiseach, 2001). The introduction of the Local Authority PPP Seed Fund, introduced
in 1999, was administered as a PPP grant aid scheme, to enable local authorities to
develop innovative projects in partnership with the private sector (Department of the
Environment, 2004). There are a number of valid reasons for implementing a PPP
legislation policy, given the complexity of PPP arrangements, enacting a legal
framework can give priority to the development process relating to the host country.
There is evidence to suggest that this has become common practice among countries
engaging within the PPP process (World Bank, 2016; Li et al., 2015). In line with other
countries such as the UK and Canada, Ireland has also developed a specialised
procurement agency. The National Development Finance Agency Act 2002 sought to
establish a stand-alone unit responsible for providing guidance relating to financial,
contractual and VFM assessment relating to PPP procurement (Reeves, 2015; NDFA,
2003).
By 2005 the role of the NDFA was expanded. The creation of the Centre of
Expertise within the NDFA would now oversee procurement of PPP contracts on
behalf of several government departments (IBEC, 2006). The scope of the NDFA is to
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provide advice in relation to financial structuring, risk and insurance, tender evaluation
and PPP fund raising, it does however exclude transport as this falls under the remit
of the NRA (NDFA, 2015). There is evidence to suggest that a centre of expertise
exists within the UK PFI framework; the remit of the unit is to provide human and
financial resources in pursuit of Value or Money (VFM) and cost effective public
services and investments (House of Commons Library, 2001). The European
Investment Bank (EIB) has invested in numerous PPP projects through the EU. It lends
full support to the creation of a centre of expertise, and envisages this as an imperative
part of the European PPP initiative. By promoting this agenda, it ensures the transfer
of shared knowledge and guidance to underpin the implementation of PPP throughout
the EU (EIB, 2016; IBEC, 2011). Under the remit of the NDFA (Amendment) Act
2007, the role of the NDFA was significantly expanded, insofar as it was now required
to represent the state in all public investments where the expenditure exceeds €20
million. With the exception of all local authority and transport PPP, the scope of the
NRA retained authority over all matters pertaining to transport procurement (NDFA,
2009). Under the amended terms of the act, the arm of the NDFA was strengthened,
where previously the advice received from the unit had been voluntary in relation to
PPP procurement and finance. Under the amended act it became mandatory for all
government departments and agencies to engage the services of the NDFA prior to
procurement expenditure (Petersen, 2011; NDFA, 2007; IBEC, 2011).

5.3 Policy events from the financial crisis to the 2012 Stimulus
package
As a consequence of the financial crisis, the impact upon the Irish PPP sector
along with the construction sector had succumb to a exogenous shock (DPER, 2018).
In addition to this, a significant drop in PPP investment was also evident, not only in
Ireland and the UK, but throughout Europe as a whole (Burke and Demirag, 2015).
Prior to the financial crisis, the government determination to pursue its PPP policy had
remained steadfast, PPP investment for the period 2008-2012 was estimated to reach
16% of planned infrastructure investment (Reeves, 2013). In support of the stimulus
package that was announced in July 2012, the government set forth the following
procurement programme; the school’s PPP bundle 4 and 5, DIT campus at
Grangegorman, the courts bundle and the primary care programme. The remit of the
NDFA extended to five of the eight projects, the remaining three PPP contracts relating

82

to transport fell under the guidance of the NRA (NTMA, 2013; Duggan, 2013). In
addition to the 2012 Infrastructure stimulus package, the government also introduced
amendments to the PPP policy framework to ensure a consensus for the measures that
were introduced (Burke and Demirag, 2015; NDFA, 2013b). This was highlighted by
the NTMA who reported:
From the outset of the launch of the stimulus programme, the NDFA has
recognised the importance of rebuilding investor interest in the Irish PPP
market in particular following the cancellation of a number of PPP tender
competitions in 2010 and 2011 as a result of the financial and fiscal crisis
(NTMA, 2013, p.8).
As a means of generating sufficient interest to finance the stimulus and to deliver
on the series of measures that were contained in the package; it was necessary for the
government to bring reform to the existing PPP policy (Reeves and Palcic, 2017). In
March 2013, the then NDFA chief executive Brian Murphy, announced a series of
changes that included reducing bidding costs by 50% and improved procurement times
from 18 to 15 months. Additional amendments included the provision of full planning
permission and exemplary design prior to engagement, aided by a standardised PPP
contract format (NDFA, 2013a). The introduction of these amendments bore strong
similarities to the changes that were introduced to the UK PFI 2 policy in December
2012. While the new changes brought about much needed appeal to entice new
investment, they strengthened the assumption that Ireland followed the precedent of
UK policy (Reeves and Palcic, 2017).

5.4 Defining the Difference
In section 2.7 of the literature review, an outline was presented of the research
questions that this study attempts to address. The aim of research question one seeks
to identify:
What are the similarities and differences that exist between the Irish PPP
and UK PFI policies and to recognise the element of change that has
occurred since the Irish policy was first introduced.
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The following sections will attempt to answer this question, by comparing the
similarities and traits that exist between both the UK PFI and the Irish PPP policies.
In section 2.3 an account was given of the financial crisis and the subsequent effect
that this placed upon the Irish economy. Details relating to the introduction of changes
to the original PPP policy were also determined in section 2.4. This section examines
the amendments to the Irish PPP policy that were implemented as part of the 2012
stimulus package, in comparison with the original policy, the details of which are
summarised in Table 5.2. In addition an evaluation is also undertaken between the
original UK PFI policy and the subsequent changes that were also introduced in 2012,
a summary of which is given in Table 5.3
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Table 5.2: A comparison of the original Irish PPP policy with the
amended Irish PPP policy
Theme

Financing of
Equity
Financing of
Debt

Original Policy 1999-2013

Amended Policy 2013- present

Low rates of private sector equity
investment (C&AG, 2004)

Private sector equity remains low
government seeks equity stake by use
of the National Pension Reserve
(Duggan, 2013; DPER, 2018b)

A blend of subordinated and
senior debt
(IBEC, 2013; Duggan, 2013b)

New and innovative sources of funding
e.g. EIB & ISIF funding
(Reeves and Palcic, 2017)

Transparency Lack of transparency and
and
accountability (PAC, 2012)
Accountability

Lack of transparency and
accountability remained unaddressed
under the amended terms
(Reeves et al., 2015)

(Reeves et al., 2015)

Issues were address, more
streamlined approach, 18 month
timeline is introduced
(IBEC, 2013; National Audit Office, 2015)

Concession toll method
(Burke and Demirag, 2015)

Availability based approach
(Reeves and Palcic, 2017)

Service
Provision

Introduced under the adoption of
the UK policy (C&AG, 2004)

Remained unchanged under the 2013
amendments (NDFA, 2013b)

Risk
Allocation

Insufficient risk transfer, public
sector exposed over lifetime of
project (Vodden, 2013)

Exposure of the public sector to
elements of risk when cost efficient to
do so (Vodden, 2013)

Budgetary
Control

No capping on PPP unitary costs
(DPER, 2016)

Capping control introduced in 2015,
subsequently removed in 2018
(DPER, 2016, 2018b)

Procurement

Transport
Concessions

Costly and drawn-out
procurement process

Introduction of social clause,
apprenticeship and long term
unemployment project quotas
(NTMA,2013)

Public Stake
holders

Not comprehensively addressed

Private

Not comprehensively addressed

Enterprise Ireland introduces 'Meet the
Buyer' event, PPP networking
showcase (Enterprise Ireland, 2014)

Identified as key element of PPP
(Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998)

Lack of transparency and evaluation
(Duggan, 2013a)

Stakeholders
VFM and
Efficiency
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Table 5.3: A comparison of the original UK PFI policy with the
amended PFI / PF2 policy
Theme

Financing of
Equity

Financing of
Debt

Original Policy 1992-2012

Amended Policy 2012-2018

Lack of public / private
collaboration and profit sharing

Government to seek equity share in all
PF2 projects 10%-25% stake

(Demirag et al., 2015)

(UK National Audit Office, 2018)

Lack of long term debt, costly with
low competition

More stringent and transparent
regulations, introduced public
awareness of the relative costs, risks &
benefits of PF2 (Vodden, 2013)

(UK National Audit Office, 2018)
Lack of transparency and
accountability

More stringent and transparent
regulations, introduced public
awareness of the relative costs, risks &
benefits of PF2 (Vodden, 2013)

Government staff lacking in
procurement skills, the overall
process was lengthy and drawnout (House of Commons Treasury
Committee, 2012)

Centralised procurement unit,
improved documentation process
procurement time reduced to 18
months procurement (Chancellor of the
Exchequer, 2012)

Shadow toll method, costly

Availability based approach

(EIB, 2011; OECD, 2015)

(Acerete and Gasca, 2019)

Lack of flexibility, expensive add
on (UK National Audit Office, 2018)

Removed from PF2 contract

Risk
Allocation

Insufficient risk transfer, public
sector exposed over lifetime of
project (Vodden, 2013)

Expose public sector to elements of
risk when cost efficient to do so
(Vodden, 2013)

Budgetary
Control

Non-alignment to sponsoring
department budget, off balance
sheet (EPEC, 2012a)

2015 Government introduced a cap of
£70 billion on total unitary costs (HM
Treasury, 2018a)

Not comprehensively addressed

Introduction of social clause,
apprenticeship and long term
unemployment project quotas (House of
Commons, 2013)

Transparency
and
(House of Commons Treasury
Accountability
Committee, 2012)

Procurement

Transport
Concessions
Service
Provision

Public
Stakeholders

Private
Stakeholders

Not comprehensively addressed

(Demirag et al., 2015)

'Meet the Buyer' PPP networking
showcase events are introduced
(Northern Ireland Assembly, 2014)

VFM and
Efficiency

Perceived as inefficient and costly
(Treasury Committee, 2012)
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Periodic review and assessment in
pursuit of VFM (Treasury Committee,
2014)

5.4.1 Financing of Equity
The initial guidelines set forth by the Irish government concerning the financial
structuring of the Irish PPP policy, had envisaged a similar debt to equity ratio as
implemented under the UK terms, the breakdown of which was estimated to be made
up of 90% debt and 10% equity (Department of the Environment Heritage and Local
Government, 2000). However, in practice, it has become commonplace for the
structure to be a combination of Equity, Subordinated Debt and Senior Debt (IBEC,
2011). This was demonstrated during the initial schools’ project, where total equity on
the part of the private sector amounted to 1% of the investment, the remainder of which
was a make-up of senior and subordinated debt at a rate of 89% and 10% respectively
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004). It has also been identified in some instances
that the source of subordinated debt has been provided for by the same equity
investors, at a notably higher rate of return. In effect, this equates to a form of financial
engineering on the part of the private sector (Palcic et al., 2018). Under circumstances
where a PPP project fails, the associated loss will be apportioned accordingly as
follows, equity, subordinated debt and finally senior debt (Duggan, 2013a).
Prior to the financial crisis, the most commonly found structure pertaining to UK
PFI investments, was typically be a blend of 90% debt and 10% equity. As a
consequence of the financial crisis, the weighted cost of such arrangements had
substantially increased and became difficult to source (Hellowell, 2012). In an attempt
to address the shortfall in available finance, the UK government introduced a credit
rating mechanism attaching to each individual PF2 project. Under the circumstances
were the equity ratio was proven to be higher, it subsequently lowered the gearing
attaching to the investment, which resulted in lower borrowing costs (HM Treasury,
2012). Under the new PF2 model both public and private sectors would co-invest and
thus jointly share in any equity returns, limiting the opportunity for excessive profits
on behalf of the private sector (Demirag et al., 2015). Amendments to the PF2 policy
also sought an increase in the equity ratio from 10% to 25%. This was introduced to
align the interests between the government and the private sector, it also sought to
deliver greater financial efficiencies and improved transparency (HM Treasury, 2012).
To summarise…
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Implemented under the same terms, the equity arrangements relating to the Irish
policy, in most part resembled that of the UK policy. The literature suggests that in
many instances the preferred ratio of 10% equity and 90% debt was in fact made up of
a hybrid arrangement of equity, subordinated debt and senior debt (Duggan, 2013a;
Hellowell and Vecchi, 2013). As a result of the financial crisis, available equity
funding had substantially diminished, along with access to subordinated debt (a loan
provided by equity investors at a higher rate of return) (HM Treasury, 2012a; IBEC,
2013). The introduction of amendments to the UK policy in 2012, initiated under the
rebranded PF2 policy, sought to raise the equity stake to 25% in all future PFI
investments (HM Treasury, 2018a). As a means of achieving this objective the UK
government also introduced equity funding competitions, in an attempt to attract
investment from the international banking community (HM Treasury, 2012; HM
Treasury, 2018a). In practice this never materialised, the rate of equity in subsequent
PFI investments has remained at 10% (OECD, 2015). In contrast under the amended
terms introduced in 2013, the Irish government sought to provide an alternative source
of equity funding by utilising the National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF) (Reeves,
2015). This subsequently led to the formation of ISIF, the state-owned sovereign
investment reserve. The role of ISIF sought to co-invest into areas such as transport,
housing, energy and innovation (DPER, 2016), effectively this provide a de facto
equity stake on the part of the state (Reeves, 2015; NDFA, 2015; DPER, 2011).

5.4.2 Financing of Debt
At the time when PPP was initially introduced, PPP finance was secured through
publicly sourced or promoted bond financing, in addition to private sector equity and
debt finance. The administration of which was derived through the services of the
National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). By
2002 finance relating to PPP was subsequently sourced through the services provided
for by the NDFA. As previously stated, the preference of the Irish government had
favoured the inclusion of a 10% equity stake attaching to all PPP investment proposals.
However, in many instances this was replaced with subordinated debt, effectively this
equated to the granting of a high-interest rate loan between the equity shareholders and
the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), being the company or legal entity that the PPP
purports to be.
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As a consequence of the financial crisis and the demise of the monoline bond
underwriters (financial loan guarantors), the government sought a diverse approach to
the financial structure underpinning the PPP investment programme (IBEC, 2013).
Prior to the financial crash the monoline industry provided assurances for the
borrowings made on behalf of the private sector. Insofar as, in the event of a default
occurring, the underwriters stepped in to cover the capital and interest element of the
associated debt (Farquharson and Encinas, 2010; The World Bank, 2017). In effect,
this enabled the private sector to obtain a triple-A rating and wider access to cheaper
funding, on the basis of utilising the credit rating attaching to the monoline insurer
(HM Treasury, 2012a). In the absence of private sector funding, the finance required
to promote the new round of PPP investments, would also include the proceeds from
the sale of legacy semi-state assets (NDFA, 2013), in addition to funding provided by
the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the NPRF discretionary portfolio (Reeves
and Palcic, 2017).
As a consequence of the financial crisis, financial backing for UK PFI
investments became difficult to source, and when it did become available it was
expensive. Furthermore, it became challenging to justify the rationale for engaging in
the process (OECD, 2015; UK NAO, 2018). Despite increased lending capacity on the
part of the EIB, the treasury held the view, that there was insufficient lending
emanating from the private sector to deliver on the schedule of PFIs in the pipeline
(HM Treasury, 2009). Concerns have also been raised in relation to PFI refinancing,
were evidence had identified disproportionate gains in favour of the private sector.
This was an aspect that had marred the public perception of the original PFI policy
(OECD 2015). Under the reform measures introduced as part of the PF2 policy, the
government sought alternatives to expensive bank financing arrangements. Long-term
funding options would now be sourced from institutional investors and the capital
markets (OECD, 2015).
To summarise…
When first introduced the financial structure relating to the UK PFI policy, was
typically made up of 90% debt, funded by bonded financing arrangements in
collaboration with monoline insurance providers (UK Committee of Public Accounts,
2010). This structure was also replicated under the terms of the Irish PPP funding
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model (Reeves, 2013; IBEC, 2011). In both jurisdictions, an on-going relationship has
existed with the EIB, where access to lower rate finance is noted as being advantageous
(Duggan, 2013a; House of Lords, 2019). To address the shortage in private sector
finance that was incurred as a consequence of the financial crisis, the Irish government
introduced a stream of financial measures in support of the PPP sector (Reeves, 2015).
This included an increase in EIB funding in line with the expansion of the PPP
programme (Duggan, 2013a). However, with the onset of Brexit, there has been a
noticable decline in recent years of EIB investment in the UK market. In stark contrast
the EIB had increased its year-on-year lending capacity to Ireland, eventually reaching
50% in many of its Irish PPP investments (EIB, 2011; HM Treasury, 2012a, 2018a;
House of Lords, 2019; The DPER, 2011).

5.4.3 Transparency
Issues pertaining to transparency and accountability have consistently marred
the Irish PPP policy. Following an interim report in 2007, the Committee of Public
Accounts (PAC) raised concerns in relation to the lack of disclosure pertaining to value
for money, future liabilities, and accountability. The findings of the report made the
following recommendations, the disclosure of PPP contracts should be made public
upon completion of the project, that value for money should be justified, in addition
to the introduction of transparent accounting practices. (Committee of Public
Accounts, 2007). The report also went on to highlight, that the decision to withhold
crucial information contained in government reports, has acted to strengthen the
argument that the lack of transparency has become embedded into the Irish PPP
system. Further evidence suggests that Ireland is not alone in this policy, it is common
practice in other jurisdictions also (Siemiatycki, 2006).
The Committee of Public Accounts noted its concerns when addressing the then
NDFA CEO Brian Murphy, by highlighting a lack of transparency on the part of the
organisation (PAC, 2012). The committee was assured that there was a requirement to
retain information regarding PPP contracts, too much transparency could be the basis
of a bad deal. Mr Murphy subsequently stated to the committee:
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With regard to releasing detailed financial-type information, one part of
me says we should be doing that, while another part of me says there are
real risks involved in doing it (PAC, 2012).
An account given prior to the introduction of the new policy amendments in
2013 found that the Irish PPP policy was still neglecting the issue of transparency.
This manifested itself in areas relating to, the state’s financial obligations, PPP activity,
the contractual values and the justification for engaging in PPP procurement (Reeves,
2013c). This was made evident in relation to the Dublin waste-to-energy project, the
inclusion of a ‘put and pay’ contract term required that unitary payments be made to
the operator Covanta, once a minimum output target was achieved. The exact terms of
this agreement in relation to risk share were noted as being ambiguous, undermined
by a lack of transparency (Reeves et al., 2015; The Irish Times, 2013). The chair of
the Committee of Public Accounts Mr Sean Fleming stated in 2018:
Members have been worried about the level of transparency surrounding
some of the biggest infrastructural projects in the country. This is an
important meeting in trying to understand whether and how value for
money is being achieved in the spending of public money on these
projects. (Committee of Public Accounts, 2018).
This clearly demonstrates that concerns relating to transparency have not abated. In
response to the criticism levied by the Committee of Public Accounts in 2018. An
undertaking was given by the NDFA, TII, DPER and The Department of Education
and Skills, that they were now willing to publish the benchmarking VFM reports in
relation to past PPP investments, evidence of which was subsequently presented in
April 2018 (NDFA, 2018b; Transport Infrastructure Ireland, 2018).
During an online discussion with Observer columnist Will Hutton on November
15, 2009, shadow chancellor George Osborne had disclosed that he was drawing up
alternatives to the existing PFI policy. The first of these measures would seek to
strengthen the policy in relation to accounting practices and transparency (The
Guardian, 2009). Under the terms of the PF2 review, the government sought measures
to address the lack of financial accountability, that had weakened the public perception
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in relation to VFM over the duration of the investment (Hellowell, 2012). PF2 had
sought to address a range of amendments in relation to transparency of funding,
relative whole life costings, abolition of PFI credit regime and a shift in risk transfer
(Vodden 2013).
To summarise…
Information obtained from the initial evaluation report into the viability of the
Irish PPP programme, informs us, that in a limited number of cases there would be a
requirement at both political and administrative levels to provide transparency to the
process (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998); this was subsequently transcribed into the PPP
policy framework, published in 2001. The initial government wording of the policy
stated that all PPP procurement should be conducted in a transparent and open manner
(Department of Finance, 2001). However, in practice this has never come to fruition,
instead it became a point of criticism since the policy was first introduced. The
Committee of Public Accounts has highlighted on several occasions, their concerns in
relation to transparency surrounding PPP procurement (Committee of Public
Accounts, 2007, 2012). In relation to the initial schools’ project, the government did
release a one-time-only VFM report in 2004 (Reeves, 2013a). The argument against
such disclosure, is placed at maintaining a balance between competitiveness and the
defence of commercial sensitivity (Committee of Public Accounts, 2012).
Furthermore, changes to the NDFA act 2007 failed to address the issue of transparency
and disclosure (NDFA, 2013). As a complementary measure to the stimulus package
of 2012, the government introduced changes in 2013 to the PPP policy (Reeves and
Palcic, 2017; NDFA, 2013). However, the measures failed to address the legacy issues
relating to disclosure and transparency (Reeves, 2013a).
In comparative terms, the Irish experience has replicated the approach of the UK.
Since its initial introduction, early criticism of the PFI policy has also highlighted a
lack of openness and transparency on the part of decision-makers to inform or involve
the relevant stakeholders (McCabe et al., 2001). Transparency in relation to future
liabilities and refinancing gains have been found lacking in PFI, undermining the VFM
aspect that remains a key motivation for the uptake of the policy (House of Commons
Treasury Committee, 2012; EIB, 2011; Vecchi, 2013). As an equity stakeholder, the
UK government sought to address this issue by retaining a seat on the board of
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the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), being the company formed to deliver the proposal
(HM Treasury, 2018a). In this regard the Irish policy failed to follow suit.

5.4.4 Procurement
Early criticism of the Irish PPP policy had cited the lack of deal flow as an area
of concern, private sector participants had also complained of the lack of skill on the
part of the public sector to administer the programme (IBEC, 2007). In addition to a
costly and drawn out bidding practice, contracts in relation to the process were noted
as being poorly structured (Reeves, 2013a; Transport Infrastructure Ireland, 2018).
Delays in procurement, financing, on/off-balance-sheet clarification and design issues
were highlighted in the initial third-level PPP projects (Petersen, 2011; Comptroller
and Auditor General, 2004). Under the amended PPP policy terms, the government
sought to address the restraints of a lengthy and drawn out procurement process; by
reducing the tendering phase to between 15 and 18 months from Official Journal of
the European Union (OJEU) notice stage, to financial close and award of contract
(Reeves and Palcic, 2017; IBEC, 2013). Pre-planning permission and specimen
designs were also introduced in an attempt to expedite the process (NDFA, 2013).
Other measures introduced to streamline the process, included the removal of the draft
tender stage and the introduction of a financial incentive to reimburse bidding costs by
up to 50% (Reeves, 2015).
From a UK perspective, on May 11, 2010 George Osborne was subsequently
appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer. A year to the day following his discussion
with Will Hutton of the Observer, the chancellor duly announced his intention to
undertake a fundamental reassessment of the PFI policy terms (Vodden, 2013; HM
Treasury, 2012). A twelve-month consultation process subsequently ensued to
determine the measures necessary to reform the policy. The key inefficiencies
associated with the existing PFI model were characterised as, a costly process that was
slow to deliver. In addition, lengthy tendering periods have been noted as a deterrent
to potential PFI consortium bidders (OECD, 2015; UK Parliament, 2008). In an
attempt to address these concerns, the government sought to introduce centralised
procurement units. In addition to the recruitment of key personnel and up-skilling of
existing staff, a greater emphasis was placed on professionalism and approach to the
process (HM Treasury 2012). Standardised output specifications were also introduced,
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alongside a reduction in the tendering process to 18 months, from OJEU notice stage
to the notification of the preferred bidder (HM Treasury, 2012a).
To summarise…
Delays in PFI procurement times have been attributed to bureaucracy on the part
of local and national governments, in addition to changing market conditions (HM
Treasury, 2018a). In an attempt to address these concerns, the competitive tendering
phase relating to PF2 projects was reduced to 18 months under the amended UK policy
(HM Treasury, 2012). The tendering period relating to PPP can be a lengthy process,
incurring both consultation, legal and financial costs (Hearne, 2009). In line with the
UK model, Ireland also introduced an equivalent 18-month tendering period. This
measure was focused towards increasing the attractiveness for investors, to participate
in the series of investments that were announced as part of the 2012 stimulus package
(IBEC, 2013).

5.4.5 Transport Concession
In relation to transport investment, under the new amendments the government
sought to adopt the availability based approach, whereby fixed unitary payments are
made on the basis of performance and availability. This was contrary to the previously
adopted policy, whereby the state entered into concession based and user risk
arrangements (Reeves and Palcic, 2017; Burke and Demirag, 2015a). The Committee
of Public Accounts noted that past concession arrangements, had exposed the state to
excessive guaranteed payment terms and had generated undue risk and exposure for
the taxpayer (Committee of Public Accounts, 2018). In relation to the 11 motorway
projects completed at the time of the amended policy measures, eight of these were
concession based PPPs (Committee of Public Accounts, 2018). The government
decision to adopt the availability method was in line with its policy to apportion risk
to the party best able to handle that risk (Burke and Demirag, 2017).
Driven by public distaste towards the introduction of hard tolling (fee-based),
since the introduction of the PFI policy; the UK government has opted in most-part for
an integrated approach, as a procurement method associated with the delivery of its
road network programme. (Stafford et al., 2019). First-round PFI concession
arrangements favoured the shadow tolling approach, whereby the private sector
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operator received a unitary payment based on an estimated number of road users by
the distance travelled (Bain, 2008). Critics of this approached identified that in the
event a shortfall in the amount of traffic, the government was obliged to meet the
shortfall in the private sector revenue (Palcic et al., 2018). Which ultimately negates
the argument that the key advantages in PFI is the transfer of risk to the private sector
(Edwards et al., 2004). In subsequent rounds of PFI investments, the UK government
introduced the availability concession method, whereby unitary payments were made
on the basis of the asset being available for public use, this was also assessed on the
performance and up-keep of the asset (Stafford et al., 2019).
To summarise…
Following the initial feasibility report undertaken by Farrell Grant Sparks in
1998, in respect of concession-based PPP, the report determined that a toll-based
system should be adopted, in line with the UK concession model. There has been
evidence to suggest that concession-based tolling had been adopted in Ireland prior to
the initial decision to engage in PPP. Notably since 1984 and 1990 respectively, both
the East-Link and West-Link Bridges have operated on a concession basis tolling
method (International Monetary Fund, 2004). As part of the 2013 policy amendments,
the government introduced an availability-based approach to PPP concession
procurement. This is determined by a deduction in unitary payments where the asset
or facility fails to deliver a predetermined performance or standard (NDFA, 2015).
This method of concession procurement has been adopted into areas such as national
transport infrastructure, student accommodation, health and the schools’ bundle
projects (NDFA, 2018).
Similar to the Irish experience, the UK had also engaged in concession-based
procurement prior to implementation of the PFI policy. The construction of the
Channel Tunnel commenced in 1988: upon completion in 1994, it has continued to
operate on a concession basis (House of Commons Library, 2001). In several
contractual arrangements, the government has entered into shadow toll agreements,
effectively a risk-share agreement to attract the necessary private sector investment
(EIB, 2011; OECD, 2015). Introduced as part of the PF2 reforms, the UK government
sought to adopt an availability approach to procurement. PF2 standardised contracts
would now clearly define availability risk: where that service or standard is not
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delivered to the specific quality, the PPP/PFI company would incur penalties or face a
reduction in unitary payments (Hellowell, 2012; EPEC, 2016). The new measures
introduced in 2012 also defined that where the private sector retains the construction
risk or the availability risk, the asset should remain off-balance sheet (HM Treasury,
2012)

5.4.6 Service Provision
The provision of soft services relating to Irish PPP procurement was first
determined in the guidance notes issued in April 2000. Once an asset has been
commissioned, the outsourcing of additional service requirements, such as cleaning
and security, may be provided for by the private sector by means of an additional
contractual arrangement (Department of the Environment Heritage and Local
Government, 2000). To determine the affordability and the implications relating to the
cost of additional service provisions, a comparison can be made to the traditional
procurement model (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004). An indication was given
in 2013 that the government were considering amending this term, however, this has
not materialised and subsequently, it remains a compulsory element in all Irish PPP
contracts (NDFA, 2013b).
In many instances, the provision of UK PFI infrastructure was also associated
with the compulsory requirement to engage in ancillary services such as cleaning,
security and maintenance (Froud and Shaoul, 2001). Due to the complexity of PPP
contractual arrangements, expenditure relating to maintenance or additional capital
expenditure is lacking in flexibility. Therefore, costs associated with facilities
management have been noted as expensive, given the duration of the pay-back period
(OECD, 2015). It has also been identified that in many instances, sub-contracts that
have been issued to third parties for the provision of such services, could be traced
back the PPP parent company (Burke and Demirag, 2015). In relation to ancillary
services provided to the NHS, in some instances, unexplainable price differences have
been uncovered, raising doubts over the continued use of such services (UK
Committee of Public Accounts, 2011b). It was also identified that some of those same
facilities providers, attached a risk premium that exaggerated and ultimately drove up
the cost (HM Treasury, 2012a). In an attempt to address this issue the introduction of
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the PF2 policy amendments in 2012, provided the option to include or exclude soft
services provisions from all future contractual arrangements (UK NAO, 2018).
To summarise…
By 2013 there were indications to suggest that in other PPP jurisdictions, there
was a move to reduce or eliminate the provision of soft services. However, in
opposition to this, the Irish government has stated its intent to retain the provision of
soft services as a mandatory contract term (NDFA, 2013a). As part of the amendments
to the 2012 UK PFI policy, the British government removed the compulsary
requirement to avail of privite sector soft services, replacing it instead with the option
to include or exclude it from the process (UK National Audit Office, 2018). On a
number of occasions concerns have been raised regarding the cost and inflexibility of
such services, given the length of such contractual arrangements (HM Treasury, 2012;
Demirag et al., 2015).

5.4.7 Risk Allocation
Under the initial terms of the PPP framework, the government sought to allocate
the appropriate measure of risk between both the public and the private sector entities,
engaged in the process. This was categorised under the following headings, Planning
and Design, Operating, Demand, Financial and Legal risk. (Department of
Environment Heritage and Local Government, 2003). The policy also set-forth, that as
a further precaution, that such risk should be evaluated against the public sector
benchmark. A key advantage of risk-sharing for the government, has been identified
in relation to the construction stage of the process, which carries a high level of
inherent and financial risk (Reeves and Palcic, 2017). Under the terms of the initial
framework the government maintained an alignmemnt with the measures adopted
under the UK policy (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004). Burke and Demirag
(2015) have argued that in recent years, that the private sector has gained ground over
the government, in relation to the sharing of demand risk associated with road
developments.
Under the conventional methods of public sector procurement, exposure to risk
has been highlighted in areas pertaining to design, construction and financial risk. It is
perceived that private sector expertise and efficiencies provide the best measure to
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address these issues (UK Parliament, 2008). However, it must be factored in, that the
risk element endured by investors in relation to past UK PFI procurement, contained
premiums that were in excess of the expected return. In relation to maintenance and
performance clauses, deduction schedules have been found to be insufficient, resulting
in a disproportionate risk-sharing arrangements (Hellowell, 2012). The original PFI
policy stated that risk transfer should be assigned to the party best able to absorb it.
There is little evidence to suggest that this was ever the case, and appears most evident
in the transport sector (EIB, 2011). As shadow chancellor George Osborne stated:
For projects such as major transport infrastructure, we are developing
alternative models that shift risk on to the private sector. The current
system, heads the contractor wins, tails the taxpayer loses, will end (The
Guardian, 2009 p.6).
The implementation of PF2 was derived after a collective consultation process
involving 139 interested parties, each seeking to arrive at a consensus on the economic
impact that would be incurred, by adopting the components of the amended policy.
The characteristics of the changes sought to restructure the working relationship
between both the public and private sector actors (Vodden, 2013; HM Treasury,
2012a; Vecchi, 2013). Among the changes introduced as part of the PF2 policy
amendments, was the measure to transfer risk to the party best able to manage that
risk. A determination of this would be reached by individual analysis of each element
of the contract and the subsequent impact pertaining to value for money (Vodden,
2013). In a further effort to achieve efficiency, the UK government also sought to
address the cost of PPP construction and operational insurance, by assigning the cost
between both private and public sectors. The application of which was made on the
basis of who could best manage that risk, on the assumption that it would ultimately
reduce the cost of PF2 insurance premiums (HM Treasury 2012).
To summarise…
Traditionally risk can be identified by means of a quantifiable measure to
determine the cost, revenue and return of an investment. The characteristics of original
PFI contracts had shown that private sector investors had averted the element of risk
by directing it disproportionately towards both the subcontractor and public sector
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alike (Hellowell, 2012). In this regard, the Irish PPP model has largely replicated the
terms of the UK PFI policy (NDFA, 2013b). More stringent measures introduced
under the PF2 policy reforms sought to address legacy issues relating to risk transfer
(HM Treasury, 2012). When previously, the UK government has had to intervene
with significant subsidies to shore up failing PFI projects. In the case of the London
Underground PFI project, this resulted in the government shouldering 95% of the
lenders' risk exposure (Burke and Demirag, 2015a). The PF2 reforms sought to
apportion in greater detail, the appropriate level of risk to the party best able to manage
that risk. This measure attempted to address the disproportionate level of risk attributed
to past PFI contracts, where risk apportionment was found lacking. It also sought to
ensure that value for money was optimised in favour of future PF2 contracts (HM
Treasury, 2012). Risk pertaining to original PFI contracts identified uncertainty in
relation to financial structuring: and the pursuit of excessive rate of return on the part
of the private sector investors was also evident (Hellowell, 2012). In relation to risk
pertaining to Irish PPP procurement, the initial policy framework sought to allocate
risk in line with the UK PFI policy. It identified from the outset that risk was inherent
when engaging in PPP procurement and should therefore, be apportioned to the party
best able to manage that risk (Department of the Environment Heritage and Local
Government, 2003). In summary, the UK PF2 policy appears more comprehensive in
detail and structure when compared to the Irish policy, in particular when reaching a
determination surrounding the apportionment of risk, to the entity best able to absorb
such risk.

5.4.8 Budgetary Control
Due to the off-balance sheet nature of PPP, the only entry in the government
book of accounts, relates to the unitary charge that is payable to the private sector over
the course of the contract. Since the policy was first introduced, this has been allocated
on an individual basis to the department or contracting authority that had sanctioned
the proposal (DPER, 2018c). Due to the expansion of the Irish PPP portfolio and the
subsequent growth in annual unitary payments (CIF, 2017), in 2015 the government
sought to address this escalating cost by introducing a capping measure, that curtailed
the states combined exposure to PPP to 10% of its annual capital investment budget
(Oireachtas, 2018a).
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From the outset, UK PFI procurement classification was determined as offbalance sheet, and treated as a collective budgetary policy. This accounting treatment
of PFI created an incentive for sponsoring departments to engage in the PFI model
(HM Treasury, 2012a) A spending control measure was introduced as part of the
amended PF2 policy, to limit off-balance sheet obligations to £70 billion, in relation
to existing PFI and future PF2 capital expenditure (European PPP Expertise Centre,
2012c).
To summarise…
In June 2013 the UK government announced a spending round for the provision
of future infrastructure. In relation to the PF2 element of this investment programme,
a control limit was introduced. This was set over a five-year period and imposed a
capping on PFI/PF2 procurement of £70bn (HM Treasury, 2013). In contrast, the Irish
PPP policy adopted a percentage basis approach to PPP procurement, by applying a
10% capping on annual unitary payments, relative to exchequer capital spending
budget. This measure was introduced in 2015 to ensure affordability and continued
sustainability over the duration of the contract, and to maintain alignment with the
traditional procurement policy (DPER, 2016; Reeves and Palcic, 2017). The
application of a 10% capping was subsequently removed in March 2018 (DPER,
2018a).

5.4.9 Public Stakeholders
The amended PPP policy also sought to address youth and long-term
unemployment issues. The new measures also included a social term, requiring that
2.5% of PPP project employees must be registered on an approved apprenticeship
scheme. Under the schools building programme, in an attempt to address
unemployment in the Irish construction sector, the government sought to include a
10% employment quota, taken directly from the live register (NDFA, 2015). The
introduction of a social clause as part of the capital expenditure programme marks a
change in direction for the government, demonstrated by its willingness to adopt a
horizontal policy as a means of alleviating the impact of high unemployment (NDFA,
2014). In essence, this approach not alone acted to rejuvenate the economy, as part of
the 2012 stimulus, it also sought to reduce the financial burden upon the exchequer by
reducing the live register. While the inclusion of a social clause can derive many
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benefits (Dail Éireann, 2014). In appearance, it may also suggest that the government
was in breach of the fundamental EU principles, of equal treatment and nondiscrimination, insofar as, the relief was applicable to Irish workers only. However,
under the EU treaties, where the intervention seeks to tackle social exclusion or
education, it is deemed permissible (ICTU, 2013).
The aims of the EU Procurement Directives seek to dilute the influence of
national preference, in favour of procurement objectives that comply with the
fundamental principles1. In contrast, the aims of EU secondary legislation or social
clauses, take a concentrated approach to address areas of social imbalance relating to
environmental2, employment or social inclusion policies3. New legislation was
subsequently introduced in 2014 to make the inclusion of a social clause mandatory in
all public procurement contracts above €1 million, the aim of which sought to protect
the vulnerable, support the disadvantaged and to develop a social economy (Dail
Éireann, 2014).
Implemented in 2012 The UK Public Services (Social Value) Act, requires
contracting authorities to give due regard for the inclusion of social clauses when
entering into contracts on behalf of the public. The aim of which sought to provide
leverage for the government’s attempts to address issues pertaining to employment,
social and environmental concerns, while in-keeping with the EU Directives (Northern
Ireland Assembly, 2014). In relation to youth unemployment, measures were also
introduced to make it mandatory in all relevant public contracts above the threshold of
£1 million, to include an apprentice employment option (House of Commons, 2013).
This model was extensively replicated throughout the different regions of the UK, in
2013 similar legislation was introduced by the Scottish Parliament4, whereby a
prerequisite threshold of £4 million and above deemed it necessary to consider the
inclusion of a social clause (The Scottish Government, 2013). Under the Welsh
legislation, a more encompassing arrangement was preferred, insofar as, it target
recruitment from the live register, job retention and training5 in exchange for access to
1

Directive 2014/24/EU of The European Parliament and of the Council
Concordia Bus Finland Judgment, Case C-513/99 (2002)
3
Public procurement guidelines for goods and services, DPER (2017)
4
Procurement Reform (Scotland) Bill
5
Framework Agreements Procurement Advice for the Public Sector in Wales
2
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public contracts of £1 million and above (The Welsh Government, 2017a). To give a
demonstration of the versatility that can be applied to such measures. The Northern
Ireland Assembly sought to include a policy clause on the basis that, for every £250
thousand spent on labour hours related to each individual public contract, a guaranteed
return of 13 weeks employment was returned to the community (Northern Ireland
Assembly, 2014).
To summarise…
As a consequence of the financial crisis, Ireland along with Greece, Spain and
Portugal were said to be among those most impacted by the crisis. However, it is
important to distinguish that in the case of Ireland and Spain, the root cause of the
impact, was not solely related to the financial crisis. In both situations, the impact was
exacerbated by an underlined property bubble and the collapse of the construction
sector (Hardiman and Dellepiane, 2012). In an effort to address the unemployment rate
within the construction sector, the government sought to introduce a social clause
among the series of measure that were introduced to the policy. The purpose of which
sought to rejuvenate the PPP sector and stimulate employment in the construction
sector (NDFA, 2015). The decision to develop an approved apprenticeship scheme,
along with sourcing 10% of PPP contract employees from the live register, appears
from this literature review, to be a common approach in both jurisdictions. At the onset
of the crisis, the UK unemployment rate stood at 5.1% and peaked at 8.3% in 2012
(Coulter, 2016). In comparison the Irish unemployment rate began at 6.3%, reaching
13.6% in the same period (Hardiman and Dellepiane, 2012). The literature tells us that
in comparison to the UK, the Irish government placed a higher emphasis on adopting
this measure as it attempted to quell a growth in unemployment within the construction
sector.

5.4.10 Private Stakeholders
In partnership with the NDFA, a business hosting event was established to act
as an interface between the main PPP contractors and SMEs located within the region.
The purpose of the 'Meet the Buyer' event was to establish a network, through speed
meetings and information gathering on the procurement opportunities available as part
of the stimulus initiative (Enterprise Ireland, 2014). The existence of similar 'Meet the
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Buyer' events were also noted as part of the UK PF2 procurement process, but to a
lesser extent and appear not to be policy-driven (NHS Trust, 2016).
Meet the buyer events were also a contingent of some PFI proposals, but were
not applicable in every situation. The literature also identified that this measure was
utilised randomly throughout all regions of the UK. Under the terms of the Northern
Ireland Assembly procurement policy6, such interaction was seen as a strategic tact to
the benefit of both parties (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2014). In the provision of NHS
hospitals “meet-the-buyer-events” were deemed the most appropriate route for the
supply of labour, plant and materials (The NHS 2016). Under the Welsh schools
building program similar interactions were also noted (The Auditor General for Wales,
2017).
To summarise…
As part of the 2012 policy measures, the Irish government sought to introduce a
networking event to connect SMEs with main PPP contractors. Hosted jointly by the
NDFA and Enterprise Ireland, the aim of the event was to bring awareness of the
contractual opportunities associated with each round of PPP procurement. In addition,
participants were informed of available grants and enterprise support schemes in
relation to job creation (Enterprise Ireland, 2013; NDFA, 2015; Protection Department
of Social, 2015). In comparison with the PF2 reforms of 2012, the UK model does not
extend to the provision of employment grant or relief schemes (HM Treasury, 2012).
However, during the undertaking of the literature review, this author noted the
presence of 'Meet the Buyer' events in relation to PFI procurement, dating back as far
as 2004 (Gov.uk, 2009).

5.4.11 Value for Money and Efficiency
In 1998 the Inter-Departmental Group report into the feasibility of implementing
an Irish PPP policy, stated that one of the key benefits attributed to the policy was its
ability to deliver value for money and efficiency (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). As a
means of verifying this, all PPP proposals would subsequently be benchmarked against
the traditional procurement process, under the following criteria, the transfer of risk,
6
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whole life costing, performance, the output specifications and the skills of the private
sector (Department of the Environment Heritage and Local Government, 2000). Under
the terms of the policy, it became mandatory in 2003 for the NDFA to administer the
benchmarking exercises on behalf of the state, to determine the presence of VFM
(Oireachtas, 2008a). In addition to the benchmarking process, a qualitative assessment
is also undertaken (DPER, 2013), to assess if a sufficient amount of risk has been
transferred away from the public sector, to determine if VFM has been achieved
(Burke and Demirag, 2015). Criticism towards this measure has highlighted the need
to publish past assessments, for the purpose of evaluation and transparency (Duggan,
2013a).
To justify the additional cost associated with UK PFI investments, it is necessary
to demonstrate that value for money and risk transfer are present (HM Treasury,
2018b). From the point of view of the taxpayer, value for money becomes
questionable, where evidence suggests that windfall gains and excessive profits have
been experienced on the part of the private sector (OECD, 2015). By continuing to
engage in a PFI procurement policy where efficiency and value for money are nonexistent, this in turn creates a burden upon the taxpayer (House of Commons Treasury
Committee, 2012). Under the reform measures set out in PF2 policy amendments,
attempts were made to address the criticism attaching to the lack of value for money
and efficiency, including the pursuit of long-term affordable debt finance and to
streamline the procurement process. In addition, PF2 sought to replace the criteria
relating to the existing value for money assessment (HM Treasury, 2012). The PF2
policy amendments also favoured the introduction of increased gain-share
arrangements in relation to insurance and re-financing, in addition to termination
clauses, which were found lacking under initial PFI contractual arrangements (HM
Treasury 2018a).
To summarise…
The pursuit of value for money has become synonymous with the UK PFI policy,
since it was first introduced in 1992 by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman
Lamont, as a means of procuring UK infrastructure (The UK Parliament, 1992).
However, attributes in relation to value for money and efficiency have not been shared
by all parties engaged in the PFI process. The policy has come under scrutiny when it
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was determined that in some instances PFI procurement had underperformed. It was
further impeded by high financing cost, where value for money and efficiency could
not be determined (House of Commons Library, 2001). In addition, it has been
suggested that under-achievement in relation to value for money could initially be
attributed to a lack of experience and expertise on the part of PFI participants (Asenova
et al., 2002). The findings of several government reports had determined that there
was little or no justification for the use of PFI as a means of achieving value for money
and efficiency. In several instances, government departments had been given no
alternative but to engage in PFI as a procurement option (UK Committee of Public
Accounts, 2011). The policy measures introduced by the UK government in 2012
sought to replace the existing criteria for the assessment of value for money. In doing
so a periodic review was introduced to incentivise efficiency and value for money
throughout the lifetime of the contract (HM Treasury, 2012; Treasury Committee,
2014).
In this regard, the Irish authorities failed to follow suit, favouring instead to
engage in a once off a post-project review (Department of Public Expenditure and
Reform, 2006). There have been calls for the provision of a periodic review to be
included in the contractual arrangements pertaining to PPP (Committee of Public
Accounts, 2007). It has also been suggested that all value for money tests should be
made publicly available to promote transparency within the PPP sector (Reeves,
2013b). In line with the UK PFI policy, evidence in relation to value for money
pertaining to the Irish PPP policy, has also come under scrutiny. The evaluation of the
initial PPP pilot schools project had determined a weakness in the evaluation process,
when a comparative costing between both the traditional and PPP procurement models
had incorrectly understated the actual cost of the investment (Comptroller and Auditor
General, 2004; Hearne, 2009). It was also determined that in pursuit of VFM and
efficiency, lessons learned from the UK PFI experiences would determine that a more
cautious and exploratory approach was taken towards the Irish PPP policy. This was
further strengthened by the formation of the central PPP unit, the NRA, and the
adoption of a centralised approached to PPP procurement (IBEC, 2007).
To reach a consensus in relation to the perceived similarities and differences that
exists between both the UK PFI and the Irish PPP policies, this study will apply a
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rating system that demonstrates the degree of alignment that exists between both
jurisdictions. This will be observed by applying a colour code, a visual representation
for the degree of common ground that this question seeks to identify.

Table 5.4 :Applying a rating to the findings

Green indicates that there are Strong similarities existing between
both policies, like-for-like in nature and structure.
Amber indicates that there are Mixed similarities existing between both
policies, shared components, and approach.
Red indicates that there are Weak similarities existing between both
policies, non-adoption or diluted approach.

Table 5.5: A Comparison of the similarities and differences between the Irish
PPP policy and the UK PF2 policy
Policy
Measure

Financing of
Equity

Similarities

Differences

Initially identical with
minor changes
introduced over time

The equity stake in UK
PF2 was 10%-25%, Irish
PPP equity stake 10%

The Irish policy in most part
replicated the UK measure

EIB investment in Irish
PPP was typically 50%,
EIB investment in UK
was typically 25%-30%.
UK sought private sector
pension investment. Irish
PPP sought national
pension investment
(ISIF). UK is facing a
reduction in EIB funding
since 2016 re-Brexit

The Irish PPP policy was
more reliant on the EIB
funding, due to lack of
private sector finance. The
Irish government utilised
the National Pension
Reserve Fund to guarantee
the lending capacity of the
banks

The Irish PPP policy
amendments failed to
address issues in
relation to transparency.
UK PFI policy took a

Lack of transparency
unaddressed under the
2013 amended Irish PPP
policy. However, in 2018 at
the request of PAC,

Financing of
Debt
Both policies sought
funding from the EIB in
addition to a blend of
private debt and
equity.

Transparency

Both jurisdictions
defend the lack of
transparency on the
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Overall Rating

and
Accountability

Procurement

Transport
Concessions

Service
Provision

Risk
Allocation

Budgetary
Control

Public
Stakeholders

basis of commercial
sensitivity.

more open approach
regarding relative costs,
risks & benefits as part of
PF2 amendments

measures taken towards a
more transparent process.

Changes introduced to
offset a lengthy and
drawn-out process.

Both identical in
character, no noticeable
difference was identified.

The Irish amendment
replicated the UK
amendment

Similarly, in the case
of both policies, with
the exception of the
UK preference of
shadow tolling, to
appease the general
public’s dislike for
direct (fee paying)
tolling

In 2012 the UK
introduced a preference
for availability-based
approach. In line with the
UK policy the Irish
government also opted
for an availability-based
with less strenuous
regulations.

Availability based
concession approach was
adopted under both policies
to off-set the impact of
previous restrictive and
costly shadow toll
agreements.

The Irish policy initially
replicated the UK
measure by making all
soft service provisions
mandatory

Under the UK PF2
amendments, the
provision of soft service
were made optional.
Under the Irish they
remain mandatory.

UK amendment driven by
public opinion, critical of
costs. The Irish PPP policy
has yet to address this
issue

The Irish PPP policy
has typically replicated
the UK PFI .

UK amendments
addressed concerns in
relation to risk allocation,
detailed apportionment
of risk

Irish policy contains some
ambiguity in relation to risk.
NDFA exercised some
clarity on the matter in
relation to Carillion

Under the UK PFI/PF2
policy, spending capped
at £70bn on cost. Irish
PPP procurement was
capped at 10% of the
total capital budget

Different approach is taken
between both. In March
2018 the 10% capping in
relation the Irish policy was
scrapped.

Irish initiative to source
10% of PPP construction
staff from the live
register, plus 2.5%
apprenticeship quota.
Evidence of similar
arrangements under the
UK PFI policy

Social clauses were more
evident under the Irish
policy to alleviate high
unemployment in the
construction sector as a
result of the financial crisis

Unitary payment
system

Both governed and
must comply with the
EU public procurement
Directives, in addition
to the fundamental
principles of the EU
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Private
Stakeholders

VFM and
Efficiency

Meet the Buyer event,
introduced under the
Irish PPP policy.
Identified in the UK
PFI policy, but to a
lesser extent.

Under the Irish policy,
Meet the Buyer events
appear to be policy
driven. Under the UK PFI
policy they appear
discretionary and less
common.

Established to encourage
SMEs to engage in PPP
contracts as a means of
stimulating growth into the
private sector.

Both policies
perceived as inefficient
with high financing
cost and lacking VFM

UK introduce measures
incentivise efficiency and
VFM throughout the
lifetime of the project.
Irish policy conducts no
VFM review over the
lifetime of project

The UK PFI policy attaches
more scrutiny in relation to
VFM This has been less
evident under the Irish
policy. It remains
unaddressed

5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have demonstrated the timeline of events that surrounded the
introduction and progression of the Irish PPP policy. The literature reminds us that the
initial seeds for engaging in a PPP policy first began around 1998, when PPP was
championed as part of the solution to an increasing deficit in capital infrastructure We
identified that this necessitated the introduction of new legislation, a policy framework
and the formation of new institutions to oversee the administration and implementation
of the policy. A common thread was identified, that suggests that the Irish PPP policy
bore a close resemblance to the UK PFI policy measures. To demonstrate this we
probed the makeup of Irish policy from the initial concept, introduction and
amendment stages, set against the timeline and introduction of changes that were made
to the UK policy. Where similarities and differences were identified, we presented our
discoveries by application of a coloured rating to lend clarity to the process.
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Chapter Six: Research Question Two
Alignment and Divergence…

109

6.1 Introduction
It is rational to assume that the influence of the UK PFI policy, had acted as a
persuasive factor for the introduction of PPP into Ireland. Therefore the intention of
this chapter is to demonstrate the links that were forged between both jurisdictions. To
reinforce this argument we engage with the theoretical framework of policy transfer to
probe that relationship and to further recognise the motivation or otherwise that shaped
that timeline. The chapter will conclude by examining the recent events surrounding
both policies and to ascertain if a split has occurred between both jurisdictions. To
determine if this was so, this study will take a four-pronged approach by seeking to:
1. Understand the motivation for the introduction of the Irish PPP policy, to then
identify what influenced that decision and to subsequently track its progression. To
evaluate, weigh-up by means of policy transfer theory, what caused those events to
occur.
2. To identify how, over-time, both public and political sentiment changed towards the
UK PFI policy and how this was driven by the actions of the private sector and by
mismanagement on the part of the UK government.
3. To identify the impact of the financial crisis upon the Irish PPP policy and to examine
the need to introduce the 2012 stimulus package. Furthermore, to understand why the
introduction of a series of amendments made to the UK policy in 2012, played a pivotal
role in the rejuvenation of the Irish PPP policy in 2013.
4. To recognise the signs of divergence between both policies, to then give an account
of the run-up to the introduction of the Irish 2018-2027 NDP and the UK Autumn
statement in October 2018, set against the backdrop of Dolowitz and Marsh’s
conceptual framework.
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6.2 Overview of Research Question two
It was observed in section 2.4 that the influence of the UK PFI policy, had in
part been instrumental for the government’s decision to adopt a similar programme as
part of the Irish public procurement policy. Section 2.4 identified the changes that were
introduced in 2012 to enhance the existing UK PFI policy, and how those changes were
characteristically similar to amendments that were made to the Irish PPP policy in 2013,
the details of which are given in section 5.3 (NDFA, 2013b). The introduction of the
NDP 2018-2027 had envisaged a future role for PPP, under which the government was
receptive to engaging in new variants of the model (as detailed in section 2.6.1). The
rationale for the retention of the policy was also demonstrated in an inter-departmental
report into the future viability of the policy, in which it was demonstrated that PPP had
the potential to offer an alternative approach in times of fiscal restraint (DPER, 2018b).
In October 2018 in a surprise announcement, Philip Hammond stated during his autumn
address, that the UK government was abandoning its PFI policy. The Chancellor noted
that this approach had become “controversial” as a means of providing national
infrastructure, but gave assurances that all existing PFI contracts would be honoured
and managed in the taxpayer’s interest:
I have never signed off a PFI contract as Chancellor…and I can confirm
today that I never will. I can announce that the government will abolish the
use of PFI and PF2 for future projects (House of Commons Library, 2018a).
In the following sections, will demonstrate that since the inception of the Irish
PPP policy, similarities have existed between both the Irish and UK PFI policies.
However, it has also been identified that the landscape in which both policies operate,
is undergoing change. This has manifested itself in the shape of, one jurisdiction
announcing its continued support for the policy and the other denouncing it as having
become problematic. Research question two seeks to explore these arguments by
attempting to recognise:
What is the initial alignment and subsequent divergence that has occurred
between the Irish PPP and UK PFI policies.
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6.3 Themes arising from the literature review and the data analysis
process
Identifying themes within the data is an essential element of qualitative research,
it is the starting point by which findings of a study are derived (Bazeley and Bazeley,
2016). In the following sections, we will explore the themes that came to prominence
during the analysis of the semi-structured interviews that were held with the
participants of this study. The aim of which is to probe these arguments to assist in
answering research question two and three respectively. The methods that were
applied to formulate a response to this question, was detailed in section 4.8.3, where it
was identified that this study will utilise Braun and Clarke's six-stage thematic analysis
framework to determine its findings. To undertake this task, the transcripts obtained
from the semi-structured interview process were inputted and analysed using NVivo
software. Thematic analysis is an applied procedure to identify and categories data
pertaining to the focus of the research. It is structured on a series of codes that stem
from the transcripts or field notes relating to the study (Bryman 2013). Once an indepth understanding has been achieved, the aim of the researcher is to then identify
patterns that have evolved from the coded data, that in turn may generate themes
relating to the objectives of the study (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Table 6.1
represents a collective summary of the coding that was captured, during the thematic
analysis and is reflected in the findings of research question two and three.
Table 6.1: Research Themes 1- 6
Themes

Total coding
blocks 1046

Text blocks
Per Theme

6.3

The motivation for the initial adoption of PPP

118

6.5

The influence of the financial crisis and the
incentive to use PPP as stimulus measure

118

7.2.3

The incentive for the state to retain its PPP
programme

170

7.3

The Economic considerations that apply to PPP

217

7.4

The Legal process that governs the Irish policy

145

7.5

A perspective of PPP as a component of the
public procurement policy

278
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6.4 The application of policy transfer theory to this research
It was Identified in Chapter Three that by utilising the framework of Dolowitz
and Marsh, it could be established that a policy or procedure that originated in one
jurisdiction could be replicated in another (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). This is
achieved by drawing upon the lessons and experiences of other jurisdictions that have
implemented policies or procedures, that have proven to be successful or have
ultimately led to failure (Williams and Dzhekova, 2014). Benson and Jordan (2011)
identify that the evolution of policy transfer as we view it today has evolved from
comparative studies into US federal policy, that became enacted across the different
states and cities of America (Walker, 1969). Earlier exploration into this field of social
science include the works of Rose, who drew attention to the phenomenon of “lesson
drawing” as a means of evaluating the transfer of a policy or procedure (Rose, 1991).
The introduction of Dolowitz and Marsh’s framework in 1996 marked an increase in
the number of publications that subsequently adopted the term “policy transfer” in
addition to accepting their widely accepted definition (Benson and Jordan, 2011). Past
studies have identified policy transfer theory, as the appropriate framework by which
to evaluate the transfer of a policy or procedure from one jurisdiction to another
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 2012; Radaelli, 2000). In section 3.7.1it was highlighted that
the occurrence of policy transfer had been identified across several continents and
jurisdictions, the adoption of which was favoured by supranational organisation and
political parties of different persuasions (O’Dolan and Rye, 2012; Reilly, 2007).
Furthermore, in many instances, the conceptual framework of Dolowitz and Marsh,
has been chosen to summon up the motivations that surround the transfer process
(Marsden and Stead, 2011). The framework applies a rationale that attempts to identify
if the transfer in question was voluntary, semi-coercive or to what extent was it
implemented under conditions of direct-coercion (Benson and Jordan, 2011). In the
context of this research, it will help to identify the extent to which the Irish PPP policy
has replicated, and then diverged away from the UK PFI policy.
As a means of achieving this objective, the concepts introduced by Dolowitz and
Marsh in section 3.4 will be applied to evaluate the events and phases that the Irish
policy has encountered over its twenty-year history. The rationale for the introduction
of the policy will be examined to ascertain if the implementation was a voluntary act
or did influence or lesson drawing play a part in that decision?. In keeping with the
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framework of Dolowitz and Marsh, attention will be given to a diverse group of
political agents and non-state actors that championed the introduction of the policy,
and to what extent they held an influence over the contents and timeline of the transfer.

6.5 The motivation for the uptake of the Irish PPP policy
It was recognised in section 2.2 that the introduction of the Irish PPP policy had
been prompted by an acute deficit in infrastructure, that had stemmed from the
recession of the 1980s. In the run-up to the introduction of the policy, it was identified
that the Taoiseach Bertie Ahern had visited the British prime minister Tony Blair to
evaluate a PFI/PPP educational initiative and to ascertain if Ireland could have an input
or benefit from the proposal (Oireachtas, 1997). Petersen (2011) suggests that at the
time the Irish government was sympathetic to the UK Labour Party’s ‘Third Way’
approach, to utilise PFI as a means of providing affordable public infrastructure. In
essence, when viewed from the perspective of Dolowitz and Marsh framework, the visit
by the Taoiseach and officials from his department could be summarised as a voluntary
decision to draw lessons from the UK experience.
From an economic point of view, in 1997 the Irish economy was experiencing a
1% surplus in GDP and was on schedule to peak at 3% in the year 2000 (Central
Statistics Office, 2017). This provided the government with sufficient funding to pursue
a traditional capital expenditure programme, without the necessity to engage in the PPP
model (The Central Bank, 2004). This identifies that financial pressure wasn’t to the
fore for the decision taken to implement a PPP policy. An alternative argument was
made in the Farrell Grant Sparks report of 1998, which conceded that the current
surplus was sufficient to fund a traditionally procured programme, however in the
likelihood of a future fiscal event, it would be more prudent to use the surplus funding
to offset the national debt (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). Therefore, there is no indication
to suggest that the government’s decision to engage in PPP, was driven by the influence
of internal or external financial pressure.
In section 2.2 it was identified that Ireland was facing a reduction in EU cohesion
funding, the award of which was granted at an EU summit in Edinburgh in 1992, where
the then Taoiseach Albert Reynolds had secured IR£8 billion/ €10.25 billion on behalf
of the state (European PPP Expertise Centre, 2012a). The EU structural fund was
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initially introduced to promote more balanced development, throughout the different
regions of the EU. The program provided funding relating to infrastructure projects,
including transport, human resources, tourism and fisheries among others (Hegarty,
2003; Honohan et al., 1997). The allocation of EU funding was a contributing factor
for the growth of the Irish economy that was experienced throughout the 1990s. In the
face of a depletion in EU funding, the government was now confronted with three
options, firstly to elect for the introduction of a PPP programme, second to continue as
before with a traditional approach and thirdly to seek new hybrid funding alternatives.
The consensus of the Farrell Grant Sparks report found, that in light of the fiscal surplus
the option of direct exchequer funded investment, remained a viable alternative (Farrell
Grant Sparks, 1998). It is therefore plausible to suggest that the threat of a depletion in
EU cohesion funding, while the impact would be felt, held no coercive influence or
bearing over the decision to introduce the policy.
The introduction of the Maastricht Treaty had placed a prerequisite upon EU
member states not to exceed a 3% budgetary deficit or for the ratio between the
government debt and GDP to surpass 60% (IMF, 2017). This had the knock-on effect
of placing a restriction on the government’s ability to borrow above the 3% measure
set out in the convergence criteria. The introduction of PPP provided the government
with the option to circumvent this restriction, by recording the acquired asset as an offbalance sheet acquisition (Hodge and Greve 2010). The self-commissioned government
report again found that the margin of safety offered by the budgetary surplus provided
sufficient room to pursuit a traditional procurement option. This was a further
indication that the requirement to restrict the governments capacity to borrow under the
Maastricht Treaty criteria, had a minimal impact over the decision to implement the
PPP policy. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that any EU member state was
ever punished, for exceeding the financial criteria attaching to the treaty (Offer, 2018).
In section 2.2 it was identified that from 1994 onwards, the Irish economy had
entered into a period of economic growth; the success of which was attributed in part
to the social partnership agreements that sought to forge a relationship between the
government, employer groups and the trade unions. This was achieved in return for
shared economic prosperity in lieu of any economic or employment related disputes.
The Fianna Fáil led government of the day had favoured this approach between the
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unions and the employer groups, in doing so it had sought their prior approval for the
introduction of the PPP policy. Minister McCreevy would later reiterate his support for
this unified approach when addressing the Public-Private Advisory Group on PPPs
where he stated:
The Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF) reaffirms the
commitment of the social partners to PPPs in line with the conclusions of
the National Economic and Social Council that PPPs embody significant
potential for achieving accelerated delivery of strategic national
infrastructure and quality public services on a long-term value for money
basis for the Exchequer (Department of Finance, 2001, p.i).
Participant three, an ex-government minister identified that the decision to
implement the Irish PPP programme had in part been influenced by international
events and the preference of the then Minister for Finance:
In the period of the late 1990s, it was internationally fashionable to try and
increase the level of private sector involvement, practically in areas of
public service …When Charlie McCreevy was Minister for Finance he
made absolutely no secret about having a very strong ideological
preference for more private sector involvement to administer the services
of the state (P3, 2020).
It was also suggested that private sector lobbying, in favour of the introduction
of PPP, has also occurred between the government, IBEC and the CIF. The urgent need
to provide national infrastructure such as roads, transport and environmental facilities,
provided the private sector with the opportunity to make their pitch for the introduction
of the policy (Reeves, 2013c). The employer groups had also argued for a less stringent
approach than those measures taken in UK PFI policy; in addition, they favoured an
initial pilot study to test the waters for the feasibility of the policy (Farrell Grant Sparks,
1998; The NDFA, 2003). Participant six, an economist and leading contributor on the
subject of PPP, highlighted the conditions that existed at the time when the policy was
first introduced, "the infrastructure needs were just desperate [at the time]" (P6, 2020).
Participant six, also noted that the private sector saw this as a potential opportunity to
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add their voice for the introduction of PPP, based on the experiences of the UK PFI
policy:
[At that time] the private sector was smart enough to lobby the
government, to say that we can do what they're doing in the UK…I think
that the whole attraction of the off-balance-sheet financing side of things
was also really big back then (P6, 2020).
In the context of the private sector participant two, a senior PPP negotiator
responded, that the introduction of the policy could also be interpreted as an attempt
to circumvent a restraint on exchequer spending:
PPP provided a way for the government to deliver infrastructure without
having to have the money to hand or upfront, that was the driving force
behind the introduction of the policy (P2, 2020).
Participant six, argues against this position by identifying that while the literature
states that the government was faced with challenges to meet the demand in capital
investment, the state's capacity to finance such investment was never in question.
Therefore the presence of isomorphism must also be considered a factor for the
introduction of the policy alongside the notion that "the Irish authorities have always
been willing to learn from the experiences of the UK" (P6, 2020).
The sentiment of participant one, a financial advisor to the National
Development Finance Agency (NDFA) and the private sector, expands on this
argument by identifying the additional benefits associated with the uptake of the
policy. Insofar as PPP was not intended as a stand-alone measure, it also sought to
achieve value for money and to utilise the skills of the private sector:
When we were developing PPP, our aim was to bring in the best of the
private sector and focus on value for money, not necessarily on the
financing piece (P1, 2019).
At a global PPP summit held in Dublin in October 2001 the Taoiseach Bertie
Ahern, echoed his support for the future use of the policy, in the belief that it had the
potential to become a mainstream procurement method in the delivery of national
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infrastructure. The Taoiseach also stated his commitment to the concept of participating
in a voluntary transfer process:
The Irish government and our public authorities are very keen to learn from
the experience gained in other countries. We are also willing to share what
we have learned in our efforts to develop PPPs in Ireland (Dept of the
Taoiseach, 2001, p.1).
In summary of the above events, a determination has been made that in the
absence of any persuasive influence, In line with the arguments set forth in the
literature, it is the contention of this study that the introduction of the Irish PPP policy,
was a multi-faceted approach. Largely due to the following three factors, the
ideological preferences of the then government, the policy measures of the UK and the
lobbying on the part of the private sector.

6.5.1 The source of influence for the introduction of the Irish PPP policy
The notion that Ireland had converged with the UK policy has formed a common
thread throughout the literature. Reeves (2013) suggests that at the time when the
government was first considering the option to engage in PPP, the private sector argued
the case for the adoption of the UK model as a prime example. Consideration to adopt
a similar policy to that of the UK PFI policy, was first applied during the school’s pilot
project (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004). However, under closer inspection,
evidence suggests that the Irish economy was under less financial pressure than the UK
economy, to adopt the policy. Therefore the opportunity to apportion more time to draw
lessons from the UK experience, was possibly missed (Connolly et al., 2009). Where
lesson drawing has been identified, it has come in the form of the establishment of
a specialised procurement agency. In this regard, Ireland has followed in the footsteps
of the UK and Canada when it introduced the NDFA, the details of which are given in
section 5.2 (Petersen, 2011; Reeves, 2015).
During the initial feasibility study, the Farrell Grant Sparks report recalled the
discussions that had taken place with officials from the UK Treasury Taskforce, in
relation to the implementation of the Irish policy; where a convincing argument was
made for a rigorous implementation strategy, based on lessons that had been learned
from the UK experience. In addition, the Irish delegation had placed a strong emphasis
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upon utilising the British standards, when it came to the structuring of the contract terms
and the technical guidance notes (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). The literature also argues
that influence over the procedures to introduce the Irish PPP policy may have been
driven by the presence of isomorphism, a description of which was given in section 3.8.
Connolly et al. (2009) suggest that the act of implementing the policy, may also have
added a sense of social legitimacy for the government and to those other organisations
engaged in the process. The commissioned report by Farrell Grant Sparks also
highlighted the benefits of forging relationships with the UK officials presently
involved in the process, as means of shortening the learning curve or “lesson drawing”.
While the presence of mimicry and isomorphism are quite plausible, there is no
indication throughout the literature to suggest that it had a coercive hold over the
proceedings. The decision to engage in a pre-scouting exercise appears to be a
voluntary decision, taken on behalf of the government of the day. We therefore
recognise that the initial introduction of the Irish PPP policy was largely a voluntary
decision, without evidence to suggest that any element of internal or external influence
was imposed upon the government to make that decision. We also conclude, that in
keeping with the conceptual framework of Dolowitz and Marsh, lesson drawing was
also identified as having occurred between Ireland and the UK. Insofar as the Irish
authorities were receptive to applying a like-for-like policy to that of there closest
neighbour. In the following section, an examination will be made of the transgressional
phase of the Irish policy and to ascertain if policy transfer theory had a presence during
this period.

6.5.2 The progression of the Irish PPP policy
In 1997 under the New Labour government of Blair and Brown, an initial
feasibility study was taken to assess the continued viability of the PFI policy termed the
Bates Review, it recommended 29 key changes to the policy, one of which related to
the establishment of the UK Treasury Taskforce (Spackman, 2002). The aim of
taskforce sought to bring structure and standardisation to the process, by providing
financial and technical advice to the various government departments that had begun
to engage in the PFI programme (Broadbent et al., 2004). By May 2000 the UK
Treasury Taskforce was incorporated into Partnership UK, this was conducted under a
joint venture agreement between the government and the private sector (Spackman,
2002). The collaboration sought to utilise the skills of the private sector in areas
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pertaining to legal and financial services, in an attempt to strengthen the impact and
viability of the PFI policy; Roe and Craig, (2004) note the conflict of interest that this
had the potential to generate.
In a similar vein, in 2002 the Irish government also initiated the creation of a
similar institution, to act as an interface between the procuring authorities and the
private sector agents. The introduction of the NDFA sought to provide an advisory and
administrative role over the Irish PPP policy (ICTU, 2005), a detail of which is given
in section 5.2. However, unlike the UK model, the NDFA remained within the remit of
the government structure, the control of which extended back to the NTMA and
ultimately the Department of Finance (NDFA, 2015). In applying governance over the
Irish policy, the authorities appear to have borrowed ‘in substance’ the administrative
practices of the UK policy. In essence, they have utilised the “voluntary” advice given
by the UK Treasury Taskforce in June 1998, during the exploratory talks in relation to
the implementation of the Irish PPP policy. It was noted that the Irish delegation probed
UK authorities to identify areas of potential efficiency, in addition to highlighting the
likely stumbling-blocks that the UK officials had experienced. An emphasis was also
relayed to the Irish officials upon the importance of forging relationships with external
private sector advisors, in addition to making available the necessary resources to
promote and operate the policy (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998).
Taken in context, the progression of the Irish PPP policy moved at a slower pace
than that of the UK. The requirement to implement legislation to accomodate the
introduction of the PPP policy, commenced in 2001 with the Railway Infrastructure
Act, 2001, this was subsequently followed by the Public Private Partnership
Arrangements Act 2002 and NDFA Act 2002. Legislation relating to the privatisation
of UK state-owned entities, was first introduced under the conservative government of
Edward Heath. The Transport Holding Company Act 1972 became enacted as a
proviso attaching to the disposal of the state-owned Thomas Cook Travel Company.
This was subsequently followed by the part-disposal of BP by the Labour-led
government to satisfy the (semi-coercive) conditions attaching to the 1976 IMF crisis
(James, 2011). This set the pathway for the Thatcher government to introduce a
programme of de-nationalisation which included the disposal of the following
companies, to name but a few, Cable & Wireless, British Petroleum, British
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Aerospace, British Telecom, British Gas, Rolls-Royce, British Steel. The decision to
do so required the introduction of the following legislation, the Transport Acts of 1980
and 1985. The Electricity Act 1989, The Water Act 1989 and the Postal Services Act
2000 (House of Commons Library, 2014). This culminated in the removal of the
‘Ryrie-Rules’ which had restricted the use of private finance in the provision of public
infrastructure, except in the instance where it provided a cost-saving to the taxpayer.
Once the ruling was withdrawn it paved the way for the introduction of the PFI policy
in 1992 (McCabe et al., 2001). In the case of both jurisdictions a common law charter
applies, the prerequisite to introducing legislation as part of the Irish policy appears to
be a regulatory requirement and was therefore beyond the influence of the UK policy
(Department of the Environment Heritage and Local Government, 2000).
The scope of the UK programme included a range of investments in
Underground Transport, Defence and Health-related infrastructure. HM Treasury
(2018a) describes such contracts as being complex in nature. Most controversially,
investment in the provision of NHS Hospitals, necessitated the introduction of the
NHS (Private Finance) Act 1997. Introduced as part of the 1997 Labour government
election manifesto (Hellowell, 2012), the initiative sought to allow NHS hospital
trusts, to enter into long term contractual and financial agreements, under the condition
that it was more viable to do so (Froud and Shaoul, 2001). However, it subsequently
transcribed that in many situations excessive payments associated with such
investments, led to a buildup in debt-related issues (Hellowell, 2012). During a Dáil
Committee hearing, Professor Allyson Pollock a visiting UK public health specialist
(House of Commons Library, 2001), reiterated to the Dáil the experiences of those
NHS hospitals trusts that engaged in the PFI process:
[Hospital] foundation trusts that outsourced and raised finances are left with
a very big problem, in that as much as 15% or 16% of their income will
now be going to service the debts of PFI (Oireachtas, 2016).
In contrast, the Irish PPP portfolio has been kept within the boundary of
repeatable and low-risk investments, such as road and accommodation type
infrastructure (DPER, 2013)(see Appendix E). There is evidence that lesson drawing
played a part in this decision and in doing so, has helped avoid the complexities that
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had been witnessed during the early rounds of the UK policy. This was reiterated by
the then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern during a Dáil Debate:
In some respects, the UK is moving closer to the PPP model being
developed here in Ireland. Hindsight is a wonderful thing and Ireland has
learnt from the experience of private finance initiatives in the UK
(Oireachtas, 2001).
The literature presented no evidence in support of the Taoiseach’s comments. In
contrast, the UK government are noted as having raised awareness with the Irish
authorities, in relation to areas of concern “stumbling-blocks” that they had
encountered (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). There is evidence of joint initiatives between
the UK and Irish authorities, where both jurisdictions have shared experiences in
relation to the implementation of health services. Lesson drawing was identified when
both jurisdictions participated in a joint feasibility study, for the introduction of primary
care units into the NHS and the Irish health care system (Department of The Taoiseach,
2002). While the study was conducted in 2001, it would be 2012 before the primary
care programme came to fruition (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2012).
In the above sections, a summary has been given for the initial introduction of the
Irish PPP policy. in which it was demonstrated that Ireland sought to adopt the UK PFI
policy by way of a voluntary transfer, were lessons were drawn from the UK
experiences (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004). The literature has demonstrated
that this commenced in 1997, earlier than had previously been suggested (Oireachtas,
1997). The decision to mimic and apply the procedures of the UK policy, can in most
part be traced back to the joint preference of the then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern and
Minister of Finance Charlie McCreevy (Department of Finance, 2001c; Dept of the
Taoiseach, 2001).

6.6 The growth of public sentiment towards the UK PFI policy
In the intervening period since the Irish PPP policy was first introduced, the
classification of the Irish portfolio has remained consistent with investments into roads,
schools, housing and accommodation type infrastructure (NDFA, 2018b). In
comparison, it has been demonstrated that the UK has ventured into more complex
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sectors than its Irish counterpart (The UK NAO, 2011). The UK has sought to invest in
areas that the Irish programme has avoided up until now, such as underground transport
systems, military infrastructure and the provision of hospitals (HM Treasury, 2018a).
In the run-up to 1997 UK election, Labour’s main election theme centered around the
reform of the NHS (Fleming, 2000; Hellowell, 2012). To achieve this, it promised to
reduce the number of Health Authorities and Hospital Trusts in an effort to reduce costs
(Fleming, 2000). The introduction of the NHS (Private Finance) Act 1997, in addition
to providing hospital trusts with access private sector finance, also ensured that the
provision of healthcare facilities became one of the most important to the PFI sector
(Hellowell, 2012). To coincide with this, faced with insufficient capital funding, NHS
trusts were led to believe that PFI was ‘the only game in town’ by which to secure
investment (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2011). In several instances,
public sentiment has questioned the costs associated with utilising PFI a means of
providing NHS infrastructure (Spackman, 2002). In particular when comparisons were
made between the initial capital cost and the final cost that had accrued over the
duration of the contract (Corner, 2005; Edwards et al., 2004). Hellowell (2012) notes,
that under the Labour government’s NHS revival plan, 91% of the source capital was
derived by means of PFI derived finance. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the
UK government favoured investment by means of privately sourced finance. However,
in the face of growing public sentiment towards PFI, this has driven a change towards
higher public spending (Inderst, 2017).
By the late 1990s concerns were being raised about the viability of the UK policy,
when attention was brought to a series of well-published and costly overruns, relating
to several flagship PFI contracts. The introduction of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link Act
1996 had paved the way for work to commence on a high-speed rail link between the
UK, France and Belgium (Hellowell and Vecchi, 2013). Initial estimates put the cost
of the PFI venture at £5.8 billion, once complete the UK government had ambitions to
sell the operating rights on a concession basis (House of Commons Library, 2011).
However, a series of government bailouts in the form of loan guarantees were required
to complete the project (Edwards et al., 2004). The UK Committee of Public Accounts
criticised the deal, by highlighting that the private sector had over-stated the demand
and when faced with the consequence of this it was unable to mitigate against it, leaving
the government to pick up the pieces (UK Committee of Public Accounts, 2006).
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In relation to the construction of the Isle of Skye Bridge, from the onset
controversy surrounded Scotland’s first major PFI investment (Mcquaid et al., 2007).
Initial findings suggested that incompetence on the part of the contracting authority to
shortlist a sufficient number of preferred bidders, had impacted upon the competitive
nature of the proposal. In addition, failure to apply the appropriate benchmarking
procedures, had resulted in the private investors obtaining a return on investment rate
of 18.4 % (The UK NAO, 1999). Despite receiving excessive indirect government
subsidies (House of Commons Library, 2001), the general public was still faced with
paying some of the highest recorded tolls charges throughout Europe (Shaoul et al.,
2012). Public sentiment in the form of protesting had opposed the exorbitant cost and
excessive profit gains on the part of the private sector (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998;
Mcquaid et al., 2007). Eventually, this lead to a government buy-out of the bridge and
the removal of all associated tolls by 2004 (Connolly and Wall, 2016b).
As the new acting Secretary of State for the Environment and Transport, John
Prescott announced to the House of Commons that in keeping with the Labour Party
manifesto, the government was seeking to utilise Labour’s ‘Third Way’ approach, to
invest £7 billion in a works upgrade of the London underground system. It was further
stated that by engaging in the PPP concessionary arrangement to deliver the
programme, it would avoid privatisation and retain the all aspects of public sector
ownership, (UK Parliament, 1998). By the year 2000, consultants fees relating to the
project had reached £60 million, furthermore, it was facing a legal challenge brought
by London Mayor Ken Livingstone, on the grounds that the proposal sought to
fragment the network as opposed to integrating and expanding the service. It was also
discovered that £2.5 billion had been added to the Public Sector Comparator, which in
turn made the PFI proposal appear a more viable proposition (Butcher, 2012). The
referral to the term “Public Sector Comparator”, denotes a comparison made against a
traditional procured investment, to establish if the benefits and costs of a PFI proposal
outweigh the advantages of a publicly funded investment (Edwards et al., 2004).
In 2003 the government entered into a thirty-year concession agreement with
consortium Metronet to construct and operate the network. However, by 2007, the
consortium had dissolved with two of the three partners going into administration,
resulting in an estimated £410 million loss to the taxpayer (UK Committee of Public
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Accounts, 2010a). Inundated by a series setbacks, in 2010 the London Underground
project had collapsed, ultimately leading to a takeover by Transport for London
(Butcher, 2012). Public sentiment towards privatisation of the UK transport sector had
previously been tested during the collapse of Railtrack. In the case of the London
Underground proposal, public perception determined that it was unworkable (Shaoul et
al., 2012).
In the above summary, an account has been given of the turbulent past that has
surrounded the UK PFI policy, in which it has been demonstrated that excessive
costings, bailouts, project failures and mismanagement have all contributed to the
adverse public sentiment that has since become attached to the policy. It is these events
that would later become a contributing factor for the government’s decision to abandon
the PFI policy. In the next section, a determination will be made for the influence that
was imposed upon the government during the financial crisis and how this in turn
impacted upon the nature of the policy.

6.6.1 The progression of the UK PFI policy
Between the periods of 2007 and 2008 PFI capital investment in the UK had
peaked at £8.6 billion, spread across a series of 55 projects (HM Treasury, 2018a). The
total UK portfolio in the same period, amounted to 625 projects with an attached capital
value of £58.7 billion (UK Parliament, 2008). Despite the appearance of growth, the
sub-prime mortgage crisis was beginning to unfold in the US, the effect of which would
have far-reaching consequences (HM Treasury, 2012a). The immediate impact upon
the UK market was witnessed in the rising cost of PFI debt finance, which would
ultimately result in a higher long-term cost (Hellowell, 2012). In addition to the rising
cost of higher loan margins, arrangement and professional fees also increased, adding
a further 3% to the cost of debt finance. In turn, this widened the divide between private
sector debt finance and the rate at which the government could borrow on the open
markets. This ultimately reduced the incentive to engage in the PFI policy, as a means
of providing capital infrastructure (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2011).
This in turn became the focus of criticism that had begun to generate within the houses
of Parliament, against the continued use of the policy (HM Treasury, 2018a). In the
interim period following the financial crisis, there was a marked decrease in PFI
activity, due to lack of interest on the part of the private sector to engage in the policy
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(Mercer and Whitfield, 2018). Despite the drop-off in PFI related investment, the cost
of UK annual unitary payments was set to rise (Demirag et al., 2015).
In an attempt to rejuvenate the PFI sector and to offset the impact of the financial
crisis. The UK government introduced The Infrastructure Finance Unit (TIFU). The
objective of which sought to provide an alternative source of government funding,
delivered under the same terms as the commercial banks (EPEC, 2012b). In criticising
this move, the literature has identified that in the same period, the government had
subsidised in-part some of the leading UK financial institutions. It had not however
attached any terms or conditions upon them, that required them to reinvest in the PFI
sector (Shaoul et al., 2012). Upon entering government in 2010, the new UK coalition
government announced its intention to reform the PFI system and to introduce a series
of PFI capital investments, financed in part by private-sector pension funds and
overseas investors (Connolly and Wall, 2016).

6.6.2 The progression of the Irish PPP policy
Throughout this period the Irish government engaged in a voluntary course of
action, a programme of PPP investments set forth in the National Development Plan
2000-2006; had indicated the government’s continued support for the policy, a detailed
account of which is given in section 5.2. Additional highlights to the Irish PPP policy
included the introduction of the Centre of Expertise within the NDFA in 2005 (Duggan,
2013b), this replicated the earlier structure of the UK Treasury Taskforce (Ball et al.,
2007). In the interim period, the provision of PPP knowledge sharing among EU
member states has also gained a foothold (EIB, 2016a). Despite a slow start to adopt
the necessary administrative procedures as detailed in section 5.4.4. the government
embarked upon an immediate expansion of the policy (Hurst and Reeves, 2004). In the
next section, we will examine the measures that were introduced to offset the impact of
the financial crisis. In doing so we will demonstrate that the assistance that was
extended to Ireland by the Troika, imposed terms upon the government in return for
that support.

6.7 The weight and influence of the financial crisis
In September 2008 the collapse of Lehman Brothers had an unprecedented effect
upon the Irish economy, the details of which were captured during the literature review
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in section 2.3. As a consequence of this, the Irish PPP programme came to an immediate
halt, resulting in numerous projects being abandoned or suspended (Reeves et al.,
2015). In the interim, the Irish economy worsened under the weight of the crisis, leading
to a reliance upon EU Emergency Lending Assistance (ELA) funding, in addition to
continued access to ECB credit facilities (Whelan, 2014). In what can be described as
a coercive decision on the part of Jean-Claude Trichet, the ECB President. Trichet
warned the Irish government, that access to ELA funding was coming to an end and it
would be in Ireland’s best interest to enter into negotiations to secure a deal with the
Troika (Eichengreen, 2015). In autumn 2010 the Irish government subsequently agreed
to an €85 billion lending package with the Troika partners (Reidy and White, 2017;
Duggan, 2013). In doing so, it had succumbed to the conditions imposed under the
lending programme. In all, 270 fiscal objectives were agreed with the Troika, some of
which included the liberalisation of the Irish labour market, deregulation and the
introduction of privatisation as a method of achieving efficiency (Hardiman et al.,
2017).
In Jan 2008 the IMF had requested that a global stimulus plan, in the order of 2%
of GDP, should be implemented as a deterrent to offset the effects of the financial crisis.
It had also envisaged a sustained drop in private sector demand, that would not be
addressed by monetary policy alone (The IMF, 2009). Paralleled to this the Irish
economy was in decline and the government was in pursuit of measures to reduce
exchequer spending. The abrupt influence of the financial crisis had delivered an
immediate deficit to Irish GDP of 7.3%, this was set to decline further in 2009
eventually reaching 14% (Hardiman and Regan, 2013). In addition to the introduction
of austerity measures, Ireland had also witnessed one of the largest budgetary
adjustments in modern times (Palcic and Reeves, 2013). In context, the Irish population
equates to 1.2% of the overall Eurozone population and accounts for 2% of Eurozone
GDP. What is most striking though, in the aftermath of the financial crisis Ireland
carried 42% of the overall cost of the European banking crisis (Hardiman and Regan,
2013). Participant three, an ex-government Minister identified the underlying cause for
the collapse of the PPP programme and the wider implications that this had upon the
economy:
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Once the crash of 2007/8 came into view, you had a situation where once
the finances of the state where threatened, the state had to borrow at huge
rates and therefore the PPP policy just died overnight…at the time when
the economy had crashed, we had an additional 350,000 people who had
lost their jobs. In addition to another huge set of people who had emigrated
(P3, 2020).
Participant six, an economist described how the government had to succumb to
the conditions of the Troika, as a means of providing the necessary funding in support
of the stimulus:
The Troika were recommending that they [the state] sell off some stateowned enterprises, which the government didn't want to do…At that time
they [the state] were very much working within the constraints that were
imposed upon us. So for the government the only way of getting
infrastructure built and to deliver some stimulus on the demand side of the
economy [was to utilise PPP] (P6, 2020).
Prior to the financial crisis average investment throughout the Irish economy had
historically remained at 21%, however, due to the financial crisis this had reduced to a
low of 11%, this was driven in most part by the collapse of private-sector lending and
difficulties in accessing credit facilities from a diminishing banking sector (Farrell,
2013). In an attempt to address the impact upon the Irish economy, in autumn 2010 the
government entered into an €85 billion Troika Programme, and would remain under its
influence for the subsequent three years. The word Troika, is a collective term of the
following institutions, the ECB, the EC and the IMF (Reidy and White, 2017; Duggan,
2013). Austerity measures introduced by the government were obtained ostensibly by
spending cuts and increased taxation, at a ratio of two to one accordingly. This was
consistent with the orthodox approach necessary to make such fiscal adjustments
(O’Farrell, 2013; Hardiman and Regan, 2013). In addition, the government also
introduced measures to reform the public sector, the role of An Bord Snip Nua sought
to identify ways to reduce spending and increase efficiency across a range of
government departments (Oireachtas, 2008b). In compliance with the Troika
agreement, guidance relating to the introduction of budgetary and austerity measures
were made available to the government. However, the decision to introduce additional
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taxation measures or cost-cutting exercises, was ultimately a government choice
(Donovan, 2016; Hardiman and Regan, 2013; Healy. 2012). Austerity measures
introduced by the government, included an in increase in VAT, the introduction of the
Universal Social Charge, Local Property Tax and a reduction in Public Sector pay of
15% (Hardiman and Regan, 2013). In addition, comparable cuts were made to the
Minimum Wage and Social Protection Payments. The aim of which was to create
downward pressure on wages and thus increase competitiveness (Hick, 2017). Coupled
with austerity measures, the government faced annual payments of €3.1 billion in
interest and principal in relation to the national debt, which added further to the
reduction in GDP (Eichengreen, 2015).
Prior to the introduction of the stimulus plan, the government also found it
necessary to establish several new state-owned enterprises, namely Irish Water, Smart
Grid, Gaslink, Broadband 21, Bio-energy and Forestry Ireland (Palcic and Reeves,
2013). In July 2012 Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform, Brendan Howlin
stated, this coincided with the government determination to address the deficit in
critical infrastructure. The funding of which would be met by the disposal of legacy
state-owned enterprises, resulting in a contribution of €850 million. In addition, joint
funding would also be sourced from the EIB and the collateral of the National Pension
Reserve Fund (The NDFA, 2013;Reeves, 2015;Burke and Demirag, 2015). In total,
the government had agreed to 270 measures introduced by the Troika (Hardiman et
al., 2017). In context this amounted to a direct coercive transfer between the Troika
and the government to facilitate the loan agreements that were extended to Ireland.
Participant three, a Minister in the then government, identified that there was a
reluctance on the part of the EIB to engage with Ireland, given the severity of the
economy at that time:
The EIB wasn't initially so keen on Ireland, [insofar as] what if the country
had crashed [potentially defaulting], it was only as we began to recover
that they became interested (P3, 2020).
Participant five, a legal advisor to the NDFA and the private sector, recalled the
political and financial climate at the time when the stimulus was introduced:
I was at the launch of the stimulus package and I remember it was very
much of case of "you know" are Ireland Inc. reliable, I was writing memos
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to clients who were querying whether the Irish state would actually fulfil
their commitments under a PPP. So, the state had to very much show that
they were committed to PPP and backing these projects (P5, 2020).
Participant two, a senior PPP negotiator expanded further on this by identifying
the significant role played by the EIB as a backer of the 2012 stimulus package, for
not alone did they assist in the revival of the policy they also helped to shore up the
reputation of the Irish economy:
When we were closing projects in 2012 and 2013 around that period, they
were key, because without them [the EIB} we wouldn't have been able to
do that, because our reputation as a country wasn't great (P2, 2020).
In the next section, a determination will be made for the measures that were introduced
to reform the UK PFI policy and to what extent those changes were adopted to
rejuvenate the Irish PPP sector, as part of the 2012 stimulus package.

6.7.1 Amendments to the Irish PPP and the UK PFI policies
With the consent of the Troika, in 2012 the government introduced a stimulus
package targeted at rejuvenating the PPP sector and to revive the construction industry,
this was examined in section 2.4 and section 5.3 respectively (IBEC, 2013). To
facilitate a return back to the market, the government introduced a series of amendments
to entice the private sector to commence reinvesting in the PPP programme, this is
detailed extensively throughout section 5.4 (NDFA, 2013b). The literature has also
identified that similarities existed between the amendments that were introduced to the
UK policy and the changes that were subsequently made to the Irish policy (NDFA,
2013). In the following sections, an attempt will be made to identify, to what extent did
the amendments introduced in 2012 under the UK PFI policy, reflected in the changes
that were introduced to the Irish PPP policy in 2013.
Prior to the introduction of the Irish policy amendments, in 2012 the UK
government announced a series of changes to the UK PFI policy, the detail of which is
given in section 5.4. The introduction of these measures was seen as a response to the
market changes brought about as a result of the financial crisis. Additionally it was seen
as an attempt to address past concerns relating to the policy, that had been brought to
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the attention of the government (HM Treasury, 2012a). The literature identified that
excessive profits earned on the part of the private sector and windfall gains generated
from the re-sale of PFI contracts, had in turn attracted criticism towards the PFI policy
(HM Treasury, 2012a). In relation to these claims, it has been suggested that the finance
costs of early PFI contracts had been set at unrealistically high margins and when
adjusted downward, it had generated excessive gains for the private sector (Demirag et
al., 2015). In this regard, the Irish policy never experienced such issues. From the onset,
the government had identified that the lack of standardisation under the terms of the
UK policy had been the root cause of the problem (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). In effect
‘lesson drawing’ had preempted the Irish policy from encountering such problems.
The literature has also highlighted that the UK amendments also sought to address
concerns, that the PFI procurement period was a drawn-out and lengthy process
(Akintoye et al., 2003; HM Treasury, 2012a). Similar criticism has been attributed to
the Irish policy, where it was identified that it was also common to endure a long and
protracted procurement process (Reeves, 2015). The amendments to the UK policy,
sought to reduce this down to a desired fifteen to eighteen month period (HM Treasury,
2012a). Hellowell (2012) reminds us that due to the complex nature of some PFI
projects, such as NHS Hospitals, the presence of inherent risk can extend this period
out to an average twenty-one months. In March 2013 Minister of State Brian Hayes
announced that amendments to the Irish PPP policy would also include a revised
procurement period of between fifteen and eighteen months (Oireachtas, 2013). As an
additional incentive, to expedite the procurement process pertaining to the UK PFI
schools programme. The UK also introduced a pre-procurement planning consultation
process, to reduce the time given to the necessary design and planning process (HM
Treasury, 2012a). In this regard, the Irish policy drew lessons from the UK measure,
by introducing a similar amendment that ensured that full planning permission was
provided for prior to going to the market (NDFA, 2018a).
Under the UK measures the provision to utilise soft services was made optional
(HM Treasury, 2012a), however, the Irish policy neglected to remove this element,
choosing instead to keep it mandatory for all Irish PPP proposals (NDFA, 2013b).
Evidence from the UK literature suggests that the inclusion of soft services over the
duration of the contract, has proved excessive and costly (Hellowell, 2012). Further
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incentives introduced under the Irish measures, included the reimbursement of bidding
fees by up to 50%. However this was found to be absent under the UK measures, it
therefore appears to be an Irish driven initiative. However, the literature did identify
that under the Australian model, bidding fees associated with unsuccessful tenderers
are reimbursed (NSW Treasury, 2015).
Another area of concern that the UK amendments sought to address was in
relation to the relative costs over the lifetime of the contract, including the associated
risks and benefits (Vodden, 2013).The UK National Audit Office identified that the
right to access such information was restricted under the terms of the contract
agreement. In response to this, more rigorous measures were introduced in relation to
transparency and upfront costings (HM Treasury, 2012a). In relation to the Irish policy,
the literature has identified that issues relating to transparency have not been addressed
under the amended policy, to the same extent that the UK measures have sought to do
(PAC, 2012). However, some progress has been made to overturn the restriction on
access to publicly available information. In April 2018 assurances were given by the
NDFA to the Committee of Public Accounts, that information pertaining to past PPP
benchmarking and VFM reports would be forthcoming (NDFA, 2018b; Transport
Infrastructure Ireland, 2018).
Important to note participant two, identified that throughout the period of the
financial crisis, the UK authorities had continued to utilise PFI despite the excessive
finance cost that were present at that time. In contrast the Irish authorities had
abandoned or postponed the majority of its proposals. Inadvertently this had prevented
the Irish authorities from racking up the same excessive finance costs that the UK
government had encountered. It also allowed the Irish authorities to draw lessons from
the UK experience and develop an astuteness towards the Irish portfolio:
That is how I would see it, in terms of the timing of it [the financial crisis]
…the UK they lost the run of themselves a little bit there. If you look at
some of the buildings that were delivered, they were very high tech, very
lavish and very expensive buildings to run and maintain. Whereas I think
the NDFA and the Irish government have learnt their lessons from that
(P2, 2020).
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The literature has also identified that the actions on the part of the UK
government to introduce such changes, was driven in an attempt to appease the
financial markets (HM Treasury, 2012a). In context, of the Dolowitz and Marsh
framework, it could be viewed that the decision to do so was enacted under semicoercive pressure (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). From an Irish perspective, the
government’s adoption of similar measures was introduced under direct imposition, as
part of its commitment the terms of the Troika agreement. Mr Gerard Cahillane, Deputy
Director of the NDFA stated to the Joint Committee on Finance Public Expenditure and
Reform, that the introduction of the 2012 stimulus package, required prior approval
from the Troika before it was introduced (Joint Committee on Finance Public
Expenditure and Reform, 2018a). Minkman et al. (2018) described that in a time of
national emergency or political urgency, it may be warranted to accept the policies and
procedures of another jurisdiction.

6.8 The signs of divergence
Subsequent to the introduction of the reforms measures and rebranding of the UK
PFI/PF2 policy, as detailed in section 6.7.1. The UK PFI sector entered into a period of
decline, resulting in the lowest recorded usage of PFI since the introduction of the
policy, equating to a yearly average investment of less than £0.5 billion (HM Treasury,
2018a). The UK Committee of Public Accounts reflected that the drop in activity was
attributed to inflexibility and lack of transparency, resulting in an uptake of only six
PF2 proposals since the new measures were introduced (House of Commons
Committee of Public Accounts, 2018). It has further identified that were room existed
to renegotiate the terms of existing PFI contracts, to reduce the burden on the public
sector, the private sector was unwilling to engage (Mercer and Whitfield, 2018). In
2018 The UK Committee of Public Accounts published a report into the continued
viability of the policy. In which it identified that the UK taxpayer was now responsible
for £60 billion worth of PFI assets, with an attaching liability of £199 billion to run
concurrently until 2040s. Furthermore, the report highlighted that after twenty-five
years in operation, HM Treasury had obtained no credible data to determine if PFI was
capable of providing value for money (House of Commons Committee of Public
Accounts, 2018). Adding to this, the literature identifies that awareness has grown for
an undercurrent of tax avoidance that continues to be associated with the policy
(Woodward, 2018).
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Tax revenue is being lost through the use of off-shore arrangements by PFI
investors and the effect has not been adequately assessed. The Committee
is concerned that the Treasury has no plans to address this matter (UK
Parliament, 2011).
In addition, the extensive investment programme initiated under the New Labour
Government, was now generating financial instability within the NHS, as the high costs
of unitary payments were having a budgetary impact (Powell and Miller, 2016).
Professor Allyson Pollock a UK public health specialist, gave an account of the UK
PFI experience to a Dail Committee hearing:
Look at the histories and experiences of PFI…It is a totally discredited
policy (Oireachtas, 2016).
In a bid to alleviate the financial pressure, some NHS hospital trusts were reported
to have turned to external advisors to identify potential savings within the system (HM
Treasury, 2018a). The extent of which was identified when the UK government had to
intervene in 2014, to provide £1.5 billion in relief funding to a group of seven NHS
hospital trusts (Khadaroo and Abdullah, 2015). The impact upon the UK exchequer is
estimated to peak in 2019/2020 when annual unitary payments are set to reach £10.3
billion (OECD, 2018). This in addition to the £110 billion already paid, in the interim
period since the policy was first introduced (House of Commons Committee of Public
Accounts, 2018). Over the course of time, PFI contracts have become commodities on
the open market, where the urge to generate profits has made the PFI model
unsustainable (Whitfield, 2017). The initial concept of a secondary market, was
endorsed by the government as a means of averting the premium charged by the private
sector, for the supposed restriction of resale opportunities attaching to early-round PFI
contracts (Treasury, 2006). However, it became evident that once this market opened
up, the taxpayer received no benefit or return from such transactions, the majority of
which were conducted through off-shore arrangements. As a means of recouping a
return on their investment, the private sector sought to streamline their operations and
to seek efficiencies (UK Committee of Public Accounts, 2011a).
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The above section identifies that coercive pressure was beginning to mount for
the UK government from a number of fronts, notably, a reduction in the uptake of the
PF2 policy, growing unitary costs and public sentiment towards perceived gains and
underhandedness of the part of the private sector. In addition, the staggered approach
to the NHS organisational structure, provided little opportunity for lesson drawing. In
effect, each hospital trust acted independently when entering into a PFI finance
arrangement and not as a group entity (HM Treasury, 2018a)

6.8.1 Events leading up to the 2018 UK Autumn statement
During his speech at the annual UK Labour Party conference in September 2017,
Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell stated the following:
In relation to PFI, never again will taxpayer’s money be used to subsidise
the profits of shareholders, often based in offshore tax havens. Once in
government, the Labour Party will enter into no more PFI contracts and
further pledged to bring all existing PFI contracts back under the control of
the government (The Labour Party, 2017).
Data pertaining to PFI activity for the years 1997 to 2010 reflect that under the New
Labour government of Blair and Brown, PFI activity was at its peak (The UK NAO,
2018). In comparison, since the introduction of the amended PF2 policy, the up-take
has amounted to six confirmed contracts with a further two in the pipeline (House of
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2018). The result of which has led to a
decrease in HM Treasury staffing numbers that had previously been assigned to
administer the policy (UK National Audit Office, 2018). A further concern relates to
the impact of the Brexit referendum decision and how this might have implications for
the UK policy (Inderst, 2017). When the UK departed from the EU in January 2020,
the guarantee of future access to EIB funding remained uncertain (HM Government,
2020; HM Treasury, 2018a). The UK National Audit Office (2018) noted that this
uncertainty will extend further to include overseas investors and in this regard, the HM
Treasury and IPA are actively seeking solutions. Since the introduction of the amended
PF2 policy, the EIB has provided £758 million in finance, as a low-cost alternative to
the banks (HM Treasury, 2018a).
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In the January 2018, the collapse of Carillion has raised significant concerns for
the UK government in relation to how it manages the supply of critical infrastructure
and ancillary services (House of Commons, 2018). Prior to the collapse, Carillion
employed 43,000 people, just under half of which were in the UK. In addition to
developing and financing UK PFI infrastructure, it also acted as the second-largest
facilities provider to the UK government (Khadaroo and Abdullah, 2018). The collapse
of the Carillon group had raised concerns for the British authorities, notably in relation
to the financial practices of the organisation, in addition to its ability to trade as a going
concern. Furthermore, Carillion had amassed a series of substantial losses associated
with PFI, brought about as a consequence of below-cost bidding in an effort to stay
afloat (The UK NAO, 2018a). As the events unfolded it transpired that Carillion had
sought a bailout from the UK government, which they refused. Which supports the
argument that it is the private sector that carries the risk in relation to PFI/PPP. The
net result of Carillion collapse left an £800 million pension deficit, £1 billion in bank
debts and a further £2 billion in trade debts (Khadaroo and Abdullah, 2018).
Furthermore, the demise of Carillion had also left the UK government with the added
expense of paying the £148 million in receivership fees, associated with the closure of
the company (The UK NAO, 2018a). Perhaps the biggest impact of the Carillion
collapse came in the form of public and political backlash for the government’s
continued use of the policy (House of Commons Library, 2018b; Khadaroo and
Abdullah, 2018). The consequences of which, brought direct coercive pressure upon
the UK government, to mitigate the effects of the Carillion collapse and to bring the
policy to a close. In October 2018 the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip
Hammond, informed the House of Commons of the UK government’s decision to
abolish the PFI policy (House of Commons Library, 2018a).

6.8.2 Events leading up to the 2018-27 National Development Plan
In the opening sections of this chapter, it was identified that the introduction of
the Irish PPP policy, had been a voluntary decision taken by the government of the day.
It subsequently transcribed in section 6.7 that as a consequence of the financial crisis,
in 2010 the Irish government sought assistance under the Troika programme.
Furthermore, in section 6.7.1, it was demonstrated that prior to the introduction of the
2012 stimulus package, it was first necessary to gain the approval of the Troika. This
argument is reaffirmed by Palcic and Reeves (2013) who highlighted that as a
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prerequisite of the bail-out terms, the government was required to engage in the
privatisation of several State-Owned Enterprises (SOE). The indication of which
suggests, that throughout this period Ireland was under the direct coercive influence of
the Troika partners. The literate also describes the role of the Troika as a “shadow
authority” acting as an unwanted constraint upon the government’s ability to impose
its own domestic policies. However, in some instances, the government played this to
its own advantage by implementing reforms to the public sector under the guise of
Troika led initiatives (Hardiman and MacCarthaigh, 2019). Taken in perspective the
above events correlate with the framework of Dolowitz and Marsh, who identify that
influence is often imposed upon those jurisdictions in receipt of financial assistance
(Reidy and White, 2017; Duggan, 2013).
In 2013 Ireland departed from the Troika programme and made a return to the
financial markets, this was detailed in section 2.5. In 2014 the Irish government
embarked upon a further round of PPP developments, the focus of which sought to
address a lack of investment into social housing and to stimulate employment within
the construction sector. This was extended in 2015 to include a series of PPP proposals
into the health, justice, and education sectors. Important to note, that the return to the
financial markets and the expansion of the PPP programme, indicates a significant
turning point for the government. Insofar as, the veto held by the Troika relating to the
government’s spending decisions, had dissipated. Going forth the decision to continue
to utilise the PPP programme, would be solely as the discretion of the sovereign
government, without the influence of direct coercion.
Throughout the twenty-year history of the Irish PPP policy, the EIB has been
steadfast in its support of the Irish programme, this was demonstrated in 2016, when
the EIB opened its permanent Irish headquarters. It can be suggested that this decision,
attributes legitimacy for the retention of the Irish policy (Committee of Public
Accounts, 2017). The EIB has acted as a key partner in many of Irelands flagship PPP
and traditionally procured developments. It was an advocate for the introduction of the
2012 stimulus package, for which it provided low-cost finance (DPER, 2018b).
Important to recognise, the backing of a strategic partner can also be presented as one
having a semi-coercive influence over the policy. In contrast in section 5.4.2, it was
identified that uncertainty now exists for the UK government regarding its future
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relationship with the EIB (HM Treasury, 2018a), in turn this may act as a source of
semi-coercive pressure to transfer away from the policy.
In comparison to the UK, the presence of adverse public sentiment, is less evident
in the Irish setting. From the onset, the government engaged with the social partners to
secure the introduction of the policy, which has since been administered under a range
cross-party political affiliations. Where discourse has occurred it has been found
attaching to individual incidents of mismanagement or misfortune, this was
demonstrated respectively in the Cork School of Music project and the rejuvenation of
the Dublin City housing stock, which fell foul of the financial crisis (Oireachtas, 2008c;
Petersen, 2011). In 2018 the collapse of Carillion had also impacted upon PPP
programme, when it caused the delay in the provision of school bundle five (DPER,
2018b). More importantly, public sentiment was raised in relation to the impact and
inconvenience that this had caused to the stakeholders awaiting delivery of the schools.
It also resulted in protesting on the part of those private sector entities that had incurred
a financial loss as a consequence of the collapse. Furthermore, it also prompted a Dáil
enquiry, to ascertain how the collapse of Carillion had impacted upon the Irish PPP
programme (Joint Committee on Finance Public Expenditure and Reform, 2018b). In
March 2018 the government published an overview report into Public Private
Partnerships in Ireland, in which it identified that “lesson drawing” could be taken out
of the Carillion experience; the focus of which highlighted the need to introduce
contingency planning into such arrangements (Oireachtas, 2018a).
In February 2018 the government published the National Development Plan for
the period 2018-2027, in which it demonstrated a willingness to further engage in the
PPP policy, this was examined in section 2.4.1 (Government of Ireland, 2018). In
addition to this, in July 2018 assurance for the continued use of the policy was also
delivered in an Inter-Departmental agency report (DPER, 2018b). The finding of which
determined that the advantages that were afforded by retaining the policy, became most
evident during the recent financial crisis, whereby it provided a means to circumvent
the effects of fiscal entrenchment:
The ‘off-balance sheet’ classification of PPPs was noted as being a
particular advantage of PPPs in times of economic and fiscal crisis…,to
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deliver priority capital projects when these cannot be funded by the
Exchequer. [For this reason] it is important to continue to signal to the PPP
market… that Ireland remains committed (DPER, 2018b,p.2).
In the wake of the financial crisis, the evidence contained in the Inter-Departmental
agency report, suggests that among those contracting authorities acting on behalf of the
state notably the departments of Health, Education, Justice and Transport etc. They
remain apprehensive against the removal or replacement of the policy, in light of the
advantages that it provided to the Irish economy as part of the 2012 stimulus measures.
The literature identified that in the period subsequent to the financial crisis, the NDFA
played an active role in convincing private sector investors to return to the Irish
markets. Should the Irish PPP policy be removed or stall again in the future, given the
uncertainty that this would generate, added to the inherent risk and longevity of the
contract periods. It is unlikely that investors would return again, under such uncertain
and ambiguous conditions. In effect, the literature suggests that the current phase of the
Irish PPP policy, can be characterised as a semi-coercive stage. Where lesson drawing
during the period of the financial crisis, has emerged as the driving force for the
retention of the policy.

6.9 Summary
The literature recognises, that the initial introduction of PPP can be traced back
to the preference of the then Fianna Fáil led government. It was also demonstrated that
the core make-up of the Irish PPP policy, was an adaptation of the UK PFI guidelines,
extracted following a consultation process “lesson drawing” between the Irish
authorities and their UK counterparts. We acknowledged the impact of the financial
crisis and the subsequent intervention of the Troika programme, and how, in return for
financial assistance the Irish government had to succumb to the direct influence of the
Troika; this extended to obtaining their prior approval to implement the 2012 stimulus
package.
It was also identified that as a means of reviving the stalled PPP programme the
government sought to introduce a series of amendments to the policy to act as an
enticement to the private sector to return to the market. In the interim period, the
advantages provided by the PPP programme were made apparent to the government,
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who later endorsed the retention of the policy. In doing so it had created a semi-coercive
reliance upon PPP, a defence mechanism to offset any downturn in the economy. In
section 2.4 it was identified that the initial introduction of the UK PFI policy, was
implemented under semi-coercive conditions that had stemmed from the NPM
movement. In the intervening periods, the UK government had become reliant upon
PFI, until the growth in political and public sentiment turned against the policy. This
was brought about by a series of costly and well-published PFI failures, in addition to
the onset of Brexit and the potential departure of the EIB. The political tolerance to
retain the policy had become diluted, which ultimately led to the growth in directcoercive pressure upon the government, to ultimately abandon the policy.
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Chapter Seven: Research Question Three
The Incentive for the state…
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7.1 Introduction
In this chapter we conclude on our final research-question in doing so we
identify the incentives that exist for the state to engage in PPP. In the context of future
decision making, we identify under what conditions PPP is favoured above traditional
procurement and what are the determinants for that choice. By means of semistructured interviews, primary data were obtained from those engaged in the
administration of the policy, notably from an economic, legal and public policy
background. By means of thematic analysis, we explore the contributions that were
given by the participants of this study, to determine where the policy now sits as a
component of the state’s public procurement policy. To lend support to our argument,
we draw from the disparities that exist between the Irish PPP and UK PFI portfolios.

7.2 Themes arising from the data analysis process
In the following sections, we will explore the themes that came to prominence
during the analysis of the semi-structured interviews that were held with the
participants of this study. The aim of which is to probe these arguments to assist in
answering research question three, which seeks :
To identify what incentivises the state to retain its PPP policy
and to examine how Economic, Legal and Public Policy Perspectives retain
an influence over that process
Table 7.1 represents a collective summary of the coding that was captured, during the
thematic analysis and is reflected in the findings of research question three.
Furthermore (Appendix D) represents a word cloud, that demonstrates the most
frequently used expressions that were contained within the data.
Table 7.1: Research Themes 3- 6
Total coding
blocks 1046

Themes

Text
blocks Per
Theme

7.2.3

The incentive for the state to retain its PPP programme

170

7.3

The Economic considerations that apply to PPP

217

7.4

The Legal process that governs the Irish policy

145

7.5

A perspective of PPP as a component of the public
procurement policy

278
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7.2.3 The incentive for the state to retain its PPP programme
By 2013 the Irish economy had begun to recover from the impact of the financial
crisis, this was driven in most part by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (J. Fitzgerald,
2014). The employment opportunities that stemmed from this sectors, were largely
targeted towards third-level graduate positions within the pharma and tech industries
(Barry and Bergin, 2019). In section 6.8.2 we demonstrated, that in light of the
outcome of the relaunch of the Irish PPP programme in 2012, the government was now
under semi-coercive pressure to retain the policy. On the basis that should the state
decide to suspend its PPP programme at any time in the future, the private sector would
fail return to the market (DPER 2018).
In July 2018 the government published an inter-departmental agency report into
the future viability of PPP to assist in the delivery of the 2018-27 National
Development Plan (NDP). While the report identified that PPP had a potential role to
play by means of bespoke and self-financing concession arrangements, it cautioned
that the policy was not a solution or remedy in every instance (DPER 2018). In section
2.6.1 it was established that in October 2018 the British government had reached a
determination that the future use of UK PFI policy had become untenable. To seek a
determination to this argument, in the context of the Irish policy, the participants of
this study were challenged to identify, under what conditions would the use of PPP be
favoured above traditional procurement. The commentary that was captured in relation
to this question was subsequently analysed within Nvivo and provides us with the
following data. Participant one, a financial advisor to the NDFA and to the private
sector identified that in an attempt to obtain the maximum return for the state, any
future developments must take a more comprehensive approach, to capture a return
from adjacent or ancillary investments:
What we're saying is you have to analyse the costs, but you have got to
look at value. You have to understand value capture and how you can get
your share of it (P1, 2019).
(Connolly and Wall, 2016) note, that occasionally there are unintended benefits
derived from PPP investment, in the case of school or transit infrastructure, the supply
and demand of neighbouring property, may give rise to capital appreciation. In relation
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to future transport investments, funded by means of concession arrangements,
participant six, an economist and leading contributor on the subject of PPP identified
the economic incentives for the government to engage with the policy:
If the government thinks that they can get people to pay for infrastructure
through user charges [PPP concession arrangements], that obviously is an
attraction (P6, 2020).
This viewpoint is shared by the EIB, participant four, identified that in recent
developments that there was a move towards this type of payment schedule:
I have noticed in the last few years that there is a shift back towards
transport and user payment approaches (P4, 2020).
Participant three, a government Minister at that time, gave an account of the
benefits that had derived from the PPP schools programme. One of the key aims of the
2012 stimulus package, had sought to alleviate the pressure on the economy by
reducing the number of unemployed within the construction sector. This in turn lends
supports to the claims that were made in the 2018 inter departmental agency report;
that based on the assumption that PPP could be utilised as counter-cyclical policy tool,
to be used in times of restraint, it was therefore in the states interest to retain the policy
(DPER, 2018b)
The schools' programme, certainly here in this constituency, did at the time
generated some much-needed local employment, at a relatively smallscale investment (P3, 2020).
Participant two, identifies that PPP can be versatile and reactive, insofar as they
are subject to less constraints than exchequer backed investments, furthermore they
bring versatility to the process by allowing for public investment, that would otherwise
been subject to the time or financial restrictions.
The [PPP] social housing program is obviously up and running, this is the
infrastructure that the government needs and we need it now, (P2, 2020).
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In the same instance participant six, identifies that the policy can provide the
government with the capacity to forward-plan and apportion risk, without the necessity
to provide the upfront financing:
The long-term planning features of PPP are attractive, the fact that it's all
worked out in advance, the contractor is obliged to maintain the
infrastructure to a particular standard…The off-balance-sheet financing
thing will always be important to a degree, so that has to be taken into
account (P6, 2020).
The literature tell us that since the policy was first introduced, that a strategic
alliance has developed between the government and the EIB; while acting as an
investment partner in numerous PPP proposals, the bank has also provided the state
with a source of low cost finance (Reeves, 2015). Participant four, a senior member of
the EIB, identified the broader aspects that the bank will consider when evaluating its
investment decisions. Notably in the form of social cohesion and for the betterment of
EU citizens. In addition, the participation of the EIB also had the knock-on effect of
providing assurances to the private sector, that it was safe to follow suite:
Does the project make sense economically, does it improve the welfare of
the European citizens and are we making a difference by investing in the
project…The reason why PPP promoters want us involved is, not because
of the cost of financing, but because they know the quality of our due
diligence acts as a quality stamp, that will bring other private sector
financers into the deal (P4, 2020).
Participant five, identified the role that exists for PPP as part of the wider
approach to public procurement and not just in times of fiscal difficulty:
There should be a mix in the way we deliver infrastructure and PPP is just
one of those [elements]…I don't think it's just solely for the rainy day
[scenario] (P5, 2020).
Despite putting forward the rationale for the retention of the Irish policy, several
participants erred on the side of caution in relation to how receptive the government
was towards PPP. Participant two, identified that within government circles PPP is not
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necessarily the flavour of the month (P2, 2020). Despite these claims, several
participants indicated the key role that PPP could potentially play, in the areas of
innovation and climate change, "As we move towards the requirement to provide
alternative transport and future energy needs, it will require greater collaboration with
the private sector" (P1, 2019). Participant two, identified that this will become evident
in areas relating to sustainability, energy and wind farms, furthermore it is going to
become socially acceptable to procure such investment by means of PPP (P2, 2020).
Participant four, a senior member of the EIB identified that from a strategic point of
view, the NDFA is now seeking to incorporate climate change criteria into future PPP
proposals:
I think PPPs have a role and I take it that it is going to be increasing, I
know the NDFA are looking at this, as to how we can integrate climate
criteria into PPPs, like the rest of us we're all kind of looking at the impact
of climate agenda in our strategies (P4, 2020).
In this section, we have attempted to identify the rationale for the continued use
of PPP as part of the public procurement policy. We have distinguished that the
preferred approach of the government is to favour concession-based funding streams
as a means of self-financing public infrastructure. It was further highlighted that the
state had the potential to access untapped revenue sources by means of "value capture",
notably in the form of joint ventures or lease arrangements. We identified that PPP can
be effective in times of crisis, notably by the governments use of PPP as part of the
National Housing Strategy. It was also evident that PPP had a potential role in the
defence against climate change, insofar as the future strategies of the NDFA, now seek
to incorporate design features to address the impact of climate change and the
reduction of harmful emissions.

7.3 The Economic considerations that apply to PPP
In section 6.8 it was discovered that in comparison to the Irish PPP portfolio,
25% of the capital value of the UK PFI portfolio was related to the provision of
hospitals. The UK National Audit Office identified that the provision of hospitals is
viewed as complex and expensive when compared to other forms of PFI developments,
due in part to the nature and risk associated with the construction and maintenance
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cost (The UK NAO, 2011). In this regard, the Irish PPP programme has avoided
engaging in the provision of hospital infrastructure. It was identified in section 2.4.1
that the construction of the National Children's Hospital (NCH) was considered
unsuitable under the PPP programme, due to the two-phased approach of the
development. This was attributed in part to the scale of the project and as a means of
circumventing any further delays that might be incurred during the procurement
period. However, it was further highlighted that the implementation of the National
Broadband Plan (NBP) was deemed appropriate to procure under the PPP programme,
despite concerns that were raised in relation to the ownership structure and the
presence of political influence. This has identified the existence of a theme, in relation
to the selection process that determines the preference of one procurement method
above the other. Participant three, an ex-Minister and senior member of the
government expressed the sentiment, that the decision to engage in PPP comes at a
premium:
There were facts that stood out in relation to PPPs, one is that if you have
a solvent government the cost of borrowing…is always much cheaper then
PPP financed projects because of the way it is structured…it can be much
more expensive both on paper and in reality (P3, 2020).
Participant four, identified the approach taken by the EIB when evaluating the
robustness of the proposal:
We are not just concerned about the creditworthiness of the client, we are
also concerned about the economics of the project, we cannot finance
products that don't make economic sense (P4, 2020).
Participant three, an ex-government Minister identified the need for restraint and
apportionment when engaging in PPP as a means of procurement. As an economist
and contributor on the subject of PPP participant six, was also in agreement with this
viewpoint:
I think the key thing is proportionality on the amount of PPPs active in the
economy (P3, 2020). You have to remember that around the world very
few governments have used PPP for more than 10% of overall capital
spending (P6, 2020).
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In section 5.4 we demonstrated that under the UK PFI model, investment into
the NHS hospital portfolio had proved arduous and economically unsound, and in
several instances had resulted in a public backlash in opposition to the policy
(Spackman, 2002). In contrast, participant one, identifies that the Irish authorities
remained prudent in relation to the type and class of PPP investments that they were
willing to engage in, preferring instead to elect for economically proven and less riskaverse proposals, into road and accommodation type infrastructure. Participant six,
suggests that in doing so the Irish authorities have demonstrated that they have learned
lessons from the UK experience:
My own view is that we have stuck with some of the safer stuff, the easiest
stuff to do, [in comparison] hospitals are complicated (P1, 2019). Ireland
has been very selective, we are very slow to get into the area of health and
that would account for an awful lot of what has happened in the UK (P6,
2020).
According to participant three, an ex-cabinet member, the negotiations
surrounding the procurement of the NCH were laborious and protracted, furthermore
what this reveals to us is that due to the self-interest and political wrangling on the part
of the government. This in turn added complexity to the procurement process, and
introduced unfavourable conditions by which to utilise PPP:
I also believe that procedures involved surrounding the procurement of the
Children's Hospital were completely torturous... However the government
and the Minister for Health at the time, James Reilly and the Taoiseach at
the time gave the go-ahead, they created the decision-making model which
is based around the medical interests that were involved. Essentially, they
were left to make the decision and of course, the medical interests
ultimately wished to remain in the city (P3, 2020).
Participant one, outlined the economic advantages of adopting PPP as a
procurement choice and also identified that the National Children's Hospital was
potentially feasible under the PPP model:
Under PPP we would agree a price and that's the price… If there are price
overruns that would fall back on the private sector, the children's hospital
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could have been done…there are similar hospitals being built in Australia
under PPP (P1, 2019).
Participant five, a legal advisor to the NDFA identified that PPP was a viable
alternative as part of the procurement arrangements relating to the NCH. Participant
three, remained sceptical and expressed caution based on the problems encountered in
the UK:
I think the national Children's Hospital potentially could have been
procured completely differently and PPP could have been a part of that, it
might have been more successful procurement route (P5, 2020). In relation
to [the procurement of] hospitals, this has particularly been a problem in
the UK (P5, 2020).
In section 2.4.1 we identified that the award of contract for the National
Broadband Plan (NBP) had become embroiled in controversy due to the estimated cost
and ownership structure (Reeves and Palcic 2019). Participant one, a big-four financial
advisor in relation to European and Middle Eastern PPP investment, identified that
under similar circumstances in parts of Africa, wireless technology has helped to
bypass the same constraint without the same level of investment. Furthermore, it was
highlighted that the deal wasn't as advantageous as it first appeared (P1, 2019):
The reality is that in twenty years, if the market in which they have to get
their return from, "the three billion", [could be] worth nothing if the public
decides not to buy it (P1, 2019).
In the context of the overall PPP programme, we demonstrated in section 2.6.1
that a unique feature of the NBP provided that final ownership of the asset would not
be retained by the state. Despite the appearance, there was a consensus that the
structure to the NBP was a one-off proposition and therefore did not represent a change
in direction for the way in which the government administers the policy (P2, P5, 2020).
Participant one, raises scepticism behind the true motive for the introduction of the
NBP and suggests that it may have been driven by the need to appease a rural
electorate:
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The political demands are that all politics begin at a local level, rural
constituencies want good broadband…It's an expensive thing to keep
people happy, but that is what politics has required (P1, 2019). I'm not sure
where the value is for the state in doing it that way (P2, 2020).
Participant five, a legal advisor to the NDFA identified that despite the rigorous
undertakings on the part of the NDFA, throughout the evaluation and benchmarking
process. The ultimate decision to proceed or withdraw from the proposal rests with the
Department of Finance:
What you begin to learn is, that the decision making to decide what
projects are going to go forward or not within the different departments,
ultimately lies with DPER and the Minister for Finance (P5, 2020).
In the case of the NBP participant six, an economist and leading contributor on
the subject of PPP, highlighted that the NDFA had no role in the proceedings. Despite
this claim, the literature identifies that there is the statutory mandate for the NDFA to
provide financial and contractual advice regarding all state capital expenditure in
excess of €20 million euro:
The NDFA, they had nothing to do with that, and if I was to guess, I think
that they are probably happy that had nothing to do with it (P6, 2020).
Participant three, an ex-government Minister remained sceptical around the
claims that PPP provided value for money:
Very often he who manages to claim that PPP is efficient and effective, is
the one who makes a killing on the contract (P3, 2020).
The literature identifies that investment into PPP backed infrastructure can
appear expensive in comparison to the traditionally financed procurement (Committee
of Public Accounts 2018); based on the perception that the government can typically
source funding at lower rates than the private sector (P6, 2020). The argument
portrayed by the private sector is that they are more efficient and therefore capable of
delivering greater value for money than the public sector (Reeves 2015). In this section
participant six, upheld the argument that the use of PPP must be proportionate, set
against the backdrop of the government’s capital spending programme.
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Participant six, noted that globally it is rare to exceed 10% of the national capital
expenditure, towards the allocation of unitary payments (P6, 2020). In relation to this,
we identified that in comparison to the UK portfolio, that the Irish authorities had
retained a cautious approach towards the selection and class of investment, which in
turn curtailed the level of risk and expense associated with the investment. The
government's decision to proceed with the procurement of the NCH by means of
traditional procurement was an indication of the state's willingness to learn from the
UK PFI experience (P6, 2020); where the provision of hospitals was noted as being
problematic (HM Treasury 2018; P3, 2020). Despite the contention of several
participants that the NCH was viable under the PPP model, the development was
plagued by cost overruns, political wrangling and group self-interest on the part of the
Irish medical profession. In comparison, the procurement surrounding the NBP was
deemed viable under the PPP programme. However, despite the inherent risk and
claims that the investment provided little or no return to the state (Reeves and Palcic
2019), the government failed to engage the services of the NDFA to evaluate the
proposal (P6, 2020). Furthermore it was identified by several participants that in the
case of NBP there was lack of competition and proven viability (P3, 2020). The
decision to proceed appears largely to be based on the preference of the government
and void of any economic consideration, favouring instead to appease the demands of
a local electorate (P1, 2019). In this section participant five, identified that the decision
to proceed with one procurement process over another, will ultimately revert back to
the Department of Finance (P5, 2020).

7.4 The legal process that governs the Irish policy
Throughout the EU, authority over the legal procedures that govern the PPP
process, are administered in most part by means of a Civil Law judicial system. In this
regard, both Ireland and the UK and to some degree Cyprus and Malta differ from the
rest of Europe, insofar as PPP oversight and contractual arrangements are regulated by
application of a Common Law charter (EIB 2011; Boyle 2014). Governance over both
traditional and PPP/PFI procurement is headed by the EU public procurement
directives (The European Parliament 2014), which are subsequently re-drafted and
transposed into Irish and UK regulations (Dail Éireann 2014; House of Commons
Library 2014). Where previously the UK authorities had paved the way within Europe
for the inclusion of a common law narrative, to assist in the interpretation of EU
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legislation. Once the UK departs from the EU the argument to adapt the EU Directives,
to accommodate the needs of 1.4% of the total EU population, notable Ireland, Cyprus
and Malta will have diminished (Mccrudden, 2018). The application of a Civil Law
system, broadly speaking, places a higher emphasis upon the objectives of the
legislation, rather than the concise wording of it and therefore does not adopt the
precedent of past case law. In contrast, a Common Law jurisdiction focuses
extensively on the precedent of past case law, by which to determine its decisions
(Arrowsmith et al., 2010). Given its historical and geographical location the Cypriot
legal system, albeit a common law jurisdiction, has been influenced by both the Greek
and Turkish civil legal systems. The introduction of the British common law charter
only came into effect from the mid 1930s onwards (Hatzimihail, 2013).
To deliver on the obligations attaching to the EU procurement directives, Ireland
has frequently drawn upon the precedent of both UK and past Irish case law as a means
of dispute resolution (Irish Supreme Court 2015; OECD 2015). This was evident
during the BAM vs NTMA case when BAM applied to the Irish High Court to initiate
an automatic suspension "an interlocutory injunction" to prevent the award of the
contract to the winning bidder of the Grangegorman PPP campus development. The
NTMA appealed and won the decision by application of a UK precedent the
“American Cyanamid” case (Barrington 2019). The literature has demonstrated that
the Irish courts are willing to utilise English case law when deemed necessary, under
the context that both jurisdictions apply the same judicial system (Irish High Court,
2016). Important to note, that neither jurisdiction has implemented a dedicated PPP
legal charter (Flannery et al., 2017; EIB 2011), both are therefore reliant upon contract
law to oversee the procurement process (OECD 2015). Fitzgerald (2017) summarises
that the courts of London still have a “soft presence” within the Irish judicial system.
This can be traced back to the volume of litigation that is generated by the UK legal
system, which the Irish courts can subsequently draw upon.
In light of the UK decision to leave the EU, Ireland will become one of three
common law jurisdiction, among the remaining 27 member states that collectively
apply a civil law legal system. Dependent upon the ultimate outcome of the Brexit
negotiations, Ireland could face a legal void of varying degrees, under which the
influence of the UK judicial system could become lessened to an extent. Facing into
the future, should the UK and Ireland adopt alternative procurement policies, notably
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in the form of the UK aligning itself with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and
Ireland continuing to abide with the EU Directives; the deliberations of the UK courts
may become less relevant under an Irish setting on the basis that the terms of both
policies will fail to align. This will become evident under the following scenarios.
Firstly, that the UK adheres to the current system, under the European Economic Area
(EEA) agreement, in which case there will be no changes encountered under the
current structure. Secondly, in the event of a no-deal Brexit, under which the UK
government adopts a trade agreement in line with the policy measures of the WTO.
Then a tariff-based approach will be adopted, by which the UK authorities are under
no obligation to adhere to the terms and conditions imposed under the EU Procurement
Directives (Arrowsmith 2017a). In due course, this may dilute the relevance of UK
precedent in addressing any future procurement disputes arising within the Irish courts.
Under the final scenario, we consider the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA)
which is also derived from the WTO. In essence, all current EU member states are
signatories to the GPA under a block agreement, which allows for procurement
opportunities with countries outside of the EU 27, such as Canada and the US (Fox,
2019). In the likely event that the UK should adopt this position, although it provides
for closer alignment with the EU Directives, it is void of any guidelines pertaining to
the procurement of utilities and concession arrangements (Arrowsmith, 2017b), which
form part of the EU Directives and are a mainstay of PPP procurement. In the event
that this became the preferred option, it would lessen the output of UK case law in this
area. It would further act to reduce the dependency of the Irish judicial system to take
guidance from the UK courts. Arrowsmith (2017) identifies that prior to the
introduction of the EU Directives, the UK was void of any meaningful legislation in
the area of public procurement. The question arises, that once the UK departure comes
into being, will the British authorities retain the existing measures or introduce an
amended version of the EU Directives or alternatively seek to align themselves with
the policies of the WTO. Participant eight, a legal advisor and published author on the
subject of procurement law, identified that dependent on the outcome of the trade
negotiations between the UK and the EU this in turn may have an impact on the future
direction of UK procurement law:
The terms of any long term agreement on trade between the EU and UK
may have an important bearing on how Procurement Law may evolve in
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the UK after the end of December 2020 or any extension of the transition
period. If there is greater divergence thereafter then decisions of the UK
courts would presumably have to be regarded with greater circumspection
(P8, 2020).
Participant five, a legal advisor, identified that in the course of the negotiations,
where a determination is found lacking, the UK legal system is relied upon to provide
a source of direction:
I think when it comes to maybe guidance "the lack of", when we're
advising people from time to time we would look to the UK case law and
you would look to the guidance notes coming from the Crown Court
services for a template contract (P5, 2020).
Participant eight, an advisor in relation to procurement law, identified that
although the Irish courts are willing to adopt the outcomes of other jurisdictions, this
is only enacted upon when the Irish courts are found lacking:
The Irish courts generally will not blindly follow any overseas precedent
but will consider matters afresh on first principles and in light of the facts
and applicable Irish law (P8, 2020).
Participant seven, a legal advisor, expanded further by identifying, that although
the Irish courts are willing to adopt UK precedent when necessary, Ireland's approach
is slightly different from the UK. Insofar as under the Irish system, the courts are also
willing to utilise EU case law as a means of reaching its decisions:
From the court's perspective, while we often reference UK case law in Irish
procurement cases, the Irish courts have tended to plot their own course
based primarily on EU case law, this has sometimes been quite different
to the approach taken in the UK (P7, 2020).
Participant four, a senior member of the EIB identified that from a European
perspective, the legal oversight that governs the process is applied differently
throughout the various member states. Participant seven, also argues that even though
both jurisdictions operate under the same common law legal system, subtle differences
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exist between both the UK and Irish jurisdictions notably in areas relating to discovery
or the lifting of an automatic suspension (P7, 2020).
The legal framework can be slightly different throughout the various
jurisdictions. So, it is an intensely due diligence exercise, when it comes
to PPP (P4, 2020).
In line with the arguments presented by Arrowsmith (2017a, p.27) participant
seven, identified that the impact of the UK leaving the EU is unlikely to result in any
major disruption to the Irish judicial system. However, from a UK perspective,
concerns were raised in relation to the future of existing contracts procured under the
current EU Directives and the recognition of British standards in the specifications of
future proposals. Another area of concern was in relation to sub-threshold contracts,
although not commonly found among PPP proposals they are governed by the same
EU Directives and in turn are related to the same body of case law.
So overall in terms of impact on the courts, I don't think Brexit will be that
significant… The biggest impact (as I have been suggesting for quite some
time), is in relation to below threshold contracts…[and] periphery issues
arising from Brexit e.g. British standards in technical specifications (will
they be acceptable?) (P7, 2020).
Participant five, expands further by identifying that the legal framework that
governs the PPP policy is also subject to change and is administered under strict
guidelines. Taken in perspective, should the British government proceed instead with
the implementation of a WTO policy framework, there is no guarantee that both
policies would remain in constant alignment:
After the new directives came in 2016 there was a whole raft of changes
that had to be worked through and implemented into the process and their
interpretations, that was important. When it comes to PPP and compliance
with the regulations, it has to be word for word based on the directives (P5,
2020)
In this section we have identified that in line with the views found in the
literature, a true determination in respect of the outcome of the Brexit negotiations, as
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yet cannot be determined (Arrowsmith, 2017). Due in part to the shifting deadlines
that have become synonymous with the UK’s decision to leave the Union and the terms
under which it will depart. Participant eight, identified that in the long-term the
prospect of some divergence between both the Irish and UK jurisdictions appears
plausible, but as yet this cannot be determined and that a cautious approach was
required. The data also identified that while the Irish courts are willing to adopt the
deliberations of the UK courts, this is not considered until an assurance has been
reached that no precedent exists under Irish case law. In addition we have
demonstrated that although both jurisdictions operate under the same common law
charter, subtle differences exist between both approaches. Participant seven,
highlighted that where change would likely become evident once the UK departs from
the EU, was in relation to sub-threshold contracts. Although not directly related to PPP
procurement they are governed by the same regulations and therefore may be reflected
in the subsequent case law. It was also identified that the civil law legal system that
operates throughout the remainder of the EU, is also subject to discrepancies in the
manner in which it is administered. Attention was also given to various trade
arrangements that may become enacted, dependent upon the final outcome of the
Brexit negotiations, notably in the form of the WTO agreements. The outcome of
which may impact to a greater or lesser extent, upon the reliance of the Irish courts to
enact the precedent of its closest neighbour.

7.5 A perspective of PPP as part of the public procurement policy
It was identified in section 2.4.1 that in October 2018 the UK had announced
that it would no longer engage in PFI as a means of procurement. Prior to this
announcement in July 2018, the Irish government published the findings of an interdepartmental agency report, regarding the future viability of PPP as a procurement
option for the state. The report concluded that by continuing to engage with the policy,
the payback for the government included access to private sector innovation,
accelerated delivery and the opportunity to provide crucial infrastructure during
periods of fiscal restraint (DPER 2018). In support of this stance in December 2019
the government published a revision of the 2006 guidelines surrounding the use of
PPP, which came into effect in January 2020 (DPER 2019). The objectives of the
National Development Plan (NDP) 2018-2027 reaffirmed the government's intent to
retain PPP as a means of providing bespoke infrastructure (Government of Ireland
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2018). The inter-departmental report also highlighted that should the government
withdraw from the PPP programme and then subsequently be faced with a future fiscal
event that necessitated a return of the financial markets; there would be a reluctance
upon the part of the private sector to re-engage in the programme (DPER 2018).
Participant four, a senior member of the EIB expressed caution in relation to the future
handling of the policy, on the basis that, in order to maintain a long-term relationship
with the private sector, the government would need to provide assurances over its
commitment to the longevity of the policy, failure to do so could have lasting effects.
In essence, the contribution of participant four correlates with the findings of research
question two, which identified that following the financial crisis the government
developed a semi-coercive reliance upon PPP for the advantages that it provided to the
state and for the potential to use the policy as part of any future government incentives:
To be honest, you can't turn it on or off, this is one of the lessons of the
financial crisis. What you need in the PPP sector is to keep up a steady
pipeline of projects, if you turn that off the market loses interest, it shut up
shop, it closes offices, they go away and it hard to get them back (P4,
2020).
Participant one, a senior financial advisor, identified that the rationale for
utilising PPP had changed since its initial introduction, and that there was now a
growing reliance upon the government to engage with the policy:
In our National Development Plan, we are saying that we are going to do
everything with exchequer funding, the reality is we don't have that much
funding available. Therefore we should be looking at private finance for
some of these things and so actually PPP is far more applicable now than
it was 20 years ago (P1, 2019).
The literature identified that as a component of the public procurement policy,
the vast majority of PPP proposals had been targeted at investment into transport and
accommodation type infrastructure (DPER 2013). Participant six, highlighted that in
comparison to the UK portfolio, the Irish authorities had demonstrated restraint in
relation to the volume and classification of PPP investments, a detail of which was
given in section 5.3.2:
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In the UK, there were willing to use PFI for absolutely everything, I think
the Irish policy remained a bit more cautious and a bit more selective (P6,
2020).
Participant two, expanded further on this argument by identifying that the
managerial approach taken under the Irish model appears more closely measured:
The UK have had all sorts of problems which structure and operational
costs, I think it's down to management, I genuinely do. I think the process
is very tightly controlled here (P2, 2020).
In relation to the administration of the Irish PPP policy participant six,
acknowledges the competence of the NDFA and the proficiency by which they manage
the process (P6, 2020). Participant four, a senior member of the EIB identified the
framework under which the Irish policy is governed:
In terms of procurement Ireland has well-developed processes, a legal
framework, a relationship with the NDFA and line government
departments, in terms of working out the pros and cons of the PPP project
(P4, 2020).
The necessity to adhere to the fiscal conditions imposed under the Maastricht
Treaty raised concern for several participants. It was identified that the decision to
restrict borrowing to 3% of GDP, had imposed limitations upon the government’s
capacity to meet its infrastructure demands. In addition, it had also promoted the use
of PPP as a means of circumventing such restraints by application of off-balance
accounting methods. Participant three, an ex-member of government stated:
I want to reference a very important point, which is, the European Union
has failed to generate a clear structure in terms of a sense of public
investment. Because they have included what you might call public works,
public investment, to be factored into a 3% deficit, that has proved
incredibly difficult (P3, 2020).
From a countercyclical perspective participant six, an economist and leading
contributor on the subject of PPP identified, that the terms imposed under the
Maastricht Treaty proved restrictive in times of recession:
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Across-the-board everyone realises that [the 3% deficit restriction] is a
straitjacket, for lots of reasons and I think you'll understand them, that in
times of recession you need scope for a countercyclical approach, so they
need to widen it out (P6, 2020).
Participant five, identified that there is an element of ambiguity surrounding the
policy, based on a misconception some political parties have stated their opposition to
the policy. From the perspective of the EIB participant four, remains sceptical that
despite its twenty-year history there is a lack of analysis relating to the outcomes of
the policy:
When you step back and look at the bigger picture, in some ways what is
surprising is, that 20 years into the PPP experience, that there isn't more
analysis out there available (P4, 2020). Politicians don't understand it, we
have stopped using the term PPP, because what we found is, that people
automatically jump in and think of a particular model, which is not always
right (P1, 2019). It's also a fact that some parties will never go down the
route of PPP, broadly because they don't understand what they are (P5,
2020).
Participant six, identified that although the policy had proved instrumental as
part of the government's efforts to address the impact of the financial crisis, in the
current climate the reliance upon the policy has declined:
I think overall PPP is part of the policy menu, but it is no longer the only
show in town for sure (P6, 2020).
In this section we have identified that as a result of the financial crisis and the
lessons that were learned throughout that period, notably by the state’s decision to
utilise PPP as part of the 2012 stimulus package. That there now exists a semi-coercive
influence to retain the policy in light of the advantages that it could afford the
government, should it be faced with a similar fiscal event. Participant four, highlighted
that for their part the private sector also sought assurances from the government; that
in order to remain engaged in the programme, the state would need to provide
consistency in relation to the flow of PPP proposals, without encouraging some
investors to exit from the sector (P4, 2020). In addition, it was also noted that due to
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the level of investment promised under the Ireland 2040 framework, it was conceivable
that PPP would remain a part of that. In comparison to the UK experience, it was noted
that the Irish authorities were astute in the handling and selection of PPP proposals,
due in part to the proficiency of the NDFA (P4, 2020). Furthermore, attention was
brought in relation to the need to revisit the fiscal rules surrounding the Maastricht
Treaty criteria, due to the restrictions it was imposing upon the government's capacity
to borrow. The existence of ambiguity was also identified as creating misconception
surrounding the workings of the policy. Participant four, identified that this was in part
due to the lack of comparative analysis between both traditional and PPP backed
procurement (P4, 2020).
7.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have addressed the last of our research questions, in doing so
we have explored the various attributes that favour the use of PPP above traditional
procurement. To begin this process we engaged in thematic analysis to identify the
incentives that exist for the state to retain its PPP programme. Where it was discovered,
among others, concession arrangements and the prospect of ancillary revenue will be
favoured above the unitary charge approach. In addition, we also learned that PPP is
capable of addressing concerns surrounding social cohesion, notably in the form of
housing and job creation. It was also possible to obtain an insight to evaluate the future
role of the policy and to establish the position that this policy now occupies as part of
the public procurement regime. Attention was also given to the legal climate in which
the policy now operates, notably the changes that might be brought about as a
consequence of the Brexit trade negotiations.
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Chapter Eight: Conclusions
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8.1 Introduction
Conclusions, Recommendations and Contributions to knowledge
To recap, this thesis makes a comparative analysis by examining the timeline of
events that have surrounded the Irish PPP policy since it was first introduced some
twenty years ago, notably under the influence of its closest neighbour. In doing so it
addresses a gap in the literature that was identified in Chapter Two. In the following
sections, we identify how the aims and objectives of this study were achieved. We will
do this firstly by presenting our findings, and by ultimately identifying the contribution
that this study has brought to the body of existing literature. This chapter will conclude
by recognising the limitations of the study and presenting areas of interest that may be
addressed under future studies.

8.2 A recap of the research questions and key findings
The purpose of this chapter is to draw the study to a close; to begin this process,
we will explore the findings in relation to our three research questions. In addressing
our first research question, we sought to correlate the similarities that exist between
the Irish PPP the UK PFI policies, alongside the occurrence of change that has
occurred since the Irish policy was first introduced. The literature has identified that a
close relationship has existed between both jurisdictions since the inception of the Irish
policy in 1998 (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998); this commenced when the Irish authorities
sought to replicate the UK policy to initiate the introduction of the Irish PPP
programme (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004). To clarify, when the UK
authorities first introduced PFI, the rationale for doing so was attributed to a constraint
upon the exchequer to meet its capital infrastructure requirements. In the context of
the Irish policy, similar measures were introduced at the behest of the government,
ironically at a time when the exchequer was in surplus (Department of The Taoiseach,
2002; HM Treasury, 2018a). In our second research question, we examined the
relationship that has evolved between both jurisdictions, notably by demonstrating that
a policy that originated in one jurisdiction could subsequently be replicated in another.
To determine this, we correlated the timescale of events surrounding both policies, in
an attempt to understand what promotes or drives this occurrence to happen. The
question concludes by examining the divergence that occurred between both
jurisdictions and under what conditions this presented itself. In our final question, we
explored the decision-making process that determines the use of PPP above traditional
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procurement. Viewed from a public policy perspective, we identify the factors for the
government’s decision to retain the policy, in light of UK Chancellor Philip
Hammond’s announcement in October 2018 that the UK would no longer utilise PFI
as part of its policy on procurement. We also explored the current climate under which
the Irish policy now operates, viewed from a legal, economic and public policy
perspective.

8.3 The key findings in relation to Research Question One
What are the similarities and differences that exist between the Irish PPP
and UK PFI policies and to recognise the element of change that has
occurred since the Irish policy was first introduced.
The literature tells us that while the Irish government initially replicated the UK
PFI policy as a means of expediting the introduction of the Irish PPP programme. Over
the course of time, the state has moulded and developed a different version of PPP to
the one that was first introduced. Furthermore, it was also identified that there was an
onus upon the Irish authorities to enact new legislation to allow for the expansion of
the policy (ICTU, 2002; Petersen, 2011). In the case of the UK, this was largely in
place due to the previous rounds of privatisation that had occurred under the tenure of
both the Thatcher and Major governments (HM Treasury, 2018a). In the aftermath of
the financial crisis, in 2013 the Irish government sought to revive the stalled PPP
programme by introducing a series of amendments to the Irish policy that bore a
resemblance to changes that were made to the UK PFI model in December 2012. The
findings of this study have identified that the Irish authorities were selective in their
approach towards adopting the entirety of the UK policy changes; opting instead to
introduce five of the eleven measures and amending of rejecting the remaining six.
The findings demonstrate that both jurisdictions adopt a similar procurement process
and adhere to the legal framework enacted under the EU Procurement Directives; in
addition, both share the same approach towards concession arrangements in areas
relating to road infrastructure. It was further identified that to avoid a public backlash
towards the introduction of hard tolling (fee-based), under the UK programme, the
government sought to initially utilise the shadow tolling method (estimated usage
method). In subsequent transport developments, the UK authorities have opted for the
introduction of the availability-based method (Stafford et al., 2019). The study also
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identified that the ratio of expenditure in both jurisdictions was notably different. In
the case of the UK, investment into the area of transport equated to 13% of PFI capital
investment (HM Treasury, 2018), under the Irish programme investment in transport
amounted to 66% (DPER, 2018a).
The ability to apportion risk to the private sector was seen as one of the key
advantages for the implementation of both policies (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998), in
this regard both jurisdictions apply identical terms by which to mitigate such risk.
However, when taken in context the classification of the UK PFI portfolio has included
a higher proportion of risk-driven investments, notably into areas related to the London
Underground, NHS hospitals and Defence-related projects (Hellowell, 2012; Shaoul
et al., 2012). As a result of which, on several occasions the UK government had to
shore-up the losses of the private sector to ensure the investment reached its
completion (Burke and Demirag, 2015a). In contrast, the Irish authorities pursued a
programme of low-risk investments such as roads and accommodation type
infrastructure, predominately targeted at the provision of schools and civic amenities
(DPER, 2013), In most part the Irish authorities have remained unscathed in relation
to the apportionment of risk, with the exception of a select few motorway investments
(Duggan, 2013a). In relation to the collapse of Carillion in January 2018, the NDFA
demonstrated to the Committee of Public Accounts that a separation exists between
the private sector and the state. When under the circumstances the government had
refused to take ownership for the fallout caused by the departure of Carillion, in
particular the impact that this had the potential to impose upon schools bundle five, a
development of five secondary schools located throughout the Leinster region (Joint
Committee on Finance Public Expenditure and Reform, 2018). In addition, it was also
identified that within the confines of public procurement, both jurisdictions shared a
common approach towards social cohesion and the measures by which the state
interacts with the private sector, to the point where both the UK and Irish governments
have enacted legislation to oversee the development of social economy programmes
(Dail Éireann, 2014; HM Treasury, 2012b). The literature identified that the inclusion
of social clauses within this area of procurement is gaining traction and has since
become embedded as an objective of the EU procurement Directives.
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While similarities were noted between both jurisdictions in relation to budgetary
controls and the financial structuring surrounding the ratio of debt to equity. In the
context of the UK PFI policy, the initial preference of the government had favoured
an equity contribution of 10%, however, in practice this was seldom achieved. In
reality, the make-up of the equity pertaining to PFI contracts was in most part a blend
of subordinated debt and equity. In line with the UK, the Irish government also sought
an initial equity stake of 10%, however in many instances due to financial engineering
this fell short of the mark (Palcic et al., 2018). In relation to debt finance, prior to the
financial crisis, PPP investments were typically made up of 90% debt, secured by the
private sector through means of bonded financing arrangements (Reeves, 2013; IBEC,
2011). Nevertheless, in the absence of available funding in the aftermath of the
financial crisis, this void was addressed through the intervention of the European
Investment Bank (EIB).
The review of the literature also demonstrated that after the 2012 stimulus
package, the relationship between the EIB and the Irish authorities had grown in
strength, to the point where the EIB now invests close to €1 billion annually into the
Irish economy (NDFA, 2018c). In contrast during the same period, the presence of the
EIB in the UK PFI sector has been in decline and uncertainty now exists surrounding
the future role of the EIB until an outcome can be determined in relation to the Brexit
negotiations (HM Treasury, 2012; House of Lords, 2019). The study also finds that
under the UK system the requirement to demonstrate Value For Money (VFM) is more
heavily scrutinised than the approach taken under the Irish model. We learn from the
UK experience that the decision to remove the compulsory use of private sector “soft
services” such as management facilities and maintenance contracts, was attributed to
the excessive costs that were likely to be incurred over the lifetime of the contract.
Under the terms of the Irish policy, the findings demonstrate that the provision to
utilise private sector “soft services” remains a mandatory term. In addition, the Irish
portfolio remained risk-averse “astute” when compared to the level of risk that the
UK was willing to accept. We also identify that under the stewardship of the NDFA,
the Irish policy now functions under a well-developed framework by which the
programme is administered. In comparison we learned that the UK policy became
segmented, ultimately losing the confidence of both the public and the opponents of
the UK government.
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At the time when the Irish PPP policy was first introduced, the government stated
that the motivation to do so was driven by the inherent ability of PPP to deliver VFM
on behalf of the taxpayer (Department of Finance, 2001b). The literature highlighted
that despite these claims, there has been a reluctance on the part of the government to
demonstrate this (Duggan, 2013a). Notwithstanding, on several occasions, the
Committee of Public Accounts has challenged the state to disclose such information
on the basis of public interest; despite this no meaningful disclosure has been
forthcoming (Committee of Public Accounts, 2007). Transparency remains a crucial
area of concern for both-jurisdictions. Since the introduction of the Irish policy, it has
retained the same stance as its UK counterpart, whereby there is a reluctance to release
relevant information on the basis of commercial sensitivity. In the UK however, the
authorities were found to have taken some steps to address these concerns, following
similar criticism of its policy on disclosure (HM Treasury, 2018a). Alarmingly the
literature also demonstrated that in some instances, many UK government departments
were given no choice but to engage in the policy as a means of securing investment
(UK Committee of Public Accounts, 2011). In this regard, the study found no evidence
of similar practices having occurred under the Irish policy. In an attempt to address
growing criticism that PFI failed to provide an appropriate return for the taxpayer, the
UK authorities sought to introduce a periodic review to determine the ongoing
presence of VFM, in this regard the Irish authorities failed to follow suit. However in
December 2019, the government published a series of amendments in relation to the
guidelines surrounding the use of PPP. In which it broadened the scope of the Public
Sector Benchmark (PSB) to incorporate measures of a qualitative nature, an
assessment of which will be determined on a case-by-case basis pertaining to the
individual merits of the proposal (DPER, 2019).
In this section, we have summarised our findings in relation to research question
one. The literature demonstrates that while the Irish authorities initially replicated the
UK policy to initiate the introduction of the Irish PPP programme, arguably over time
both jurisdictions have deviated from each other to develop their own individual traits
and characteristics (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004). The literature also
indicated that the role of the EIB acted as a key factor surrounding the growth and
sustainability of the Irish policy, in comparison to the level of assistance that was
provided for under the UK PFI programme (DPER, 2018b; HM Treasury, 2018a).
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Taken in perspective, the Irish government appears to have adopted a more
conservative and cautious approach in its handling of the policy. Perhaps evident by
the fact that in addition to providing guidance over the course of the procurement
process, the NDFA is also delegated to provide an ongoing management function
throughout the lifetime of the contract (DPER, 2019). In contrast, the UK authorities
appear to have lost control in relation to costs and the return on investment for the
taxpayer, none more evident than its handling of investment into the British health
system (Whitfield, 2017). In some respects, the UK authorities embraced the offering
of PFI as a panacea, irrespective of the cost; annual unitary payments in respect of UK
PFI investments are set to peak in 2020 at an estimated £10.3 billion (House of
Commons Library, 2018a). In contrast, unitary payments under the current Irish
programme are estimated to peak at €410 million in 2023.

8.4 The key findings in relation to Research Question Two
It was identified in section 3.5 that for numerous reasons and dynamics, history
tells us that it is commonplace for the government of one jurisdiction to be receptive
or pressed to adopt the policies or procedures of another (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000).
Therefore in this section we will conclude upon the findings of Research Question
Two, which seeks to recognise:
What is the initial alignment and subsequent divergence that has occurred
between the Irish PPP and UK PFI policies.
The literature highlights three identifiable stages that capture the motivation or
rationale behind the government's decision to utilise PPP as a means of procurement;
notably, the decision that was taken to introduce the policy in 1999, the resurgence of
the policy in 2012 in the aftermath of the financial crisis and ultimately the
government’s decision to retain PPP, in light of the UK’s announcement in 2018 to
waiver any further use of the PFI policy. It is widely accepted throughout the literature
that the notion to introduce PPP as part of the public policy was first considered in
1998 (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). This study unearthed that this had commenced a
year earlier than had previously been identified in the literature, when in May 1997 the
then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern engaged in “lesson drawing”, during a ministerial visit to
his UK counterpart Tony Blair (Oireachtas, 1997). The literature identified that at the
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time when the PPP programme was first introduced, the Irish economy was
experiencing a 3% exchequer surplus, which indicated that the government was on a
sound financial footing to self-finance the deficit in infrastructure (Oireachtas, 1999).
Taken in perspective, this undermines the argument that the introduction of the Irish
PPP programme was in some way attributed to a forecasted reduction in EU cohesion
funding, in addition to the impact of the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria (Farrell
Grant Sparks, 1998). The literature also lends support to the suggestion that the
introduction of the policy was taken at the behest of the government and that this
decision was further supported by the presence of isomorphism, as noted in section 6.5
(Department of The Taoiseach, 2002). The rationale to make this argument is levied
at the favourable relationship that existed at the time between both the Irish and UK
governments. This shared understanding was arguably reinforced by the close working
arrangements both governments adopted, to oversee the enactment of the Good Friday
Agreement. This was also underpinned by the assumption that the Irish government
was receptive to the UK Labour government’s Third Way approach (Connolly et al.,
2009; Petersen, 2011). It is therefore argued that the decision to replicate the UK PFI
policy, as a means of implementing the Irish PPP policy was a voluntary action, taken
on the part of the then government.
It was identified in section 2.5 that as a consequence of the financial crisis, the
ambitious plans to utilise PPP to assist in the delivery of the 2007-2013 NDP were
brought to an immediate halt (IBEC, 2011). In this section, we summarise our findings
concerning the second stage of the Irish PPP programme. In doing so we identify that
in an attempt to bring stability to the Irish economy, in November 2010 the Irish
government entered into the €85 billion assistance programme under the stewardship
of the Troika partners (Reidy and White, 2017; Duggan, 2013). In section 6.7 we
identified that in order to secure the assistance of the Troika, the government had to
adopt a total of 270 fiscal objectives to satisfy the terms of the agreement (Hardiman
et al., 2017). In effect, this placed the Irish authorities under the direct coercive
influence of the Troika. The literature tells us that although autonomy was handed
back to the government to decide where such austerity measures were best achieved
(Donovan, 2016; Healy. 2012), it was ultimately the Troika that prioritised the
outcome (Hardiman and Regan, 2013). We identified in section 2.6 that in an attempt
to address the impact upon the economy and to rejuvenate the construction sector, in
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2012 the government introduced a stimulus package (Reeves, 2015); additionally, the
government also availed of this opportunity to revive the stalled PPP programme
(NDFA, 2013a). It is important to distinguish that while the intervention of the Troika
could be interpreted as one having a coercive influence upon the state in return for
financial assistance. It is the claim of this study that the government’s decision to
replicate or introduce similar amendments to those introduced in 2012 under the UK
PFI policy reforms, were in part adopted as a means of reviving the Irish PPP
programme. The decision to do so is indicative of a semi-coercive transfer, for which
selective decisions were taken. Throughout section 5.4 we demonstrated that when
both policies were examined under the same criteria, we found that the Irish model
matched the UK in five of eleven aspects. Furthermore, the Irish authorities had failed
to abolish the provision of the soft services that had been the source of controversy in
the UK (HM Treasury, 2012a; NDFA, 2013b). In relation to the remaining categories
that were subsequently examined, it was identified that mixed similarities existed
between both jurisdictions. It is therefore the contention of this study, that in order to
satisfy the terms of the Troika agreement, the government had to succumb to the direct
coercive influence of the Troika in order to ensure the financial stability of the state.
In comparison, the influence that was placed upon the Irish authorities to adopt or
reject the amendments that were introduced under the UK PFI policy, was determined
to have been semi-coercive in nature. It is important to recognise, that this decision to
partially replicate the UK policy, signals the onset of a divergence between both
jurisdictions.
In section 2.2 we identified that in 2012 the UK authorities introduced a series
of measures in an attempt to bring reform to the UK PFI policy. However in the
aftermath of the amendments, the use of the PFI policy had declined; so much so, that
the only proposals deemed viable were those associated with low-risk investments
(House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2018). The literature identified
that parallel to a growth in public sentiment, there was also a rise in the political
opposition in support of the removal of the policy (The Labour Party, 2017). In section
6.6 we explained how a series of well-publicised government bailouts and project
failures had come to mar the UK policy, eventually culminating in the collapse of the
Carillion group in January 2018. The literature also identified that despite having
invested in over 700 PFI projects, the UK Treasury are without any meaningful data
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to ascertain the true beneficial return to the taxpayer (House of Commons, 2018). In
October 2018, faced with the uncertainty of Brexit and further access to EIB funding,
the UK authorities announced that due to the problematic nature of PF2, they were
disengaging from any further use of the policy (HM Treasury, 2018a; Inderst, 2017).
In section 6.8.1 we were able to demonstrate that cumulatively, this placed the UK
authorities under coercive pressure to abandon any further use of the PFI policy. It is
therefore, the assumption of this study, that it is these events that mark a point of
divergence between both policies. Notably for the following reasons:
1. From a UK perspective, the political will to retain the policy had dissipated
on the part of both the Conservative and Labour governments.
2. The growth in public sentiment had begun to mar the policy, by questioning
the true return for the state. In this regard, the UK authorities were without
sufficient data to prove or disprove this assertion. This was further provoked by
the necessity of the government to intervene on several occasions to bail out the
private sector.
3. The reluctance of the private sector to buy-in to the reform measures that were
introduced in December 2012, or to return to the market in any meaningful way
thereafter.
In contrast the literature demonstrated that the Irish authorities had developed an
astute attitude towards PPP. This is demonstrated in the classification of the Irish
portfolio, the majority of which are categorised as low-risk investments into roads and
accommodation type infrastructure (NDFA, 2018b). Furthermore the Irish authorities
have readily availed of the low-cost capital funding, that was extended on the part of
the EIB (DPER, 2018b). The literature also suggests that as a consequence of the
financial crisis the Irish government was reluctant to forgo the advantages that PPP
could offer during times of fiscal restraint (DPER, 2018b). With the exception of a few
initial teething problems, the findings of this study also suggest that the Irish PPP
programme has attracted far less criticism than the UK policy. Where blame has been
attributed to the policy, it can be traced back to the cancellation of social housing
projects that were encountered as a consequence of the financial crisis (Oireachtas,
170

2008c; Petersen, 2011). The findings have also demonstrated that unlike their UK
counterparts, the Irish authorities are willing to distance themselves from the threat of
private-sector losses. This was revealed during the collapse of the Carillion group
when the government failed to yield to the demands, to shore up the potential losses
of the private sector (Oireachtas, 2018a). In relation to the future intent of the policy,
the Irish authorities have also indicated that they are receptive to change, this was
demonstrated in the workings of the 2018-2027 National Development Plan
(Oireachtas, 2018b). As this study has demonstrated, in comparison to the UK
government the Irish authorities has retained a cautious approach to PPP and on that
basis, there is still room left to seek some potential in this policy.

8.5 The key findings in relation to Research Question Three
In section 1.2 we identified that when the government first introduced PPP, it
faced little or no opposition from its opponents or those aligned with the social
partnership agreements (Department of Finance, 2001c; Reeves, 2015). This was
attributed to the broad consensus that at that time the country was faced with a deficit
in capital infrastructure that was impeding upon the economic gains that were achieved
throughout the 1990s. The introduction of PPP was seen in part as a solution to this
impasse by providing leverage to the 2000-2006 National Development Plan (NDP)
(Department of The Taoiseach, 2000). While the findings of Research Question Two
provided us with the rationale behind the introduction of the Irish policy and argues
that the policy was in many ways a replica of the UK policy. In contrast the findings of
Research Question Three, seeks to identify the conditions by which the authorities are
willing to utilise PPP in favour of traditional procurement. In this section, we seek to
bring clarity to this argument by presenting our findings in relation to Research
Question Three which seeks:
To identify what incentivises the state to retain this method of procurement,
and to further examine how Economic, Legal and Public Policy
Perspectives retain an influence over that process.
In arriving at our conclusions it is central to identify the timeline of events that
surrounded the authority’s decision to utilise PPP as part of the wider public policy and
to broadly understand what gave rise to those decisions. Notably, during the following
three periods, (1) when the policy was first introduced in the late 1990s, (2) the events
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surrounding the financial crisis, (3) finally, culminating in the government’s decision
to include PPP as a component of the 2018-27 National Development Plan (NDP). To
expand on this argument we have taken a multiple lens approach to demonstrate how
the legal environment, public policy and the impact of economics, determine how we
position PPP within the broader approach to public procurement.
The rationale for the initial adoption of PPP
In section 2.4, it was identified that the rationale for the decision to introduce the
Irish PPP policy was attributed to lobbying on the part of the private sector, the
advantages of off-balance-sheet accounting practices, and the preferred approach of the
then government. The decision to foster the measures of the UK PFI policy,
subsequently provided the government with the means to expedite this process
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004). What is difficult to ascertain is a concise
determination as to when the government is willing to utilise PPP in preference to
traditional procurement. The literature sets forth numerous reasons that could provide
an incentive for the government to favour PPP in preference to traditional procurement.
In line with the findings of this study, Reeves (2013) identifies that the ability to record
PPP as off-balance sheet, would act as one motivation for the government. Duggan
(2013), suggests that a further attraction is the level of efficiency and cost-effectiveness
that the private sector can bring to the process. Burke and Demirag (2017) highlight the
apportionment of risk and the ability of the private sector to provide ongoing
maintenance over the lifetime of the contract. Connolly et al. (2009) suggest the
presence of isomorphism or political legitimacy is also a plausible explanation for the
government’s decision to engage in the PPP process.
To substantiate this argument we begin with the discovery of new findings in the
form of “lesson drawing” on the part of the then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, during a
government visit to his UK counterpart in May 1997. The timing of this event occurred
prior to any announcement or intent to introduce the Irish PPP policy, an account of
which is given in section 2.2. We were reminded by participant three, an ex-minister,
that at the time when the policy was first introduced, it was “internationally
fashionable” for governments to engage with the private sector in the provision of
public sector services. Furthermore it was the “ideological preference” of the then
Minister for Finance, Charlie McCreevy, to do so.
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We acknowledge that lobbying on the part of the private sector also proved
influential in the government’s decision to utilise PPP; this was identified in the
contents of the Inter-Departmental feasibility study for the initial introduction of the
Irish policy (Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998). This position was subsequently reaffirmed by
participant six who identified that the private sector was willing to give assurances that
they had the ability to deliver on the outcomes of the policy, in line with their UK
counterparts. We therefore discard the claim that a depletion in EU cohesion funding
held sway over the government’s decision to utilise PPP. This argument is further
underpinned by the fact that when the policy was first introduced the exchequer was
experiencing a surplus of 3%, and therefore the reduction in EU funding posed little
threat upon the state’s ability to provide for the necessary infrastructure. It is, therefore,
the contention of this study that the decision to adopt PPP was taken at the behest of
the then government as part of its wider efforts to address the deficit in infrastructure
that was present throughout that period.
The incentive to utilise PPP to address the impact of the financial crisis
In section 2.4 of this thesis we identified that at the time when the state first
engaged in PPP, there was a select set of reasons for its decision to do so, the foremost
being that the introduction of PPP was the preferred approach of the then government.
In this section we identify that in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the state’s
decision to engage in PPP could be more concisely identified and was targeted at
stimulating the economy and offsetting the high rate of unemployment that had been
experienced throughout the construction sector. Participant three an ex-minister,
identified that the state was further burdened by the high cost of borrowing and the
growth in mass emigration. We learned from participant six that the government was
also faced with the imposition of the Troika to dispose of several semi-state assets,
under the 270 terms associated with the agreement (Hardiman et al., 2017). In the face
of such pressure, the literature tells us that the government sought to introduce the
2012 stimulus package as a means of generating employment and alleviating the
impact upon the economy (NDFA, 2013b). In section 2.3 we learned that due to the
collapse of the banking sector, the government was faced with reduced access to
private sector funding. As a net result of this we identified, the only means of
delivering the stimulus programme was through the medium of PPP.
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The findings revealed that despite an initial reluctance on the part of the EIB to back
the proposal, once committed they had the capacity to raise the interest among the
private sector, based on their standing within the financial community. In addition
participant two raised a critical point, that the participation of the EIB also acted to
restore the reputation of the country. This argument is supported by participant five
who disclosed that at the launch of the government stimulus package, the private sector
sought assurances that the state would not renege on its commitments under the
proposed arrangements. It is therefore the contention of this study that the decision to
utilise PPP as part of the government’s recovery package was not based on a viable
comparison made against a traditionally procured proposal. It was determined on the
basis that due to the government’s inability to access the financial markets, PPP was
the only viable alternative.
The incentive for the state to retain its PPP policy
The literature tells us that in 2018 on two separate occasions, the government
demonstrated its continued commitment to utilise PPP as part of its broader approach
to public procurement notably in the workings of the 2018-2027 NDP and the interdepartmental agency report into the future viability of PPP (DPER, 2018b, 2018a). In
which the government revealed that any future decisions to utilise PPP would be
evaluated on the preference to utilise self-funding concession arrangements (DPER,
2018a). The data identified that the government was incentivised by this option, under
the pretext that if the public were willing to pay for services by means of a fee or toll
payment, it reduces the burden upon the state. Participant one expanded further on this
theme by identifying the advantages that could be gained for the government by
entering into collaborative arrangements with the private sector.
It was further identified that as part of the government’s response towards the
national housing crisis, it was demonstrated that PPP provided leeway to the state by
circumventing the need for up-front government funding. However this was
counteracted by a small number of participants who identified that certain elements
within the government were not as receptive to PPP as others. We therefore
acknowledge that any future decision to utilise PPP will not replicate the widespread
approach that was adopted under the 2012 stimulus package. In this regard, while the
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government have indicated a preference to retain the policy, they remain vigilant
towards the growth in unitary payments and the future impact that this might impose
upon the exchequer (DPER, 2018b) Which in turn raises the question in relation to the
true cost of this form of public procurement.
The data also raised awareness that PPP offered the potential for the state to
access private-sector innovations, that are not so readily found in government-led
procurement. As a means of addressing the impact of climate change, there was a broad
consensus that PPP had a pivotal role to play in that area. From the perspective of the
NDFA and the EIB, we learn that future PPP proposals will now incorporate criteria
to off-set the production of carbon emissions as part of the government’s wider
approach towards climate change (NDFA, 2019). The data inform us that it will
become “socially acceptable” to utilise PPP as a means of investing in areas such as
sustainability, alternative energy sources and the provision of public transport. We
identify that PPP may become the preferred choice in situations of bespoke or one-off
proposals, as was demonstrated during the procurement of the NBP, the level of
inherent risk will also become a determining factor in the selection process. The
literature identifies that to date the Irish authorities have developed a preference for
low-risk investment proposals, as opposed to the high level of risk that was
encountered under the UK model. It is therefore plausible to assume that any notion to
invest in a PPP procured hospital or any other high-risk alternative, has the potential
to become politically charged for the government, should that proposal fail or exceed
its estimated cost. In summary, we therefore predict that any future decision to utilise
PPP will incorporate a blend of the following components, low inherent risk, the
inclusion of concession type arrangements, bespoke or one-off proposals, alternative
joint adventures and the ability to incorporate design features in accordance with the
government’s policy on climate action.
The Economic considerations that apply to PPP
The literature identifies that before a proposal can be considered viable under a
PPP arrangement, it must demonstrate that the proposition is capable of delivering
VFM on behalf of the state when compared to traditional procurement (Reeves, 2015).
In comparison to the UK, the Irish authorities remained astute when it came to the type
and class of PPP proposals, under which the state deemed viable to invest in. The data
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inform us that a preference had emerged in favour of repeated and low-risk ventures
into road and accommodation type infrastructure, such as those targeted in the
education and civic amenities sectors. Section 5.4.7 sums up evidence that under the
circumstance where a higher rate of inherent risk is found attaching to the proposal,
this has the effect of raising the overall cost of the investment across the entirety of the
contract (OECD, 2015). It was identified in section 6.8 that this was found to have
been a contributing factor in the demise of the UK policy, where investment in NHS
hospitals had become untenable (Powell and Miller, 2016). Participant six clarified
that based on the UK experience, the Irish authorities remained reluctant to venture
into the provision of hospital infrastructure based on the assumption that it was
complicated and costly to procure. The data also tells us that it is necessary to apply
proportionality towards the number of PPPs that are active at any one time within the
state, due to the impact of the ongoing payment schedule upon the exchequer. This
creates a connotation that the cost of PPP is expensive, to begin with. Participant three,
an ex-government minister, identifies that consideration must also be given to the fact
that in almost every instance the government can borrow at a lower cost than the
private sector; in turn, this reduces the appeal to engage in the policy due to the
exaggeration in costs.
The data inform us that from the perspective of the EIB, in addition to the
economic viability of the proposal, the bank will also seek a return in terms of social
cohesion or a perceived benefit for the citizens of the state. In comparison, we also
learned that in the case of the NBP, despite the absence of any appraisal on the part of
the NDFA or meaningful competition, the government elected to proceed with the
contract, notwithstanding the concerns raised in relation to cost and the ultimate
ownership structure. The data identify that the decision to proceed with the proposal
was partially attributable to regional and localised political pressure. In relation to the
procurement of the National Children’s Hospital, a minority of the participants shared
the opinion that the hospital was a viable proposition under the PPP model or at least
partially so. The data also disclosed that economic consideration is not always to the
fore; participant three alluded that during the negotiations surrounding the
procurement of the NCH, the procurement process had been drawn into controversy
due to political disagreement and group self-interest. It is, therefore, the contention of
this study that despite the presence of a rigorous benchmarking process, that seeks to
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identify a viable return for the state, notable in the context of VFM. The findings reveal
to us that the influence of local politics and group self-interest can lean upon the
process, and therefore weaken the economic viability of the proposal. We are reminded
that despite all the stops and checks that are in place, consideration to proceed with a
PPP procurement investment, is not always led by economic consideration. In this
regard, participant five revealed for us that the decision to proceed or reject the
proposal ultimately rests with the Department of Finance. In appearance, this
arrangement appears to negate the role of the NDFA, as the state’s delegated agent
with the authority to evaluate and determine the viability of such proposals. When in
practice the government has demonstrated, that on occasion, it is willing to bypass the
services of this department. We learned from participant six that in relation to the NBP,
although the proposal had been procured by means of PPP, the NDFA played no active
role in the evaluation process; and that due to the political wrangling that surrounded
the proposal, they were glad to have maintained their distance.
The Legal considerations that apply to PPP
We observed during the review of the literature that it is commonly understood,
that both the Irish and UK jurisdictions along with Malta and Cyprus are administered
under the remit of a common-law judicial system; the remaining 24 EU member states
are instead governed under a civil law charter. We have established that due to the
volume of UK case law, the Irish courts have frequently drawn upon the outcomes of
the English courts as a means of reaching its deliberations in relation to procurement
disputes. Furthermore the findings reveal to us, that UK championed the argument for
the wording of the EU Directives to be drafted in such a manner, as to include a sub
text applicable to those member states that enacted a common law judicial system.
Once the UK departure comes into effect, the remaining EU states within this category
will have diminished to 1.4% of the total EU population and has the further potential
to weaken the argument to adopt the EU Directives to accommodate such a small
populate.
The literature identified that the UK entered into a transitional period following
its departure from the EU in January 2020, to allow for trade negotiations with its
former EU partners. Depending on the outcome of those negotiations, it will ultimately
determine if the UK will remain aligned to the EU Directives or alternatively adopt
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the policies measures of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This in turn, may have
an indirect bearing over the Irish courts' reliance upon the precedent of UK case law.
Under the current arrangement, both jurisdictions abide by the EU procurement
directives, which are subsequently reflected in both the UK and Irish procurement
regulations. The literature tell us that prior to the introduction of the EU Directives
that legislation in the area of British procurement was non-existent, therefore there is
little reason to suggest that the UK will abandon the body of existing legislation on
foot of its departure from the EU. If change were to occur within the present
arrangements, it would most likely present itself in the area of sub-threshold contracts.
Although governed by the same EU Directives it will have no immediate effect upon
the administration of the policy, rather it might present itself as a future issue to
contend with. We have identified that the EU Directives are constantly under review
(European Commission, 2018) and are therefore capable of further divergence away
from the WTO. Furthermore, the data also highlighted that issues pertaining to existing
contracts procured under the current regulation will also require consideration before
a move towards the WTO is contemplated. However, the indications suggest that any
disruption to the current arrangements is likely to remain minimal, on the assumption
that the UK has a vested interest to maintain its current arrangements.
However, in the absence of a definitive outcome to the Brexit negotiations, this
leaves the Irish courts in a precarious position. The data suggests that at present the
Irish courts have in some instances availed of the findings of the EU courts in reaching
its deliberations. In the unlikely event that the UK abandons the EU directives in
favour a WTO agreement and the amount of relevant UK case law subsides, the
findings of EU courts could provide some course of direction in reaching a settlement
within the Irish courts. Until that outcome is assured, a caveat applies.
The Public Policy perspective of PPP to do…
The literature identifies that when the government first introduced PPP, the main
objective of this decision sought to supplement its existing efforts to address a deficit
in infrastructure that had stemmed from the recession of the 1980s (Farrell Grant
Sparks, 1998). In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the policy was abandoned until
2012 when the government sought to utilise PPP as part of the states efforts to recover
the economy. Inadvertently due the fiscal advantages that PPP provided to the
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government, this in turn, created a dependency to retain the policy in light of the
advantages that PPP could provide to the state in times of fiscal restraint (DPER,
2018b). We also learned that it in order to maintain an ongoing interest in the
programme, that the private sector sought assurances from the state in relation to the
flow of PPP activity, without which they would have retreated from the sector. The
data inform us that the Irish policy is guided by a proficient and well-developed
framework, administered under the remit of the NDFA. We also learned that the policy
is applied cautiously in comparison to the approach taken by the UK. We identify that
the revised guidelines surrounding the use of PPP, now occupy a subsection of the
Public Spending Code (DPER, 2019). The findings also uncovered the presence of
ambiguity among some political circles, in relation to an understanding of the language
and terms that accompany the policy. The data also indicated that based on the
assumption that PPP represents a form of privatisation, some political factions are
dismissive of its role despite having gained no in-depth understanding of the policy.
At the various junctures throughout the study, we have identified the role of the EIB
as a key financial advocate and supporter of the Irish policy. We identified that within
the structure of the EIB, policy development and best practice pertaining to PPP is
disseminated through its subsidiary EPEC. We also acknowledge that a form of
homogenisation or a close relationship now exists between the state and the EIB, to
the point where both the NTMA / NDFA and the EIB jointly share the same Dublin
address. While the NTMA and the NDFA act as direct agents of the state, under the
auspices of the Department of Finance. The EIB on the other hand, acts as the lending
agent on behalf of the EU, albeit in the capacity of a public institution. In a sign of
acknowledgement, in 2018 the Minister for Finance Paschal O’ Donohoe had noted
the intention of the EIB to relocate to the offices of the NTMA / NDFA; as a signal of
the state’s continues commitment towards a long-term relationship with the bank
(Department of Finance, 2018).
The study also identified that the imposition to adhere to the Maastricht Treaty
convergence criteria, had placed undue pressure upon the state’s capacity to meet its
capital infrastructure requirements without exceeding a GDP deficit of 3%. As a
consequence, this in turn created a further incentive for the government to utilise PPP
as a means of circumventing this restriction. It was identified by several participants
that there were now sufficient grounds to widen the budgetary threshold, on the
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assumption that it was unrealistic and therefore difficult for the state to meet its
demands under the current structure. We identify this as one of the key threats to the
policy, whereby, under the circumstances where the European Commission decide to
widen the threshold above the current rate of 3%; this would provide the state with an
incentive to borrow the upfront funding to pursue a programme of traditional or
alternative procurement .

8.6 Limitations and the proposals for future research
Limitations
One immediate concern that raised issues for this study was in relation to the
scope and size of the Irish PPP sector, given the limited number of key actors by which
primary data could be obtained. In addition the delayed outcome of the Brexit
negotiations had also proved difficult to ascertain the true impact that this might
impose upon the Irish courts, in particular the adoption of UK precedent to assist in
the determination of Irish procurement disputes. The study also identified that in
comparison to the body of literature relating to PPP, there was an absence of similar
publications in relation to traditional procurement, by which to make a viable
comparison. This study also unearthed that in the absence and disclosure of a postproject review, there is insufficient evidence by which to evaluate the true economic
offerings of the policy. This argument was reiterated in 2018 during a hearing of the
Committee of Public Accounts, when it was identified that in relation to the 30 projects
that have been completed under the Irish PPP programme, to date only two postproject reviews have been made public (Committee of Public Accounts, 2018).
Furthermore, it was identified that in practice once the NDFA has completed the
tendering process and overseen of the construction of the project, the responsibility to
conduct a post-project review rests with the contracting authority; with the exception
of the financial review which remains under the remit of the NDFA. It was also
indicated that due to time restraints and a lack of skill on the part of some government
departments, to date the task of compiling such reports have been provided for by
through the appointment of external providers. Despite the remit of the Irish
Government Economic and Evaluation Service (IGEES), their presence was noted as
being absent or undisclosed in relation to any post evaluation exercises. This study
envisages a potential role for IGEES in collaboration with the NDFA to participate in
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any future post evaluations measures. In comparison, the post-project reviews in
relation to road infrastructure are produced in-house by Transport Infrastructure
Ireland, which suggests that a disparity exists in relation to the different approach’s
that the state takes towards post project review process. In the absence of any set
guidelines in this area, this raises questions pertaining to the composition and
presentation of such reports. At the behest of the Committee of Public Accounts
assurances were given that the publication of post evaluations would be stepped up,
furthermore, the NDFA indicated its commitment to assist in the undertaking of future
evaluations.
Future research
In relation to areas deemed suitable for future research, this study identified the
following two areas to be worthy of consideration. Firstly, the literature demonstrates
that the government remains open to the prospect of new and alternative approaches
to PPP, preferably in the form of a toll or fee-based concession arrangements (DPER,
2018). This research has shown that the adoption of PPP concession arrangements has
in the past presented issues for the government, notably in relation to its exposure to
demand risk associated with road infrastructure (Comptroller and Auditor General,
2011). This has presented itself when the estimated usage rate or toll income has fallen
below a level that is deemed financially viable. This was demonstrated in the case of
the Limerick Tunnel and the Clonee-Kells motorway, when in order to gain the buyin of the private sector, the government gave assurances that it would meet a minimum
level of revenue (Burke and Demirag, 2015). This subsequently came to fruition
during the financial crisis when the government was called upon to do so. Taking into
consideration the average duration of a standard PPP contract and the ongoing reliance
upon a user or toll charge to cover the cost of the investment; should such a proposal
encounter a reduction in revenue or inevitably fail. It raises the question, is the state
inadvertently exposing itself to a greater level of risk, and is it willing to shore up the
losses of the private sector in return for the opportunity to distance its self from the
upfront cost of capital infrastructure. Furthermore, if this proves to be the case, is it
then entering the same territory that led to the demise of the UK PFI policy.
The findings of research question three have revealed to us that the Irish PPP
policy is governed by a well-developed framework, administered under the remit of
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the NDFA. The Public Spending Code identifies that in practice approval to proceed
or reject a PPP proposal is delegated to the following: Government Ministers, Head of
Department, local authority, state body or agency (DPER, 2019). Despite these
guideline, it was indicated by several participants of this study that in their experience
this was seldom the case and that ultimately the decision to proceed or reject a PPP
proposal rests with the Department of Finance. We learned from participant three an
ex-minister that the decision to proceeded with the National Children’s Hospital was
taken in close-quarters between the then Minister of Health, James Reilly and the
Taoiseach Enda Kenny. The data also revealed that in relation to the procurement of
the National Broadband Plan, despite a requirement to engage in the services of the
NDFA in all state procurement above €20 million, they were found to have played no
active role in the proceedings. It is these events that give merit to examine if the span
of control delegated to the Department of Finance goes beyond its brief and
furthermore to determine if this approach aids or impedes upon the delivery of sound
public procurement.

8.7 Conclusion
In Chapter Two of this study, we identified that when PPP was first introduced
into Ireland it was done so as a means of addressing a deficit in capital infrastructure
that had its origins in the recession of the 1980s. In the interim, PPP now accounts for
the delivery of 33% of the states motorway and dual carriageway networks. In
addition, it has also provided the state with flagship developments into the court’s
system, civic amenities and third-level institutions; and in the same instance, it allowed
the government to defer the cost and boost its efforts towards social cohesion. While
the literature provides us with evidence that the Irish authorities initially replicated and
were then willing to draw lessons from the UK experience, the study demonstrated
that over the course of time the influence of the UK policy had weakened until a point
of divergence occurred in October 2018. In part, this could be attributed to the direction
that both governments sought to take in respect of their acquired portfolios. Under the
Irish programme, the focus of investment remained fixed on low-risk proposals into
road and accommodation type infrastructure. In comparison, the UK authorities
ventured into high-risk areas associated with the provision of hospitals and
underground transport sectors, under the Irish programme such investments were
never called for. Unlike its closest neighbour, the Irish authorities developed an
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astuteness towards the type and class of investment, that it deemed viable to consider.
In doing so it avoided the wrath of negative publicity and criticism that had come to
mar the UK policy, notably that PFI favoured the private sector and was a form of
privatisation.
As the demands increase upon the government to provide and replenish stateowned assets such as social housing and education facilities, this has also placed
pressure on the government to retain the policy. We have established that the
government’s ability to absorb the payment structure pertaining to PPP fluctuates at
approximately 10% of the state’s annual capital expenditure budget. In response to this
the government has indicated that under future proposals, consideration should be
given to self-funding concession arrangements (toll-based) as a means of avoiding any
burden upon the exchequer. This study has identified that opportunities lie further
afield for the state, by means of “value capture” or by diversifying into PPP joint
ventures with the private sector, into areas such as the Pharma and Tech industries.
Throughout the interview process, a high regard was extended to the NDFA for
their contribution towards the administration of the policy and for their active role as
advisor to the state in relation to all matters pertaining to procurement; however, this
study noted their absence during the procurement of the NBP and the NCH. In this
regard, the study informed us that the final decision to utilise PPP as a procurement
choice ultimately rests with the Department of Finance. The sentiment remains that
one of the key attractions for the state to retain the policy, is the advantages that it can
afford the government during times of fiscal restraint. The data tells us that once
implemented, the sustainability of the policy is dependent upon a constant flow of
activity, without which the private sector would retreat from the market. However, the
data suggests that by widening the borrowing restrictions imposed under the
Maastricht Treaty, this in turn could provide relief towards the exchequer’s capacity
to borrow and in doing so reduce its dependency upon the policy. The analysis
presented in this study gives an important insight into the role that PPP has occupied
as a part of the wider public policy. In doing so it makes an important contribution to
the existing literature and leaves room for future studies to add to this debate.
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8.8 Closing thoughts and Reflection
In March 2020 as this study was drawing to a close, the Irish state had entered
into a stage of lockdown in an attempt to curtail the impact of the Coronavirus
Pandemic. Ireland was not alone in this regard, as many other nations across the globe
took similar actions to stem the spread of the outbreak. As a result of these measures
activity within the economy had become severely impacted upon, requiring the
intervention of the government to provide assistance to those who had become
impacted as a result of the closure; the initial response was estimated to have cost the
state €6.7 billion (NTMA, 2020). Similar relief measures were also introduced across
the EU as a means of offsetting the impact throughout the region. In an attempt to
reduce the effect upon the broader EU economy, the introduction of a debt-sharing
mechanism by means of a de facto “Eurobond” arrangement, was agreed in principle
between France and Germany in late May 2020 (Delfs et.al, 2020), the purpose of
which sought to alleviate the debt burden and to stimulate the economies throughout
the EU. In this regard, the government have determined that as a consequence of the
pandemic that the Irish economy will also enter into a period of recession (NTMA,
2020). Depending on the severity of this outcome, it will inevitably place an onus upon
the state to intervein in an attempt to rejuvenate the economy. As this study has shown,
it is these same conditions that give rise to utilise PPP as part of the 2012 stimulus
package, based on the countercyclical advantages that the policy could provide to the
state. It is therefore conceivable that under the current circumstances PPP may emerge
as part of the solution to this unfolding situation.
At the onset of any research endeavour, as a novice, it is totally inconceivable to
equate the task ahead, issues pertaining to time, the skill of deciphering the agenda,
what’s what so to speak. The eventual acceptance that everything that you read or
write, will ultimately warrant scrutiny, editing, or disposal. To identify your most
productive surroundings, your favourite place, the perfect time, will all eventually fall
into place. To accept that everything is temporary until the book is bound, that includes
your plans and the concept that is under review, everything is subject to change ‘the
sum of the learning curve’. To hold in the highest regard, the participants that gave
freely of their time, by agreeing to share their experiences; and those others who
willingly parted with their academic knowledge and skill. Without which we would
have nothing to show for.
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Appendices
Appendix A:
Typology of Public Private Partnership Definitions by Country and
Supranational Organizations
UK
(The UK Parliament, 1992)

Ireland
(Farrell Grant Sparks, 1998)

Ireland
(Comptroller and Auditor General,
2002)

Ireland
(Broadbent, 2003)

Ireland
(The Department of the Environment,
2003)

UK
(HM Treasury, 2003)

As a possible transitional step, “private contractors might
be invited to design, build and operate roads, for which
they would receive payments from Government relating
to the use of their roads. Money contributed by the private
sector under these arrangements will not contribute
towards public spending: it will represent additional
resources in the area concerned.” p.5
“a partnership between various public administrations
and public bodies on the one hand and legal persons
subject to private law on the other, for the purpose of
designing, planning, constructing, financing and/or
operating an infrastructure project.” p.1
“PPP is not the same as traditional procurement where a
set of inputs, building design and specification, is
provided. In the case of PPP procurement, output
requirements are provided requiring the bidders to decide
how to deliver these in the most cost effective and
efficient manner. In this case, the bidders separately and
in competition with each other proposed a new build
solution to meeting the outputs.” p.114
“Public private partnerships (PPPs) are a recent extension
of what has now become well known as the “new public
management” agenda for changes in the way public
services are provided. PPPs involve organisations whose
affiliations lie in respectively the public and private
sectors working together in partnership to provide public
services.” p.332
“The benefits of a PPP are that the public and private
sectors will have certain advantages relative to each other,
and these advantages can be exploited so as to deliver a
superior project or service in the most economically
efficient manner.” p.4
“Appropriate transfer of risk generates incentives for the
private sector to supply timely cost effective and more
innovative solutions. As a general rule, PFI schemes
should transfer risks to the private sector when the
supplier is better able to influence the outcome than the
procuring authority” pp.
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Northern Ireland
(The Department of Finance Northern
Ireland, 2003)

Holland
(Klijn G. R., 2003)

Ireland
(C&AG, 2004)

(IMF, 2004)

(EIB, 2005)

Australia
(English, 2006)

Australia
(The Australian Government, 2008)

Canada
(Garvin and Bosso, 2008)

UK

“In Northern Ireland a Public Private Partnership will
generally be a medium to long-term relationship between
the public and private sectors, including the voluntary and
community sector. Involving the sharing of risks and
rewards and the utilisation of multi-sector skills, expertise
and finance to deliver desired policy outcomes that are in
the public interest. “p.5
PPP is defined as a “cooperation between public and
private actors with a durable character in which actors
develop mutual products and/or services and in which
risk, costs, and benefits are shared.” In an ideal PPP, the
traditional distinction between public and private is
dissolved.. p.1
“PPPs may be structured in a number of ways, with
varying degrees of involvement of private sector
participants.The contractual arrangements become more
complex as the degree of involvement of private sector
participants increases.” p.9
“There is no clear agreement on what does and what does
not constitute a PPP”p.6
Put simply, a PPP is the provision, long-term operation,
and maintenance, of public infrastructure by the private
sector. However, this description also fits a range of other
activities, including privatised utilities. The EIB has no
formal definition of PPP p.10
“The term ‘public private partnership (‘PPP(s) while
universally used, has different contemporary meanings
and manifestations. Differences in PPP models stem from
situationally-specific contextual factors that affect their
outworking in different jurisdictions over time and, in
turn,
their
nature,
purpose,
characteristics,
implementation and oversight.” p.1
“Value for money is a key principle of PPP projects and
includes both a quantitative and qualitative assessment of
the benefits of the private sector proposals. The
quantitative assessment is assisted by the use of the Public
Sector Comparator (“PSC”). The qualitative assessment
looks at all other factors including certainty of delivery,
quality, efficiency of design etc” p.9
“A P3 is a long-term contractual arrangement between the
public and private sectors where mutual benefits are
sought and where ultimately (a) the private sector
provides management and operating services and/or (b)
puts private finance at risk” p.163
“Private Finance Initiative (PFI) projects are a type of
public-private partnership (PPP), used to fund major
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(The UK Parliament, 2008)

capital investments. PPPs refer to a wide range of different
types of collaboration between public and private bodies.
They cover a range of business structures and partnership
arrangements, including joint ventures, the sale of equity
stakes in state-owned businesses and outsourcing where
private sector operators use existing public sector assets,
as well as PFI” p.1

Canada

“A P3 is a long-term contractual arrangement between the
public and private sectors where mutual benefits are
sought and where ultimately (a) the private sector
provides management and operating services and/or (b)
puts private finance at risk.” p.163

(Garvin and Bosso, 2008)

Canada
(Partnerships BC, 2009)

US
(Erie, Kogan, and MacKenzie, 2010)

“A public private partnership is a partnership
arrangement in the form of a long-term performancebased contract between the public sector (any level of
government) and the private sector (usually a team of
private sector companies working together) to deliver
public infrastructure for citizens.” p.1
“P3s involve collaboration between at least one
government entity and one or more non-public actors for
the pursuit of public objectives. This excludes everyday
client– supplier relationships, including contracting
where governments pay other actors for products or
services.” p.646

(Dewulf, et al., 2011)

“Several governments across the world are increasingly
embracing the use of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)
to deliver infrastructure services. In part the rationale for
the use of PPPs is the need to buffer public finances with
investment from the private sector in order to create or
refurbish infrastructure assets” p.2

UK

“The PFI procurement process has often been slow and
expensive for both the public and the private sector. This
has led to increasing costs and has reduced value for
money for the taxpayer” p.6

(HM Treasury, 2012a)

(European PPP Expertise Centre,
2012a)

“A distinctive feature of PPP projects is that their
requirements are defined in terms of outputs rather than
inputs. Conventional project procurement has usually
focused on inputs. In this regard, PPPs involve
fundamental changes in the way projects are prepared and
in the information that the Authority needs to provide to
private sector sponsors” p.9

UK

“Procurements of PF2 projects have a number of features
that make them more complex than many other types of
procurement. PF2 projects will be a long-term agreement
for the design, construction, financing, maintenance, and

(HM Treasury, 2012a)
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sometimes operation, of a new asset; and their
procurement needs” p.35
UK
(Gov.UK, 2013)

(OECD, 2015)

Canada
(Siemiatycki, 2015)

Canada
(Melville, 2016)

(The World Bank, 2016)

“PPP (Public Private Partnership) is the general term for
partnerships which involve everything from operating
facilities and providing services on behalf of the public, to
flexible methods of financing these services PFI (Private
Finance Initiative) is a particular method of financing
capital investment which requires that the private sector
design, build, finance and operate specific facilities.”p.3
“Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are a way of
delivering and financing public services using a capital
asset where project risks are shared between the public
and private sector. A PPP is designed as a long-term
output specified contract between the government and a
private partner whereby the public service delivery
objectives of the government are aligned with the profit
objectives of the private partner.” p.9
“The evidence presented in the paper shows that the
structure of PPPs in Canada challenge theories about the
optimal role of the private sector in PPPs, and raises
questions about whether the common deals in Canada
meet the conventional definition of a PPP” p.344
“A complex sub-contractual arrangement often
characterises PPPs. However, this structure stems from,
and is governed by, the top contract between the public
sector counterparty and a private legal entity created
specifically for the project” p.154
“any contractual arrangement between a public entity, or
authority, and a private entity, for providing a public asset
or service, in which the private party bears significant risk
and management responsibility.” p.2

(EIB, 2016, p.4)

It is widely recognised that, in common with all largescale public investment programmes, to be successful,
PPPs require conducive legal, regulatory and institutional
frameworks

Wales

“The Mutual Investment Model is an alternative form of
public private partnership developed by the Welsh
Government. In essence, Mutual Investment Model is
similar to the long established private finance initiative.
However there are several important areas of difference,
which the Welsh Government

(The Auditor General for Wales, 2017)

intends will promote the public interest, increase
transparency, and enhance value for money” p.43
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US
(Hodge and Greve, 2017)

“P3 is viewed as a specific type of infrastructure delivery
mechanism with a specific institutional and financial
architecture in place to initially fund and deliver
construction works as well as operate the long-term
facility” p.58

(ECA, 2018)

“PPPs are complex arrangements, mostly produced by
private stakeholders, and the definition of risks should be
clearly defined, even where projects are to be classified
"off government" balance sheet” p.12

US

“Public-private partnerships are defined as relationships
between CDC and the private sector that are formal and
informal in nature where skills and assets are shared to
improve the public’s health and each partner shares in the
risks and rewards that result from the partnership” p.2

CD 2018)
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Appendix B:
Typology of Irish Partnership Arrangement
Type

Activities Involved

Design- Build and Operate (DBO)

The contractor designs builds and operates
(constructs or renovates) a public facility or
infrastructure

Design- Build Operate and Finance (DBOF)

The contractor designs builds operates and finances
(constructs or renovates) a public facility or
infrastructure

Design- Build Operate Maintain and Finance
(DBOMF)

The contractor designs builds operates maintains
and finances (constructs or renovates) a public
facility or infrastructure

Design- Build- Maintain (DBFM)

The contractor designs and builds (constructs or
renovates) finances and maintains a public facility
or infrastructure

Design- Build- Maintain (DBFO)

The contractor designs builds operates and
maintains (constructs or renovates) a public facility
or infrastructure

(The Department Of Finance, 2006).

Appendix C:
Typology of International Partnership Arrangements
Type

Activities Involved

Build-own-operate (BOO)

The private sector designs, builds, owns,
develops, operates and manages an asset with no
obligation to transfer ownership to the
government. These are variants of design-buildfinance-operate (DBFO) schemes.

Build-develop-operate (BDO)
Design-construct-manage-finance (DCMF)
Buy-build-operate (BBO)

The private sector buys or leases an existing asset
from the government, renovates, modernizes,
and/or expands it, and then operates the asset,
again with no obligation to transfer ownership
back to the government.

Lease-develop-operate (LDO)
Wrap-around addition (WAA)
Build-operate-transfer (BOT)
Build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) Build-rentown-transfer (BROT) Build-lease-operatetransfer (BLOT) Build-transfer-operate (BTO)

The private sector designs and builds an asset,
operates it, and then transfers it to the
government when the operating contract ends,
or at some other prespecified time. The private
partner may subsequently rent or lease the asset
from the government.

(The IMF, 2004).
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Appendix D:
NVivo word cloud, depicting the most frequently used words, captured

approach time housing

procurement

pppfinance
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Appendix E:
Current PPP Projects and estimated committed costs as of 2019
Operational
From

Project
UCs Primary Care Centre

2017

Operational
From

Project
National Convention Centre

2010

Operational
From

Project
Criminal Courts Complex
Courts Bundle

2009
2018

Final year of
Payment
2042

Year of Final
Payment

2035

Final year of
Payment

2035
2043

Total Committed Payments Including VAT

Total
409,172,000

Total
417,747,887

Total
386,283,112
362,497,389
748,780,500

Operational
From
2002
2004
2007
2010
2011
2013
2016
2018
2020

Project
5 Pilot Schools
National Maritime College
Cork School of Music
Schools Bundle 1
Schools Bundle 2
Schools Bundle 3
Schools Bundle 4
Schools Bundle 5
Grangegorman
Total Committed Payments Including VAT
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Final year of
Payment
2027

Total
104,419,988

2029
60,900,234
2032
2035
2036
2039
2041
2043
2045

118,336,754
161,967,928
237,034,222
325,440,140
183,319,058
242,169,688
564,374,138
1,997,962,151

Operational
From
2005
2005
2006
2009
2010
2010
2009
2010
2005
2006
2017
2019
2019

Project
M4 Kilcock - Kinnegad
M1 Dundalk
M8 Fermoy
N25 Waterford
Limerick Tunnel
M3 Clonee Kells
N6 Galway Ballinasloe
M7/8 Portlaoise
M50 Upgrade
N11 Arklow - Rathnew
N17/18 Gort - Tuam
M11 Gorey - Enniscorthy
N25 New Ross Bypass
Total Committed Payments Including VAT

Final year of
Payment
2033
2034
2024
2036
2038
2052
2035
2022
2042
2040
2042
2044
2044

Total
5,356,097
3,107,858
9,694,345
24,986,651
165,766,205
225,916,897
28,686,597
4,759,580
683,217,876
382,329,570
885,267,259
485,857,518
316,479,010
3,221,425,464
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